University of Alberta

The State and Agriculture:
The Social Dynamics of Agricultural Policy in Ghana (1900-1994)

by

Korbla Peter Puplampu ©

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements
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Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to the loving memory of Papa and Gbli, for their dynamism and foresight, and Mama for her integrity and sense of duty.

Abstract

During the last two decades, many African countries experienced a crisis in agriculture. The economic, political and social consequences of the crisis exposed the fragile nature of agriculture in Africa and established the importance of agriculture in national development. In analyzing the causes of the agricultural crisis, several studies have converged on the role of the state and attributed the problem to failure of the postcolonial state's agricultural policies. However, the postcolonial state is a product of the colonial one. Therefore, any analysis of the postcolonial state's role in the agricultural crisis must begin with the colonial state.

In focusing on the state, previous studies also made an implicit assumption about the state's power to create and manage the conditions required for agricultural development. Neither the state nor agricultural development exists in a vacuum. State power functions within a social context. Like any form of economic activity, agricultural development depends on the availability of several resources and a reward scheme. The state's role in agricultural development, therefore, depends on how agricultural policies impact social groups directly and indirectly involved in the agricultural sector in terms of conditions of access to and the availability of resources and rewards.

This study examines the state's role in agriculture and the implications for food security in Ghana. The study discusses agricultural policy performance by emphasizing the social dynamics that condition access to resources and rewards for social groups. The study also probes into the socio-cultural and political milieu that explain the context for, and outcomes of agricultural policy performance in the nature and structure of the colonial and postcolonial state, and how perceptions of development determine the state's relationship with social groups.

Analyzing agricultural policy from these complex relations, the study arrives at the conclusion that the agricultural crisis is the result of ineffective agricultural policies, emanating from the dynamics and sometimes contradictory relations between the state and social groups. In light of the ineffectiveness of agricultural policy, the study calls for changes in state-society relations. These changes, the study contends, are necessary if the goals and actions of agricultural policy are to enhance the role of agriculture in national development and promote food security.

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It is gratifying to note that in these days of intensified workloads amidst reductions in institutional resources and a growing sense of uncertainty in private life, I found so many people who were willing to and offered me all the assistance I required. However, I am solely responsible for any errors in the presentation of facts and or flaws in interpretation.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

A. The Problem

During the last two decades, many African countries experienced a crisis in agriculture. As the basis of the economy of many African countries, the economic, political and social consequences of the crisis exposed the fragile nature of agriculture in Africa and established the importance of agriculture in national development. The development literature on Africa reveals the respective dimensions of the agricultural crisis.

Africa's economic deterioration, noticeable from the mid-1970s, was worsened by the worldwide recession in the early 1980s. The initial shocks were felt during the first oil price hike in 1973, which also coincided with drought conditions and later the second oil price hike in 1979. The volume and value of major agricultural export crops (coffee, cotton, cocoa, palm oil, and groundnuts) declined due to political instability and the marketing structure for agricultural export crops. By their nature, export crops are subject to price fluctuations in international commodity markets. The state marketing structure also appropriates the revenue from agricultural exports and underpays farmers.

As a result of the 1980-1983 worldwide recession, world commodity prices fell sharply. The fall in prices, coupled with the decline in the volume of agricultural exports, affected the foreign exchange reserves of many African countries. With shortfalls in foreign exchange and producers receiving less than their fair share of export prices, it was difficult to sustain production of export and domestic food crops. Africa was thus the only region in the developing world to experience per capita declines in food production during the last two decades and increased reliance on imported food crops like maize, rice and wheat (Mkandawire,1989; World Bank,1981).[1]

Reliance on external sources for food constitutes an unnecessary drain on national resources. Apart from wheat, maize and rice could be produced locally. Commercial food import capacity has been weak because of the falling volume and value of agricultural exports, and despite the growing volume of imported food, food is often scarce because of high prices, population increases and poverty. Food prices are high especially in urban areas where a disproportionate share of imported food items are consumed. Given the political significance of urban dwellers, governments are under tremendous pressure to import and subsidize food prices for urban dwellers. To do otherwise will lead to serious social and political upheavals (Tapsoba,1990:13).

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[1] The differences in the performance of agriculture between Africa and other developing regions (Asia and Latin America) can be explained in terms of the policy framework brought to bear on agricultural development. The framework was a consequence of the interaction of complex internal and external factors. See Staatz and Eicher (1990) for an extensive discussion on the impact of historical ideas on agricultural development in the Third World.

Income per capita had been on the decline in Africa. In the 1960s, incomes per capita increased at a moderate rate of 1.4 per cent per year, declined to 0.2 per cent per year in the 1970s and the rate of growth between 1980 and 1986, was negative 2.8 per cent (Sandbrook,1993:5). In 1990, the low prospects of economic growth gave Africa "the dubious distinction of being home to 24 of the world's 26 poorest nations" (Ayittey, 1992:8). Africa's annual population growth rates, for the greater part of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, was 3 per cent (World Population Data Sheet,1995). The combined effect of poverty, population increases, food shortage and high food prices in the 1980s led to social and political disturbances. There were "food riots" in Ghana, Liberia, Tunisia, Zambia, the Sudan and Somalia. Disturbances resulted occasionally in changes in government (Chazan and Shaw,1988:6; Lofchie,1986:5; Seddon,1986).

The poor economic performance contributed to political instability and civil strife. Social groups, particularly in the urban areas, believed control of the governmental machinery would improve their economic situation. There was therefore a competition among social groups to gain control of the state. The ensuing struggle by social groups, produced winners and losers and contributed to political instability. For example, Ghana and Nigeria have suffered from political instability through frequent changes in government. Civil strife has been provoked by domestic unrest, sometimes exacerbated by external forces leading to conflict between neighbouring countries. The Sudan, Chad and Uganda, for instance, have been embroiled in prolonged civil wars.

Political instability and civil strife have negatively affected the policy framework for socio-economic development. Wars have destroyed the infrastructure, while concerns with security and political legitimacy by respective national leaders, have resulted in limited financial resources being diverted to purchase weapons (Young,1988:27). Furthermore, political instability and civil strife have undermined the capacity of African states to rescue their ailing economies, and made it difficult for countries to take advantage of any favourable opportunities that may emerge in the world economy (Sandbrook,1985:2).

The social ramifications of the above economic and political conditions point to a precarious existence of the people. Writing with particular reference to Ghana, Sandbrook (1985:3) remarks:

> A labourer had to work for more than a day to buy a beer, and almost two days to buy a loaf of bread. In 1983, a yam sufficient for a family meal cost ... two weeks' wages for a labourer. In addition, households were obliged to waste a great deal of time each day locating supplies, as food and other essential commodities were scarce.

The illustration above epitomises the severity of the agricultural crisis and the extent of human deprivation. Indeed, televised images of famine victims brought the human dimension of the agricultural crisis in Africa to world-wide attention.

Since the agricultural crisis was highlighted during the last two decades, it has created the impression that the crisis originated from conditions during that period. This impression is not only erroneous, but equally misleading because:

> the crisis stems from a seamless web of political, technical and structural constraints which are a product of colonial surplus extraction strategies, misguided development plans and priorities of African states since independence, and faulty advice from many expatriate planning advisers. These complex, deep-rooted constraints can only be understood in historical perspective (Eicher,1982:157).

Eicher's call for a historical perspective for understanding Africa's agricultural crisis is very relevant, more so, in the case of Ghana. In spite of land availability, and an enterprising group of farmers in cocoa and food crops production; Ghana was not spared the African agricultural crisis (Micah,1989; Hansen,1989; Kraus, 1988; Tabatabai,1988; Ray,1987).

Ghana provides an important case study for understanding the African agricultural crisis for two main reasons, one historical and the other contemporary. The historical reason is the specific circumstances of Ghana as a former British colony. The study of colonial agricultural policy will provide the background for an understanding of Ghana's current agricultural problems. The contemporary importance of Ghana is her pacesetting role in the implementation of World Bank and International Monetary Fund sponsored structural adjustment policies.

Before 1957, Ghana was called the Gold Coast. By 1900 the British forged a monocrop export-agricultural economy in the Gold Coast based on cocoa.[2] Spearheaded by a group of aggressive, vigorous and entrepreneurial small-scale farmers, cocoa production was a successful and profitable undertaking (Beckman, 1976; Hill,1963). Cocoa exports provided revenue for the colonial state. However, cocoa production also introduced significant changes in the structure of the rural economy. For example, in reorganizing land, labour, and credit to meet the demands of producing cocoa, the social basis of accessing these resources changed considerably. The export focus underlying agricultural policy, the product of pragmatic and ideological reasons to be discussed later on, introduced the basis for the neglect of local food production. The colonial state encouraged food imports and the financing of such imports, alongside urban and infrastructural development, was by extracting revenue from export agriculture.

During the colonial era, the Gold Coast did not experience any serious land shortage, ecological or social conditions that would disrupt agricultural production and marketing. Cocoa revenue, the basis of the economy, was determined by world market prices. Fluctuations in cocoa prices meant inconsistent patterns in revenue accumulations. In addition, the colonial context of the economy determined how cocoa revenue was used. The monocrop and colonial nature of the economy, the neglect of food production, marked the beginning of policy biases in the agricultural sector in general and food agriculture in particular.

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[2] Although called the Gold Coast, the focus was on agricultural exports because in the initial period of colonial occupation, the infrastructure to support mining of gold was not in place. Agriculture, for which the colonial government did not have to make any heavy financial investment, was therefore the focus of colonial development policy. The name Gold Coast was changed to Ghana with political independence in March 1957. Gold Coast will be used in discussions on the colonial era.

It is notable that at political independence in March 1957, cocoa revenue, capital stocks, import capacity and consumption patterns made Ghana, in comparative terms, occupy "a privileged place among the so-called underdeveloped or developing economies..." (Szereszewski,1966a:41).[3] Postcolonial governments in Ghana have also relied on cocoa to finance urban development, infrastructural projects, and agricultural modernization programs. Under agricultural modernization programs, financial and human resources committed to large-scale mechanization farms went mostly to people with affiliations to governing circles. Many of the farms have turned out to be a complete failure. Agricultural modernization has also derided the contribution of small-scale farmers in the production of food crops but tolerated them in cocoa production for export.

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[3] The bulk of cocoa revenue was stashed in securities in British financial institutions. The governments of Ghana and Britain had to negotiate the conditions for access to these financial resources.

Development (urban and infrastructural development, and agricultural modernization) depended on unstable cocoa prices. The politics of agricultural policies, and the bias towards the export sector, also introduced changes in how social groups in agriculture had access to resources and the economic value of agriculture. From the mid-1960s to early 1980s, Ghana experienced a decline in average income, falling exports, runaway inflation, and unable to meet national food needs (Tabatabai,1988; Bequele,1983). The problem then is to explain how a country which in the 1950s *appeared*[4] to be in a "take-off" position in terms of Rostow's (1965) stages of economic growth found itself in a mess from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s?

Ghana is the first African country to adopt structural adjustment policies (Staatz and Eicher,1990:21-22). Structural adjustment policies, focusing on export agriculture and a minimal role for the state in economic activities, do not pay any attention to the instabilities and uncertainties of the world market. As the longest implementing African country, Ghana's adjustment program has been described by the international financial institutions (the World Bank and the International

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[4] Appearance is emphasized because the structural location of the national economy in the international economy as well as the social context of state policies were significant constraints on policy performance.

Monetary Fund) as an adjustment "success story."[5] The extent of this "success story" has been a source of controversy. Part of the controversy is that the proposed policies, and the framework for policy implementation reveal a "naivety of political analysis [which] ... was startling..." (Mosley et al.,1991:24).

Consequently, adjustment policies cannot answer the question whether export agriculture will lead to improvements in foreign exchange reserves and food imports while neglecting conditions for local food production. By advocating what the international financial institutions believe to be expert and neutral economic policies, the adjustment program presents an ahistorical analysis of how markets function and neglects the power issues associated with world market participation. It is therefore not surprising that despite the adjustment program, cocoa revenue in Ghana continued to fluctuate in line with world market prices (Leechor,1994:167). Thus, the prospects of improvements in cocoa exports is uncertain even under the structural adjustment program.

The seeds of the agricultural crisis in Ghana were sown in the policy on export agriculture, and the social and political forces that defined access to resources and rewards. The policy framework beginning from the colonial era has been sustained by postcolonial governments. If the structural adjustment program also focuses on export agriculture and is silent on the political aspects of implementation, to what extent will the program reverse the agricultural decline and improve the economy?

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[5] While Ghana was the toast of the international financial institutions in the 1980s, the current focus is on Uganda. Uganda is the first country to benefit from the novel initiative to write off the debt for selected heavily indebted poor countries. See the World Bank (1997a) for an outline of the initiative and the Halifax Initiative Coalition (1997) report for a review of the debt initiative.

B. Research Objectives and Conceptual Framework

This study has two aims. The first is to explain agricultural policy performance in terms of the conditions under which agricultural groups have access to resources and rewards. The second is to examine the implications of agricultural policy performance for understanding food security in Ghana. The success of agriculture, like any other form of economic activity, depends on what resources and rewards are available to agricultural groups. Agricultural resources include land, labour, water supply and inputs like pesticides and fertilizers. Other resources include knowledge, technological innovations and diffusion, agricultural credit, infrastructural support (research, communications and market networks) and foreign exchange. Rewards are the incomes made by social groups from agricultural activities. The amount of income enables farmers and traders to secure non-agricultural goods and services.

African states, like many others, are involved in agricultural development because of agriculture's importance to the national economy. State involvement in agriculture also highlights the political context of agricultural policies. As a general term, policy "implies state intervention in the economy, while 'policies' are the specific type of intervention such as, for example, producer price policy, exchange rate policy, credit policy, or research policy" (Ellis,1992:7). If policy is conceptualized only in terms of intervention or actions, the consequences of the absence of policies cannot be accounted for. However, as Galjart (1971:38-39) correctly argues, it is important to take into consideration the absence of policy, because policy absence is itself a policy. Agricultural policies emanate from and are implemented by institutions, some of which are part of the formal state machinery and others are informal or under the sponsorship of private organizations.

Agricultural policies in Ghana are the actions and non-actions that result in intended and unintended consequences in the ability of formal and informal institutions to provide social groups with resources and rewards. An example of a formal institution in agriculture is the Ministry of Food and Agriculture; the major body in charge of the initiation, coordination and implementation of agricultural policies. A special type of formal institutions are those representing foreign governments and multilateral agencies. An example of the former institution is the Ghana office of the Canadian International Development Agency representing the Government of Canada while the latter is exemplified by the Ghana office of the

World Bank, representing the United Nations system. Informal institutions range from typical international non-governmental organizations like the Sasakawa Global 2000; to local "governmental non-governmental organizations"[6] like the United Ghana Farmers Cooperative Council of the 1960s and the December 31st Women's Movement of the 1980s.

Social groups, as used in this study, exist at two main levels. At the first level, social groups include civil servants, policy makers, military personnel, chiefs, and community leaders. The important feature of the first level of social groups is their role as sources of authority and will be referred to as the socially relevant group for agriculture. The second level of social groups is made up of producers, traders or buyers and consumers. Within this group, specifically called social groups in agriculture, there are sub-groups. For example, producers are made up of small-scale and large-scale farmers. The two levels of social groups, it needs to be stressed, do not exist in water-tight compartments.

Civil servants and policy makers who typically work in formal agricultural institutions can also be producers and indeed consumers. Thus relations between and within social groups are fluid. The fluidity in relations, as later discussions will show, determine the nature and implementation of agricultural policies. Underlying the relations between and within the social groups are socio-cultural and political factors. The dynamics of socio-cultural and political processes define how producers and buyers in particular have access to what kind of agricultural resources and rewards. The processes have implications for consumers and ultimately food security.

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[6] These organizations, though they claim to be non-governmental organizations are closely associated with the government and rely heavily on government support for their survival.

The idea of food security rather than food self-sufficiency provides a better framework to address the impact of agricultural policies in Ghana. Food self-sufficiency implies that a country must satisfy its food needs from domestic sources alone. Food security, however, goes beyond domestic capacity to include the ability to secure food from external sources (food import or aid).

According to the Food and Agricultural Organization (1988:22), food security has three specific elements: adequate supply of food, stability in the supply of food, and the access to food. The overriding objective of food security is to guarantee enough food to all at any given time. Reutlinger (1985) stresses ability to get food as an essential element in food security, in contrast to chronic and transitory food insecurity. Chronic food insecurity results from the lack of resources to produce or acquire food. Transitory food insecurity is the temporary decline in the ability to find food because of high prices or lack of income.

Within the context of this study, food security is the availability of food from either domestic or external sources, or from both sources. Food from a domestic source implies there is a local capacity for production, marketing and consumption. The reliance on an external source for food presupposes the availability of foreign exchange which is contingent on the value and quantity of exports. In addition, food security is defined in terms of the extent to which food is available to all groups of people, irrespective of place of residence. The extent to which agricultural policy address food security, is a key component of agricultural policy performance.

Agricultural policy performance has positive or negative implications of policy for food security. Agricultural policy can make a positive contribution to food security in two related ways. First, social groups, specifically producers and buyers have relatively easy access to agricultural resources and receive adequate income from their productive activities. The result of better access to resources and adequate income is that agricultural groups have the motivation to sustain their productive activities. Secondly, social groups are not only secure in their food requirements, but given the income they receive from agriculture, they are also able to secure non-agricultural goods and services. For the general population, the effect of food security is an active and healthy population, able to play a positive role in national development. The negative implications of agricultural policies for food security amount to problems in productive activities, inadequate income and difficulties in securing food and other social and economic services. The effect is seen in social strife, poverty, hunger and an undernourished or malnourished people, unable to contribute to national development.

C. Theoretical Focus and Significance of Study

Africa's agricultural crisis has received considerable scholarly attention. Analysts have generated a large amount of literature, broadly divided into two main categories - the internalists and externalists (Mkandawire,1989; Lofchie, 1986). Briefly stated, for analysts within the internalist framework, the agricultural crisis results from policies carried out by the postcolonial African state, especially in agricultural markets and pricing. Agricultural policies, according to internalists, have worked to distort the market for agricultural produce in an attempt to placate the articulate urban population. In the end, producers are not adequately rewarded, creating disincentives for production.

Externalists, on the other hand, view the agricultural crisis as the inevitable outcome of colonial and neocolonial structures of dependency and underdevelopment. Colonial agricultural policy, under the guise of free market, the externalists argue, promoted the export of agricultural crops for the import of industrial and consumer goods. Agricultural policies of the postcolonial state also continued the colonial strategy of export promotion because neocolonial structures fostered a close relationship between the foreign exchange needs of the local ruling elite and the international economic system.

The two perspectives offer valuable insights into the agricultural crisis, but are also limited in several respects. For instance, by concentrating on the post-colonial state, the internalists failed to account for the historical role of the colonial state, the fact that the colonial state was an activist one and did intervene in agricultural marketing and pricing. Similarly, the externalists sacrificed context specific studies of societies for macro-level analysis. Even though the externalists explain the agricultural crisis from an international perspective, they have also underestimated the strength of the international economic system. Specifically, the reinforcing mutual interests between internal political elites and their external counterparts are not adequately explored.

In spite of differences in analysis, the two perspectives share some common assumptions. Both realize the importance of agriculture and advocate policies that will ensure its role in national development.[7] The state has also been accorded a strategic role in agricultural development. The Keynesian model that dominated development theory and planning during the 1950s and 1960s favoured a strong centralized African state in promoting state-controlled or dirigiste economic development and breaking down the structures of underdevelopment (Galli,1992:5; Hettne,1991:49-50; Sender and Smith,1986; Huntington,1968).

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[7] There is considerable agreement in the literature on the role of agriculture to development in most of the present industrialized and developed societies. Thus, there is the assumption that agriculture can play an effective role in the development efforts of many African countries. See Johnson (1993), Eicher and Staatz (1990), Rostow (1965), Schultz (1964), and Johnston and Mellor (1961).

State involvement in agriculture was justified with historical arguments. The risky nature of agriculture, warranted governments to provide subsidies for public institutions in agricultural research and infrastructural development in view of the free-rider[8] nature of these services. Agricultural development would also be pursued through modernization involving the use of mechanical power, leading to capitalist development for the internalists, and socialist development for the externalists. For both perspectives, the development process would be propelled by "forward-looking" modernizing elites in government bureaucracies, emerging industrialists and progressive large-scale farmers.

However, in the two perspectives, state power was taken as a given, and not related to wider socio-cultural and political processes that constrain the effectiveness of agricultural policy. "Today's world," George (1986:23) reminds us, "has all the physical resources and technical skills necessary to feed the present population of the planet or a much larger one." As indicated earlier, Ghana has abundant resources (land, aggressive cocoa farmers and small-scale food producers) and no major disruptions have occurred in social conditions to affect agricultural production. Financial resources also have been available to help undertake infrastructural development, but have been of no benefit to agricultural marketing.

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[8] Developed by Olson (1965), the free-ride problem explains individual rational behaviour in relationship to the benefits of "public goods" (for example public transportation, agricultural research) which are available to everybody. The theoretical basis of the problem shows the limits of human rationality.

The agricultural crisis in Ghana raises questions about state power, and how agricultural policies influence which groups have access to available resources and rewards. It is important to explore the socio-cultural practices that govern accessibility to resources. In addition, an analysis is also required of the extent to which socio-cultural and political processes diverge or reinforce each other in allocating agricultural resources. These are significant areas of inquiry if Ghana does have enough resources to produce and market crops and yet has experienced the agricultural crisis. Unfortunately, neither internalists nor externalists offer this line of analysis because of conceptual difficulties of the state.

Even though social and political theorists have grappled with the state's role in society since Thomas Hobbes wrote *Leviathan* in the seventeenth century, there is no agreement on the conceptual attributes and activities of the state. Scholars, in accordance with their ideological and methodological dispositions, argue heatedly over the attributes and activities of the state. To a large extent, the work of Karl Marx and his colleague Friedrich Engels, and that of Max Weber have influenced much of the scholarly debate on the state.

Marx and Engels highlighted the state's role in mediating conflict between social groups, generally represented by the owners of capital and labour. Engels, writing after the death of Marx, argued that since "the state arose from the need to keep class antagonisms in check ... the modern representative state is an instrument for exploiting wage labour by capital" (Engels,1884/1986:210). Thus, Marxist-oriented writers conceptualize the state as an institution representing the interests of powerful sections of society.

Max Weber conceptualized the state in terms of its institutional character, its rule making functions and the monopoly over the use of legitimate force in enforcing its orders (Gerth and Mills,1946:78). From a Weberian perspective, the state employs its bureaucratic machinery of specialized and graded hierarchy of officials, rational calculation of means and ends to attain a common good. To Weberian theorists, state power is a neutral force existing outside the social and economic system, which creates a harmonious society by managing competing group demands.

In Africa, theorizing about the state has followed either the Marxist or Weberian perspective with particular emphasis on its nature, organizational capability and relative autonomy.[9] More recently, the African state has been conceptualized in terms of its relationship to the international political economy, and questions have been raised about its relevance to contemporary studies.[10] The debate about the conceptualization of states notwithstanding, bureaucratic state institutions exist in many African countries taking decisions on behalf of their people with varying degrees of success and failure.

The colonial and postcolonial state or government in Ghana has acted on behalf of Ghanaians at different times and in varying degrees. A detailed account of these presentations is not the focus of this study. However, common attributes or characteristics of the state, both in the colonial and postcolonial phase, can be identified. While the transition from colonial to postcolonial era might have given the impression of fundamental changes, a critical analysis reveals one important fact about both phases, the state concentrated on cocoa exports to raise revenue.

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[9] Alavi's (1972) study of the postcolonial state in Pakistan and Bangladesh provided the inspiration for the theoretical discussions of the contemporary African state. That study laid the basis for the analysis of the postcolonial state in Kenya by Leys (1975) and that of Tanzania by Saul (1974).

[10] Hyden (1996) argues that the African state is vanishing and so also will its study be. Migdal (1988:23) notes that "the bipolar configuration of world politics [makes possible states that] have failed miserably in gaining predominance in their societies." Jackson and Rosberg (1982) also attribute the existence of the African state to the willingness of other states in the international system to diplomatically recognize African states.

Recent discussions on the nature of the state have demonstrated that the state hardly functioned as an autonomous vehicle for social change. Social and political pressures have prevented both phases of the state from serving as an effective institution in national development and the transformation of agriculture. To explore these social and political pressures, Skocpol (1985:7) calls for a "fundamental rethinking of the role of states in relation to economies and societies." Unravelling the role of the state in relation to economies and societies amounts to reconceptualizing the state as a complex institution made up of individuals and interest groups with diverse links to the society.

According to Ginsberg (1961:40), society is a collection of individuals united by social relations which mark those associated individuals off from others who do not belong to that set of relations. Society is thus an operating unit. As far as this study is concerned, the state and the two levels of social groups are the main operating units in the society. If rethinking the state's role has to be in relationship to societies, as Skocpol advises, then the nature of state and society relations should be the core of any attempt to explain the performance of state policies.

Indeed, analyses of the state's role in development has shifted remarkably in the last decade. Concerns with the "state's *incapabilities*, its functional decline, instability and inability to bring about intended changes in society" (Azarya,1988:3, italics in original), have replaced the former interest in the state's ability to promote development or social change. It is now acknowledged that although formal institutions of the state may be omnipresent, "they are hardly omnipotent" (Chazan,1988:327). Thus, state policies have to be analysed in relationship with social and political processes (Chazan et al.,1992; Rothchild and Chazan,1988). In this kind of analysis, there is no *a priori* assumption about the power and importance of the state. The influence of the state, its functional institutions and policies are explored in terms of complexities and constraints with society.

The theoretical basis of the proposed framework for analysis follows what Migdal, Kohli and Shue (1994) refer to as the state in society perspective. In this perspective:

> States are parts of society. States may help mold, but they are also continually molded by, the societies within which they are embedded. Once ... the important point that ''states matter" has ... been made ... there is no getting around the mutuality of state-society interactions: Societies affect states as much as, or possibly more than, states affect societies (Migdal, Kohli and Shue,1994:2).

Understanding the agricultural crisis from the state-society perspective means engaging in an analysis not limited to either the state or society. But instead, the spotlight should be on dynamics of their relationship with respect to the socio-cultural and political processes that affect agricultural policy performance.

D. The Argument

The study will argue that the agricultural crisis in Ghana is the result of ineffective performance of policies. Agricultural policies have induced and reinforced differential access to resources and rewards by agricultural groups. A common feature of both the colonial and postcolonial state has been the absence of agricultural social groups in ruling coalitions. During the colonial era, the state was dominated by officials from the imperial country consisting of the colonial governor, top-level bureaucrats, merchants and missionaries (Howard,1978:35). In the postcolonial era, people who mostly identified their interests with urban rather than rural-based agricultural interests occupied the state machinery. A situation developed in which agricultural policies were determined by urban oriented groups, who depended on revenue generated by agricultural groups (Gyimah-Boadi,1985 :48).

The accomplishment of farmers' groups depends on how the government perceives their role in national development. The cocoa industry has been the focus of agricultural policy because cocoa generates foreign exchange and other forms of revenue. This explains why cocoa farmers and the industry at large feature prominently in agricultural policies in Ghana. Although the cocoa industry was extremely successful for the state and farmers, its success engendered changes in how resources were organized. Access to land, for example, was determined by kinship affiliations. Variations of tenure arrangements, sustained through cultural values also existed.

Commercialization of the cocoa industry and other changes in the economy led to increasing pressures on land-use rights and intensified the meaning and relevance of socially constructed access to land. The state's attempt to control the terms of rewards, at times led to struggles between the state and farmers, with each trying to preserve its interest. These struggles on one hand mirror the dynamics of state and society relations over socially constructed notions of authority, systems of production and conditions of access to resources and rewards. On the other hand, the struggles determine the effectiveness of agricultural policy.

Since state power fares within a social context, patterns of political practice have compromised and undermined agricultural policy. The argument being advanced in this study follows the contention that:

> Access to the means of production in rural areas of Africa has been subject to instability and struggle since colonial times. Accordingly,...patterns of production and investment are best understood as outcomes of a conjuncture between long-term patterns of contested access to productive resources... (Berry,1993a:249).

Once struggle and uncertainty are the typical features that determine a group's access to resources, it also implies that group experiences vary one from the other, especially if agricultural policy places a particular group at a disadvantage. The differences in the group's access to resources and rewards do not only affect the agricultural sector, but also the value and conditions of crops produced and ultimately food security.

E. Organization of Study and Source of Data

In arguing that the agricultural crisis in Ghana is the result of policy performance over access to resources and rewards, the study will address the similarities and differences in colonial and postcolonial agricultural policies. To set the stage for the rest of the study, Chapter Two examines the role of the state within the existing theoretical discussions of Africa's agricultural crisis. Although the state's political behaviour has been recognized, there are no discussions about that behaviour in relation to limits on state power. Explaining the agricultural crisis will require an understanding of the complexities of state and society interaction, and a historical analysis of the socio-cultural and political processes brought to bear on agricultural policy.

Chapter Three situates the agricultural crisis within the context of historical and contemporary relations between the state and society. The chapter explores common characteristics of the colonial and postcolonial state and how perceptions of development define the state's relationship with social groups. The chapter discusses the hows and whys of agricultural policies, emphasizing the socio-cultural and political processes which account for the ineffectiveness of agricultural policy.

Chapters Four to Six discuss how the agricultural policy performance contributed to the agricultural crisis. Each chapter isolates the problems of the agricultural sector, examines the policy responses to these problems and draws implications for food security. Chapter Four examines agriculture under the colonial state. Chapters Five and Six focus on the postcolonial state, with the latter exploring the agricultural dimensions of the structural adjustment program. Chapter Seven, the last chapter, offers a summary of the study. The chapter also offers concluding thoughts on how changes in the relations between state and society can enhance the relationship between the state and groups in agriculture if the goals and actions of agricultural policy are to enhance the role of agriculture in national development and promote food security.

Data for the study was drawn from primary and secondary sources. The primary data consisted of unstructured interviews with officials of some selected formal and informal agricultural organizations (See Appendixes 1 and 2 for the list of organizations consulted and some of the issues raised in the unstructured interviews). Secondary information came from historical and current documents and monographs dealing with various aspects of agricultural policies and agrarian change in Ghana. The contemporary aspect of the secondary information also relied on in-house literature (the so-called grey literature) from formal and informal institutions.

The reasons and objectives of the study warranted data collection from more than one source. Combining methods in social research, the process Denzin (1970) calls triangulation, addresses the deficiencies associated with one method. Triangulation was all the more pertinent in this study because of problems of data quality[11] and the framework for the analysis of food security in Ghana.

In general, data on agricultural production must be treated with some caution. To varying degrees, data are incomplete, conflicting and in some cases not available, especially data on the consumptive or nutritional aspects of food security. Analysis of the consumptive aspects of food security will be limited to the few studies conducted in the last decade. It is important to stress that data collection has improved with the structural adjustment program. However, the interpretation of such data is very contentious because of the deep ideological commitments that characterize studies of adjustment policies (Mkandawire,1989:3).

Addressing food security in Ghana is also hindered by the absence of an analytical framework. Analysts of agriculture concentrate on cocoa, with little focus on the domestic dimension of food security in Ghana.[12] The failure to analyse the relationship between conditions for cocoa and food production limits insights on the problems that farmers are faced with in producing cocoa and food crops. The aim of this study is to analyse the available data in light of the stated objectives.

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[11] Tabatabai (1988:713-714) gives the example of two very different series of wholesale prices for crops coming from the same source, the Ministry of Food and Agriculture.

[12] Some exceptions are Micah (1989), Hansen (1989,1987a) and Ray (1987).

F. Conclusion

This chapter has introduced the context to examine agricultural policies and their implications for food security. From an historical perspective, the export focus of colonial agricultural policy initiated changes in agriculture. Farmers responded to opportunities in the world market for export crops by increasing production. In order to sustain production, changes occurred in how farmers organized agricultural resources and expected higher rewards. However, differences in access to resources and rewards engendered reactions from farmers. The impact of these reactions contributed to ineffective agricultural policies.

Contemporary discussions, either due to the lack of conceptual focus, theoretical clarity or ideological reasons attribute the agricultural crisis to policies of the postcolonial state. Agricultural policies are not initiated or implemented in a vacuum and should not be understood only as a product. Rather, the interest should be on the processes that impinge upon policy performance, beginning from policy initiation to its implementation. It is the contention of this study that situating agricultural policies within the historical complexities of state and society relations over conditions of access to resources and rewards can provide a better understanding of the agricultural crisis.

CHAPTER 2

THE STATE AND AGRICULTURE IN AFRICA: A THEORETICAL REVIEW

A. Introduction

The previous chapter introduced the argument on how agricultural policies on the allocation of resources and rewards is the root cause of the agricultural crisis. Agricultural policies, the chapter also argued, have to be analysed within a broader framework of the relationship between the state and society. This chapter examines the theoretical debates on the African state's role in agriculture. The chapter points to the common failure of existing discussions to place their analysis within a broader context. The first part of this chapter examines the debate between the internalists and externalists. The second part presents a general critique and an outline of the alternative framework within which the agricultural crisis can best be situated.

B. The Internalists

The major argument of this group is that the agricultural crisis is the result of policy failure of postcolonial African governments. There are two main strands in this perspective: one discusses the relationship among population growth rate, urbanization, the climate, soil fertility and topography, and the other examines the state's role in agricultural marketing and pricing policies. There is a considerable discussion among the internalists about the importance of population in agricultural development. The views range from Malthusian conceptions of the rate of population growth outstripping agricultural production, to a growing population stimulating agricultural and industrial development.[13] The estimated total population of Africa in 1995 was over 720 million. According to 1995 estimates, 45 percent of the population was below the age of 15, and only 3 per cent was over the age of 65 (World Population Data Sheet,1995). Thus, about 48 per cent of the population are either too young or too old to contribute to agricultural production.

The rate of population growth in relation to agricultural production can be explained in terms of population distribution and its impact on the environment. Increases in rural-urban migration followed the expansion of social amenities and establishment of import substitution industries in urban areas in the immediate post-independence period. Migration is age and sex selective, involving mainly young men who migrate to cities in the hopes of working in factories and generally escaping from the drab life in rural communities. Job opportunities are, however, not guaranteed for most people in the urban areas.

Migration of able-bodied people from rural areas places agricultural labour in the hands of the women. The contribution women can make to agriculture is constrained by socio-cultural and political barriers (Chapter 3). Migration, therefore, resulted in labour shortages (despite the high population growth) in the agricultural sector. The quality and quantity of the remaining agricultural labour, could not make any meaningful contribution to agricultural production (Oluwasanmi,1973:2).

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[13] The latter view is particularly associated with Boserup (1965).

Changes in the agricultural production system and the ecological balance of the region also contributed to problems in production. Shifting cultivation, the predominant and most established system of production, involves the clearing of forest. Planting on this parcel of land continues until decreased yields reveal signs of soil exhaustion. The farmer then moves to clear a new land area while the previous one reverts to forest. This system of cultivation, though environmentally friendly and conserves soil nutrients through the long fallow period, can be sustained only with low population. Competing demands for land, partly due to population changes and urban development, have compelled many farmers to reduce the number of years the land reverts to bush (Brown and Wolf,1985). Frequent land use, sometimes without proper management, affects nutrient levels and crop yield. Moreover, the low fertilizer usage causes some farmers to cultivate marginal lands or to abandon their farmlands altogether (Hinderink and Sterkenburg,1987:101).

The timber trade and firewood usage have led to the loss of forest. In West

Africa, the coastal forest is disappearing at the rate of 5 per cent per year (McNamara,1985:23). By clearing vegetation cover, the land is exposed to wind and rainfall erosion. Rainfall is Africa's important climatic element. The quantity of rainfall is unreliable and its distribution varies from season to season, affecting soil conditions, vegetation and farming systems. In West Africa, for example, the soils are fragile and susceptible to loss of organic matter and other nutrients, caused in part, by unreliable rainfall patterns (Okigbo,1984; Acquaye,1973; Ahn,1969). Population and environmental changes increased the harmful effects of Africa's unreliable rainfall and the overall effect strained virtually every component of society (McNamara,1985:17). An expanding labour force without a commensurate increase in jobs contributes to the rate of unemployment, especially in the cities.

Perhaps, the other variant within the internalists' perspective is the most influential. The variant originates from classical and neo-classical economic debates over comparative advantage and free trade. The theory of comparative advantage, enunciated by Ricardo (1962:132), calls upon each country to produce some commodities in exchange for commodities from other countries. This theory assumes that some commodities are better produced in some areas. Thus, by concentrating on what it produces best, a country would benefit by trading with another country. Comparative advantage functions in an environment where markets are free. The free market idea stems from the work of Smith (1776/1976). Likened to an "invisible hand," a free market allocates resources and offers rewards in the most efficient, and impersonal manner. It is therefore assumed that prices are a reflection of the forces of demand and supply, and should remain free from all forms of intervention.

Based on the above ideas, this variant of the internalists' perspective attributes the agricultural crisis to marketing and pricing policies pursued by African states. Analysts within this framework argue that, since the postcolonial period, African countries have suppressed the economic interests of the agricultural sector in order to finance other sectors of the economy, particularly industrial and urban development. The logic of this situation is as follows:

> Like all nations in the developing world, the nations of Africa seek rapid development. Their people demand larger incomes and higher standards of living. Common sense, the evidence of history, and economic doctrine all communicate a single message: that these objectives can best be secured by shifting from economies based on the production of agricultural commodities to economies based on industry and manufacturing. The states of Africa, ... therefore adopt policies that seek to divert resources from their "traditional" economic sectors (the production of cash crops for export) to their "modern" or "developing" sectors (their nascent industrial and manufacturing establishments) (Bates,1981a:11).

African governments are involved in agricultural markets through state marketing boards and macro-economic policies.

State marketing boards are legitimate instruments of the state charged with the purchase and sale of agricultural produce. Marketing boards are monopsonies, that is, single buyers from many producers and sellers. The boards set the buying price and, indeed, use "their market power to keep the price paid to the farmer below the price set by the world market, [and in so doing] they accumulate funds from the agricultural sector" (Bates,1981a:12). While the policy is to generate funds for national development, subjecting agricultural markets to extensive control also "lowers the returns farmers can expect from production for the market, both in absolute and relative terms" (Bates,1984:252). Farmers as rational actors respond to low prices by withdrawing from the market and decreasing production.

The state also pursues macro-economic policies that undermine the agricultural sector (Lofchie,1986:10-11). Through exchange rate policies that overvalue the national currency, prices of exports are raised. Macro-economic policies lower prices of imported consumer goods including food for urban residents. In addition, the macro-economic policies pursue an import substitution industrialization program which is financed by the agricultural sector. By sapping resources from agriculture into industrial activities that failed because most were designed without serious considerations of local resource endowment, industrialization produced negative consequences for the economy.

State administrative units are another problem. Units involved in agricultural administration lack qualified staff. Bureaucracies are corrupt, inefficient and mismanaged. Officials are political appointees who resort to various forms of rent-seeking behaviour, undermining the effectiveness of the institutions they head and the policies they are supposed to carry out. At the national level state institutions have become entities onto themselves. In Ghana, state institutions do not relate to local institutions nor solicit active participation by rural people; who are most affected by rural and agricultural development programs (Puplampu,1992).

The internalists, consequently, recommend drastic changes in the way the state conducts its activities. Some of these recommendations have been in force since the 1960s. Many African countries have adopted population policies to constrain population growth rates. To reduce the consequences of unreliable rainfall, irrigation schemes have been established while rural development programs have been adopted to stem the tide against rural-urban migration. Ghana and Kenya, which enacted population policies in the 1960s, nevertheless, continue to experience high fertility rates.

In 1984, Ghana's "population growth continues unabated at 3.3 per cent per year" (World Bank,1984:xvi). A 3 per cent per year increase was still recorded in 1995 (World Population Data Sheet,1995). Like the effects of population policy, the impact of irrigation schemes and rural development programs have been small. Giant in scope, the administration, management and implementation of irrigation projects and rural development programs have not been satisfactory (Heyer, Roberts and Williams,1981).

The failure of population policy, irrigation schemes, and rural development programs within the context of the world-wide depression of the early 1980s, and the rise of conservative governments in developed countries placed African countries in a difficult economic situation. Conservative governments urged the international financial institutions (the World Bank and International Monetary Fund) to offer advice to African governments. Under the adjustment program, the World Bank (1981;1989) insisted that state interference in the market distorts price signals. As a result of inadequate reward, farmers have no incentive to increase production. The state is therefore to "free" agricultural market and improve the incentive structure and focus on export agriculture.

Yet, after a decade of adjustment "Africa in the 1990s remains in crisis" (Sahn,1994:1). A study by the World Bank (1994a) selected 29 African countries that have embarked on the structural adjustment program and analysed their economic performance over two periods (1981-86 and 1987-1991). The study revealed that only six out of the 29 countries saw a large improvement, nine countries experienced a small improvement, eleven countries showed deteriorating conditions and three countries could not be categorised for lack of sufficient data.

Overall, the World Bank (1994a:2) concedes that “there is considerable concern that the reforms undertaken to date are fragile and that [the policies] are merely returning Africa to the slow-growth path of the 1960s and 1970s.” Specifically on agriculture, the World Bank argues that countries that embarked on agricultural and pricing reforms reaped significant benefit, even though "[t]he real international prices of Africa's major export crops - cocoa [Ghana's major export crop] and coffee - dropped almost 70 percent between 1980 and 1990... (World Bank,1994a:77).[14]

In Ghana, the supposed adjustment "success story," the benefits of adjustment are yet to be felt among the vast majority of the population. There is an increasing recognition that 5 percent per annum real growth and the 2 percent per annum increase in per capita income attributed to adjustment, do not bring any comfort to "the average poor person in Ghana [who] would not cross over the poverty line for another half century" (World Bank,1993:ix).

The problem of adjustment policies stems partly from its ahistorical propositions. A historical and structural analysis will undermine the argument that agricultural policies of African states are simply "antithetical to the interests of most farmers" (Bates,1981b:147). Important historical forces like colonialism, which conditioned agricultural policies, have external origins. These are some of the issues addressed by the externalists.

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[14] The circumstances under which falling prices will lead to significant benefits is the subject of considerable debate. Indeed, the 1994 World Bank reports have been the subject of critical scholarly reviews. See in particular, Rempel (1996), Hutchful (1995), Sepehri (1994) and Mosley and Weeks (1994).

C. The Externalists

Externalists do not deny the role of internal policies in the agricultural crisis. Drawing on insights from the Latin American structural dependency debate, externalists rather maintain that internal policies result from external forces. The Latin American dependency debate has several variants (Larrain,1989; Palma,1981; Love,1981). Briefly stated, development in Latin America is explained through trading relations between the region and developed industrial markets. Extending this debate to the African scene, the agricultural crisis is traced to colonialism and neocolonialism. These processes, externalists argue, incorporated previously self-contained units of production into a world capitalist system (Amara and Founou-Tchuigoua,1990; Gakou,1987; Osaghae,1985; Wallerstein, 1985; Amin,1973).

The role played by African economies in the world economy can be explained through the division of labour between "central" and "peripheral" economic regions. The centre is autonomous and dynamic, while the periphery is less autonomous and dependent on the centre. Many African countries are in a peripheral position. In their structural role, African economies produce low-priced agricultural commodities in exchange for high-priced industrial goods.

In Eastern and Southern Africa, agriculture was organized in plantations and large-scale settler farms (Arrighi and Saul,1973). In West Africa, colonial policies tolerated small-scale farming to the extent that it produced cash crops for export

(Barker,1984; Heyer, Roberts and Willams,1981; Amin,1973). The emphasis on export crop production under principles of comparative advantage and free market, the externalists contend, was not favourable to the agricultural dominated economies of Africa.

The source of the unfavourable condition was due to the fact that:

> ... in [the] early period of colonial rule ... the larger needs of metropolitan institutions for expanded cash-crop production in Africa coincided with the administrative needs of the colonial officials. Export production was needed to provide a tax base sufficient to cover the costs of administration. And export production provided an ideological reinforcement [for comparative advantage and free market principles] (Wallerstein,1985:46).

Part of the taxes collected were kept in financial institutions in the imperial country. As the colonial state focused on export crop production, agricultural resources were devoted to that sector over domestic food production. To externalists, the current agricultural crisis is therefore, "not so much a result of sheer urban-bias or state ineptitude as it is the consequence of chosen state development strategies, the contours of which, however, had earlier been mapped for postcolonial regímes by colonialism" (Micah,1989:474).

Externalists also point to wide fluctuations in agricultural prices compared with imported industrial goods, fluctuations caused by the demand elasticities of agricultural exports. This unpredictability is worsened by the introduction of synthetic products produced cheaply as substitutes for natural commodities. Locked into an "unequal exchange" (Emmanuel,1972), many African countries have to export ever more raw materials to import a given level of industrial goods:

> As agricultural exporters, African countries do not have the option of stimulating world demand for their products by cutting prices. In sharp contrast to world demand for industrial goods or manufactured consumer products, world consumption of Africa's most important agricultural commodities rises very sluggishly in response to falling prices. This means that African countries as a whole cannot compensate for low price levels by increasing the volume of agricultural goods they market (Lofchie,1986:8).

Commercial trading companies during the colonial era established an oligopolistic structure. Actively aided by the colonial state, commercial trading companies used their power (and not the market) to fix the price of agricultural commodities and imported manufactured goods. In this way, they boosted their surpluses, which were invested in Europe and primary areas (agriculture, forestry and mining) of the colony.

The external orientation of the economy made it difficult to establish any link between agriculture and industry in the colonies. Colonial policies encouraged this practice because local industries were crushed. Lacking local industries, the colonies provided the raw materials and served as a market for industrial goods from Europe (Rodney,1982).

The postcolonial state, in a bid to improve agricultural production, established large-scale mechanized farms. Most of these farms were geared towards the production of export crops, and neglected food production and the role of the small-scale farmers (Hansen,1987a; Mengisteab,1985; Beckman,1981). Large-scale farms imported technology and machinery, some of which turned out to be inappropriate and became a drain on national resources. Based on the above considerations, externalists argued that the African agricultural crisis can best be understood within "a deep inhospitable international environment, one that would have created critical economic difficulties even under the best internal management conditions" (Lofchie,1986:9).

Thus, confronting the crisis will involve fundamental changes in the structure and nature of relations at two levels: the national level of social groups and the state, and the global level of capitalist world economy. Changes in the former are necessary in order to initiate changes in the latter, and the need for these changes is the context for the delinkage and self-reliance that externalists have been advocating (Amin,1990; Founou-Tchuigoua,1990).

The call to delink and be self-reliant led many African countries to adopt measures for a broader participation of citizens in social and political processes. The goal has been to incorporate the bulk of the population, especially those in rural areas, in national development. However, after several years, many governments in Africa, whether they claim to be socialist or capitalist, have failed to attain the goal above (Sandbrook,1986). Reasons for the failure range from leadership problems to institutional inertia. Consequently, there is a divergence of interests between the state institutions and some social groups. In addition, there is a coincidence of interests between powerful internal and external forces to participate in the global economy, although each participates for different reasons. The coincidence of interests, a product of the structure of relations established during the colonial era, has been resilient and continues to influence agricultural policies.

D. Critique

The analysis of the two perspectives provides answers to some aspects of the agricultural crisis. The internalists emphasize, and rightly so, the important role domestic policies can play to promote agricultural development. As an agent of development, the African state should have been able to embark upon policies to resolve problems in agriculture. While the internalists focus on the state, they cannot explain the failure of policies adopted. Although Kenya and Ghana did adopt population policies, population increases occurred in both countries.

A major problem of the internalists approach is that their analysis does not pay any attention to historical factors and power relations. The criticism of the state's role in marketing boards, for instance, needs to be placed within a historical context. Marketing boards were not created by postcolonial African states. Established by the colonial state, marketing boards served as an important institution in the accumulation of revenue needed for the reconstruction effort in Britain and other European countries after the Second World War. Even though some of these funds were later available to postcolonial governments, the role of these institutions in the accumulation of revenue, when comparative advantage and free market principles were supposed to reward and allocate resources, is worth exploring.

In setting up these institutions, the colonial state demonstrated that, power, and not the so-called free market, is critical to ensure the interests of the metropolitan country (Bauer,1963). For Britain and her colonies, the

> commitment to free trade was more apparent than real. What it meant in practice was not free trade between the colonies and the rest of the world as much as free trade between British capital in the colonies and capital in Britain. It was a policy aimed to serve narrow sectional interest dressed up in general terms. Moreover, whenever free trade threatened British interests as happened on occasions when a group of colonial producers [for example in the Gold Coast] were able to compete effectively with British enterprise, allegiance to the holy grail [that is free trade] was either forgotten or carefully avoided (Kay,1975:107).

Cash-strapped postcolonial governments, having observed that state power can be used to control marketing boards to generate funds, continued with the practice originating from the colonial era.[15]

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[15] The postcolonial government was aware that farmers would react to marketing boards as was the case during the colonial era. However, the government was prepared to make appeals for patriotism and promised to use revenue from marketing boards for "national development." Even though some of the promises were carried through, the manner in which the boards were operated undercut their ability to continuously accumulate national revenue for national development, showing that local political elites were simply in haste to use state institutions to entrench themselves after the departure of the colonial administrators (Chapter 3).

The externalists rectify the ahistorical and lack of power analysis in the internalists framework. By pointing to historical circumstances, the externalists show the power dimensions of colonial rule and other external limitations on the African state. However, many African countries attained political independence three or more decades ago. The African agricultural crisis cannot possibly be "explained" solely from an external perspective. The continued focus on external forces can serve only as an excuse for policy failure in Africa.

A further analysis is required on a number of issues: What factors account for some of the continuities between colonial and postcolonial agricultural policies? Where does the postcolonial state stand on the coincidence of interests between internal and external forces? Externalists have not provided satisfactory insights into these questions. One reason for the unsatisfactory analysis stems from how analysts applied the theoretical concepts from the Marxist literature on development which provides roots for the perspective.[16] Analysis of the historical processes between imperialism and capitalist development in the so-called backward countries have been treated in a mechanical and dogmatic fashion. It has therefore been difficult for the externalists to address the contradictions and ambiguities in the dependency literature on the state, social groups and capitalist development in Africa (Nyang'oro,1989; Callaghy,1988; Nyong'o,1987; Lubeck, 1987).

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[16] Brewer (1990) provides a spirited critique of the Marxist literature on development. An attempt to restore the essence of Marxism for development, especially in the Third World, is contained in Warren's (1980) polemic account. A synthesis of the Marxist conception of development and whether development practitioners and scholars have gone "beyond the impasse" (Schuurman, 1993) in development theory are provided by Kiely (1995) and Moore and Schmitz (1995).

In spite of differences in analysis, internalists and externalists agree on the importance of agriculture and the state's role in agricultural and national development. Since independence, the goal of many African countries has been to achieve sustained economic development through agriculture. However, the set of agricultural policies pursued have failed to generate sustained economic development. The contrast between intention and results raises two questions: If agriculture is the basis of the economy of many African countries, why do governments persist with policies that will have a negative effect on agriculture?[17] Why have rural and agricultural development programs failed? The answer to these questions requires some conception of the state and its relationship to the agricultural sector.

According to Bates (1983;1981a), the African state's involvement in agriculture is predicated on political rather than economic reasons. As major employers, African governments are naturally interested in how much the urban worker spends on food because urban protests over the scarcity of food can lead to political instability. The state participates in the food market, for instance, by setting low prices to appease the articulate urban residents comprising industrial workers, the middle class and political elites (Lipton,1975). A political logic therefore informs state behaviour.

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[17] This question is similar to Bates' (1981a:3) classic conundrum in which he wondered why policy makers would "adopt public policies that have harmful consequences for the societies they govern?"

However, the provision of cheap food and other politically-inspired practices constitute an implicit acknowledgement that governments are aware that they have to provide these services if they are to remain in power (Young,1988:59). To undertake these activities would require revenue. As such, governments face challenges not only in terms of how revenue is extracted, but also how to ensure that extraction does not solicit a violent reaction. In other words, there are limits on state power. To understand these limits in the context of agricultural development policies, means exploring the dynamics of state-society relations over conditions of access to the resources that generate the revenue in the first place.

Hyden (1980) offers another line of argument on the state and social groups. Hyden acknowledges the limited impact of state policies on agriculture and attributes it to the cohesiveness of traditional society and farmers being "uncaptured" by the state. Farmers as a social category are "uncaptured" by the state because they are located in an "economy of affection." This economy allows "for redistribution of opportunities and benefits in a manner which is impossible where modern capitalism or socialism prevails and formalized state action dominates the process of redistribution" (Hyden,1980:19).

Hyden therefore recommends in the name of progress (capitalism or socialism), a more effective incorporation of farmers by the state, but ignores the fact that farmers have to struggle for resources to generate the revenue the state desires, and are also interested in good rewards. The assumption that rural societies are harmonious and static entities, is not consistent with the dynamics underlying the relationship between farmers (rural) and the state (urban).

Since the existing explanations have not explored the dynamics of state and society relations, it is not surprising that the agricultural crisis has provoked a condemnation by both the internalists and externalists of the African state. The internalists carry the condemnation a step further than the externalists. Backed by intellectual authority and financial might of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the internalists have stressed the need for a minimal state. In addition, internalists call for unburdening farmers by removing the state from the market and the creation of a competitive environment for the economy (Lawrence,1986). Allegedly, this competitive environment would reward farmers adequately and increase their production of export and domestic food crops. The question, however, is this: how will a minimal state and market reforms per se, resolve the agricultural crisis?

Governments, irrespective of ideological or political orientation, are involved in agricultural development in order to reap the contributions of agriculture to national development. State involvement in pricing policy, for example, aims at stabilizing producer and consumer prices. The ultimate goal is to "keep both producers and consumers happy by fixing relatively high prices for the former so that they can produce more while maintaining lower prices for the latter" (Tapsoba,1990:20). While this may be feasible in theoretical terms, in reality, the policy instruments and objectives are inherently conflicting.

The assumption that farmers will respond to price and market reforms, because prices will increase, does not take into consideration the types of agricultural crops and the empirical context of agricultural markets. There are two major crop categories in the agricultural market, those that depend on world market prices and those that depend on local competition. The first crop category, called tradeables (for example, cocoa, coffee, and tea as export crops) depend on the world market. State marketing boards distribute tradeables. The internalists have accused marketing boards of accumulating revenue by exploiting differences between world market prices and the price paid to producers. Even if state marketing boards lowered the implicit taxes levied on these crops, income from export crops will depend on both the state and on external factors. To advocate removal of the state without addressing world prices will lead nowhere in providing incentives for the production of export crops.

The second category of crops, the so-called non-tradeables (for example cassava, yams are major food crops) depend on local competition. The markets for non-tradeables crops have been relatively free. However, because of structural barriers, farmers have not benefited from the market for non-tradeables. Domestic markets are fragmented, and many farmers consume what they produce, probably to attain self-sufficiency. Self-consumption also suggests "a defensive reaction against the failure of the [fragmented] marketing system to provide a continuous and reliable supply of food at reasonable price" (Ghai and Smith,1987:60).

The fragmentation of markets results from structural constraints besetting agriculture (Green,1986; Eicher,1982). During the colonial era, infrastructure was tailored to meet the needs of the export sector. Roads, railways, ports and communication systems were limited to export centers on the coast and did not serve food-producing areas in the hinterland, hence introducing price distortions into the local food market.

Market conditions therefore vary for tradeables and non-tradeables and the income of farmers is not entirely set by the state. Structural conditions also determine prices in internal and external markets. Thus,

> governments in the region have much less influence over agriculture and food prices than is sometimes imagined. Only when producers have limited options or are producing commodities at very low opportunity costs are governments able to distort producer prices markedly below equilibrium or

> world market prices. This will occur more frequently for export crops than domestic food crops... (Ghai and Smith,1987:67).

As such, there is no consensus as to whether removal of the state will lead to increases in prices and stimulate production of agricultural crops (Ghai and Smith,1987; Lipton,1987).

Despite the problem of price fluctuations for tradeables, the internalists persist in promoting export agriculture. Internalists argue that a measurement of the "domestic resource costs" shows that African countries have a "comparative advantage" in export agricultural crops, and local food production is "inefficient" (World Bank,1981:64-65). The suggestion here is to increase export crops and use the revenue accrued to import food. However, in the last decade, international prices of cocoa and coffee fell by almost 70 per cent. Many African countries had difficulties improving the real income of export crop producers despite massive restructuring of state marketing boards and monetary reforms (World Bank, 1994a:77-79).

The policy recommendation to introduce market reforms, the stress on export crops for increased exports and revenue does not address the reality of world markets for African countries. The former policy does not consider the fact that market performance depends on the nature of agricultural goods (tradeable or non-tradeable) and the latter fails to acknowledge that African countries have exported agricultural crops since the dawn of colonial rule and have suffered the consequences of doing so (Jamal,1993). Given the contractions and uncertainties of the world market, for many African countries, Harrison (1993:346) observes, "the great world marketplace must often seem like a casino where ... [l]ady luck reigns over their foreign exchange earnings." Hence, stressing export crops, market and price reforms is not sufficient to address the agricultural crisis.

The misguided recommendation on market reforms comes from the failure to differentiate between abstract principles of the market and the practical needs of real markets (de Alcantra, 1993; Mackintosh,1990). Mackintosh (1990:46) identifies at least three ways in which the World Bank uses the term 'market'; as a purely historical, abstract idea of "the market"; as the types of markets constructed in economic models; and as a real entity with a great "variety of social classes, power relations, and complex patterns of needs and responses" (Mackintosh,1990:47). In suggesting that state intervention causes market failure, internalists stake a claim for the restoration of real markets. However, the analysis offered by internalists has no discussion of real markets (Bernstein,1990:18). Agricultural producers who are supposed to benefit from a policy of "getting prices right" once markets are restored, may find that even increased prices for their products will be counteracted by higher increases in prices of essential goods and services (Harris and Crow,1992).

Actors in the market, for example producers, traders and consumers, are supposed to operate by the same economic logic. Power and privilege are played down. Producers and distributors are not equally endowed with power. Market supremacy is, therefore, a nebulous idea. To think of "the market" as if it were a single, benign and integrated exchange system is not only naive, but equally misleading (de Alcantra,1993:7). In this regard, it is correct to argue that "there is no such thing as a free market: *all* markets are structured by state action; the only variation is how the terms of their operation are set" (Mackintosh,1990:50, italics in original).

Another important factor in agricultural development is human resource and institutional development. Eicher (1982:157) notes that colonial governments paid little attention to institutional development of agricultural professionals. By the early 1960s, French speaking tropical Africa had only one college for agricultural training. Between 1952 and 1963, only four university graduates in agriculture were available in Francophone Africa. A comparatively higher figure of 150 was available in English-speaking African countries during the same period.

The focus of colonial agricultural research policies worsened the harmful effects of the paucity of agricultural professionals. Agricultural research in many parts of the developing world began when diseases and pests attacked export crops. Research stations that sprung up devoted themselves to technical concerns of export crops. Technical research was premised on the assumption that objective answers would be found to problems of agriculture and embraced by all categories of farmers. Yet, the "miracles" expected from the Green Revolution in wheat and rice production in India and other Asian countries did not run into difficulties because of technology per se.

The Green Revolution was introduced into a social environment of unequal access to agricultural resources like land and labour. Thus, many farmers did not have the financial resources to acquire the technology. The few farmers who controlled land, for example, acquired the technology. The benefits of the Green Revolution, did not extend to many farmers because of the social and political context of the agricultural economy (Griffin,1979; Frankel,1971).

The Green Revolution's lasting legacy was that success of agricultural research depends on the close collaboration between technical and social aspects of research.[18] The lack of integration between technical and social research, the focus on export crops and minimal attention on food crops, unfortunately still prevails in Ghana and many African countries (Puplampu,1996; George,1986:91; Nweke, 1979). Hence the minimal impact of agricultural research systems on agriculture in many African countries.

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[18] Biggs and Farrington (1991) recognize the collaboration in technical and social research in what they call social science analysis of agricultural research. Technical and social aspects of agricultural research they argue, "are continuously and inextricably interwoven. To pull them apart lead to situations where policies and programs designed to achieve one set of objectives result in very different outcomes" (Biggs and Farrington,1991:3).

In summary, for many African countries, "the virtues of ... producing for the world market in order to attain rapid growth and development [have] not been confirmed" (Gakou,1987:40). Although state involvement in the market does distort prices, especially for tradeables, removal of the state is no guarantee for increases in producer prices. There are structural and institutional limitations on the state which affect its ability to set the terms of market operations. Without addressing the context of agricultural policy as to how agricultural groups have access to resources and rewards, a minimal state and a return to the market will be meaningless and ineffective as measures to confront the agricultural crisis.

E. The Social Dynamics of Agricultural Policy

To engage in the social dynamics of policy performance is to analyse the disjunction between stated policy objectives and outcomes. Two lines of policy analysis can be identified. In one approach, policy makers cite "'obstacles to implementation'" (Schaffer,1984:181) as reasons for poor performance, and do not account for their lack of understanding on why policies do not achieve stated objectives.

We are told that the agricultural research system, for example, does not contribute to agricultural development because farmers "refuse" to use new technologies. Problems in setting the research agenda, the power play between institutions involved in research, and the lack of representation of the farmers' viewpoint within the research system are not addressed. However, these are issues to be addressed for research to make any significant contribution to agricultural development. Policy analysis from this approach or what Clay and Schaffer (1984:3) call the "'mainstream'" approach does not raise these questions, and is of limited value in explaining policy performance.

The other analytical framework, realises that policy makers usually do not state their real intended objectives, and what may seem as poor policy performance may be achieving unstated goals. The key issue in this framework is the analysis of the social basis of power. Keen (1994), in a provocative study, offered a thorough and sophisticated analysis of the famine in Sudan between 1985 and 1989. The political regime, Keen (1994) argues, was unable to transcend the long-running sectarian conflicts between the north and south. It used famine in the southwestern corner as state policy to contain these conflicts.

Thus, the famine benefited some groups at the expense of others, an important insight for exploring policy performance. Put differently, "[e]ven as policymakers "fail" to achieve stated goals, it is quite possible that they are achieving other, unstated goals" (Keen,1994:9). The question, therefore, is "not why public policy 'fails.' It does not always necessarily or completely do so....

Public policy is, after all, what it does [and does not do]" (Schaffer,1984:189).

Indeed, Griffin's (1979:176) remarks on how to analyse the failure of the Green Revolution are also helpful in discussing the performance of agricultural policy in Ghana:

> Rather than assume that governments attempt to maximize social or national welfare but fail to do so, it might be more suitable to assume that governments have quite different objectives and generally succeed in achieving them. Rather than criticizing governments for failing to attain, or offering advice on how to attain a non-goal, it would be more instructive if time were devoted to analyzing what governments actually do and why.

The reasons given for policy performance should not be taken at face value. Even the authoritarian colonial state, from which the postcolonial one emerged, experienced poor policy performance because of the context in which policies were initiated and implemented. A major part of the context was the range of group interests, which created problems for the realization of stated policy objectives.

The social context shapes policy outcomes. Explaining the agricultural crisis from the perspective of policy performance, should, therefore, begin with an understanding of the state both in its colonial and postcolonial phase and the social processes that affect policy performance. With conditions of access to resources and rewards as the main issue in this study, the analysis of policy within the context of power and the socio-cultural processes will afford us a better opportunity to understand the agricultural crisis.

An analysis which considers the context for policy performance will enable us to look beyond prices of agricultural produce, and focus on farmers' access to productive resources, patterns of control over output and marketing (Berry,1993b:1057). Perhaps, the need to focus on power, especially to understand the food dimension of the agricultural crisis is the simple fact that there is "no such thing as an apolitical food problem" (Sen,1982:459).

F. Conclusion

The theoretical origins of a policy can enlighten us to the processes involved in setting and attaining policy goals. This chapter discussed the existing theoretical literature on the role of the African state and some of the policy perspectives recommended to resolve the agricultural crisis. For the internalists, the reasons for the crisis can be found in processes of domestic policy-making and implementation. Externalists account for internal processes using external factors. It was, however, clear that both internalists and externalists agree on some basic issues concerning the role of the state in agricultural development.

What has been missing from each perspective is a conceptualization of the state in relationship to society. Exploring the social dynamics of agricultural policy and the focus on history, provide a more fruitful perspective for explaining the agricultural crisis. Such an analysis focuses on power and the socio-cultural processes that are brought to bear on the state. The next chapter discusses some aspects of the socio-political context of agricultural policies in Ghana.

CHAPTER 3

THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN GHANA

A. Introduction

The previous chapter reviewed the prevailing theoretical perspectives on the state and agriculture in Africa and concluded they are inadequate for addressing the agricultural crisis. The chapter also argued that policy performance is at the heart of the agricultural crisis. However, policy performance must be analysed in terms of how the social basis of power has affected the availability of agricultural resources and rewards to social groups in agriculture.

This chapter directs attention to the social context of agricultural policies in both the colonial and postcolonial era. The chapter examines the institutional framework of agricultural development and shows how the structure of power relations between the state and society have contributed to ineffective agricultural policies. Specifically, the chapter identifies the patronage ties built into the nature of, and structure of state institutions, the ideological conceptions of development and the fractured and sometimes contradictory relationship between the state and social groups in agriculture. The first section of the chapter isolates the physical, socio-cultural and political basis of agriculture while the second section analyses agricultural policy in terms of the relationship between state and society.

B. Background

The agricultural sector in Ghana consists of crops, forestry, fisheries and livestock. Crops, the major concern in this study, can be categorised in many ways (Figure 1). In this study, crops are either agricultural raw materials for export or food crops. Agricultural raw materials include oil palm, rubber, coffee, cotton, kola and cocoa. There are also non-traditional agricultural export crops like pineapples, cashew nuts and bananas. Except for rubber and cotton, the remaining agricultural raw materials can be transformed into edible items. These items, however, do not constitute important parts of the Ghanaian diet. The major food crops in Ghana include cereals such as beans, maize, rice, millet and sorghum, as well as roots and tubers such as yam, cocoyam, cassava and plantain.

Climatic factors, socio-cultural and political forces have shaped the agricultural sector. Close to the equator, Ghana experiences fairly high and stable temperatures throughout the year. The average temperature ranges between 26 and 29 degrees celsius with the northern sector receiving the higher end of the range between February and April. Rainfall is the most important climatic element, it influences temperature, soil conditions and vegetative growth. Rainfall decreases northwards from the southwest corner. There are two rainy seasons in the southern part of the country. The main wet season extending from April to July and the minor season occurs between September and October-November. The rainfall for

Figure 1


GHANA AND ITS REGIONS
Staple Food & Tree – Crop Production
BURKINA - FASO
CÔTE D'IVOIRE
TOGO
Volta
Gulf of Guinea
HIGH RAINFALL FOREST
Food Crops : cocoyam, cassava, plantain
Tree Crops : oil palm, rubber, citrus
SEMIDECIDUOUS FOREST
Food Crops : cocoyam, cassava, plantain, maize
Tree Crops : oil palm, cocoa
TRANSITION ZONE
Food Crops : cassava, maize, yam, cowpeas
Tree Crops : cocoa
NORTHERN SAVANNAH
Food Crops : cassava, sorghum, millet, yam, maize, groundnuts
Tree Crops : sheabutter
COASTAL SAVANNAH
Food Crops : rice, vegetables
Tree Crops : coconut
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
REGIONAL BOUNDARY
0
40
80
KM

Cited in Sarris and Shams,1991:25

the south varies on average between 127 cm and 210 cm. The south-eastern corner and the northern parts of the country experience single and light annual rainfall between April to October, with an average between 71 cm and 110 cm respectively.

Crop production varies with farming zones which are identified on the basis of rainfall (See Figure 1). The two major zones are the southern belt consisting of the coastal and forest regions and the northern savannah belt. Cocoa, rubber, coffee and food crops like cassava and plantain are produced in the southern farming zone, while millet and sorghum are produced in the northern farming zone. Yam and maize are produced in both farming zones. The southern part of the country, particularly the Ashanti and Western regions (Figure 2), in addition to agricultural crops also harbours mineral (gold, bauxite and manganese) deposits and forestry products. With agricultural and mining wealth located in the south, development policies and strategies pursued by the state favoured the south to the detriment of the north, which is without raw materials.

Agricultural production systems range from shifting cultivation to bush fallowing, mixed cropping and plantation agriculture. Shifting cultivation is practiced in both the forest and savannah regions for the production of food crops. As the oldest system of farming, shifting cultivation depends on land availability and low population densities. In view of competing demand for land and other forces of change, shifting cultivation has given way to permanent systems like mixed

Figure 2 Ghana - Regional Boundaries


BURKINA FASO
AFRICA
Atlantic Ocean
Bawku
Bolgatanga
UPPER REGION
White Volta River
NORTHERN REGION
Tamale
River Oti
Damongo
COTE D'IVOIRE
TOGO
Black Volta River
BRONG AHAFO
Wenchi
Lake Volta
VOLTA REGION
Sunyani
ASHANTI REGION
Mampong
River Afram
River Tano
Kumasi
Konongo
Ho
EASTERN REGION
Kibi
Koforidua
Obuasi
Akosombo
Dunkwa
River Ankobra
WESTERN REGION
River Pra
GREATER ACCRA
Tema
Accra
CENTRAL REGION
Tarkwa
Saltpond
Cape Coast
Sekondi
Takoradi
0 20 40miles
GULF OF GUINEA

Note: The administrative division shown is that which ruled between 1959 when Ashanti was divided into the Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo Regions, and 1983, when the Upper Region was divided into Western and Eastern Sections.

Cited in Rimmer,1992: Chapter 2

cropping and plantation.

Mixed cropping involves the cultivation of a mixture of export and food crops. Mixed farming maintains a healthy balance of crops, protects the environment and secures the farmer's income and food supplies. In the case of cocoa production, the initial cultivation of food crops protects cocoa seedlings. Plantation agriculture is characterized by its large size, systematic layout, use of hired labour, mechanization and chemical inputs. There has been no consistent history of plantation agriculture in Ghana. Attempts during the colonial era in oil palm production were inconclusive. However, in the last two decades, the postcolonial state revived large-scale plantation agriculture in oil palm, rice and maize production.

Another important feature of Ghana's agriculture is the changing nature of farmers. There are two main categories of farmers: small-scale[19] and large-scale farmers. Small-scale producers using family land and labour and relatively little capital have been at the forefront in crops production (La-Anyane, 1974:393). As the pioneers in cocoa production, small-scale farmers increased their farm size when cocoa production became a profitable undertaking. Cocoa farmers then relied on hired labour and technical advice from extension officers. The bulk of food crops is produced by small-scale farmers (Hansen,1989; Micah,1989). Under the auspices of the postcolonial state, agricultural modernization schemes privileged large-scale producers since the 1960s in the production of export and food crops.

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[19] I am using small-scale farmers and peasant farmers interchangeably. Some of the characteristics of peasants, for example, as independent producers who have control over land and labour, apply to small-scale farmers in Ghana. See Shanin (1990), Williams (1981), and Bernstein (1981; 1979) for conceptualization of peasants and empirical studies by Barker (1989), Arhin (1983), Howard (1980) and Hyden (1980).

Apart from the crops produced, another important distinction between small-scale and large-scale farmers is their relationship to the state. Small-scale farmers, residing mostly in rural areas are "at arm's length from the social sources of [state] power" (Shanin,1990:43). The state, nonetheless, requires small-scale farmers to produce export and food crops, to raise foreign exchange and conserve foreign exchange spent on food imports respectively.

Small-scale farmers also require income from the sale of crops, in order to buy non-agricultural goods and services. Small-scale farmers depend on the state for access to some resources, for example, research and extension services. However, small-scale farmers can also rob the state of revenue if and when they smuggle exports crops for sale in neighbouring countries for higher prices or produce food crops for their own consumption. As a result, the state and small-scale farmers depend on and require each other.

Large-scale farmers, have extensive non-agricultural interests and a better working relationship with the state. Consisting, at times, of serving or retired senior members of the civil service and military, many large-scale farmers have a closer relationship with ruling coalitions. Given their extensive non-agricultural interests, large-scale farmers are mostly absentee farmers, who do not live near their farms. Large-scale farmers depend on various forms of labour arrangements and also use their close relationship with ruling coalitions to acquire agricultural resources which are diverted into non-agricultural activities.

The basis on which small-scale and large-scale farmers relate to each other, and the state-farmer relationship in general is grounded in socio-cultural practices and political considerations. The socio-cultural context of agriculture is structured around group shared norms, behaviour patterns and values. To isolate the salient features of the structure of social interaction requires an insight into the social organization of the various groups inhabiting the country.

In whatever form the social matrix of Ghana is observed and irrespective of language or myth of origin, there are significant and enduring aspects of social interaction. They include the stress on group life, the role of kinship[20] and the importance of chiefs and lineage heads in the maintenance of law and order (Assimeng,1981). Writing about social organization in the Gold Coast, Kimble (1963:125), had this to say: "They lived in a large number of isolated, self-contained societies: isolated by difficulties of transport,... by a relatively self-sufficient economy, and by a tightly-knit sense of community and kinship."

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[20] The essential aspects of kinship are ties of descent and marriage. Descent reckoning in Ghana is largely unilineal, that is; either through the male or the female, giving rise to the patrilineal and matrilineal descent systems. The patrilineal system is practised in the northern farming zone and parts of the south in the Greater Accra Region, Eastern and Volta Regions confers first rights and duties to the paternal kin (Nukunya,1969). In the matrilineal system, the rights and duties are derived through

Contemporary Ghana is the product of a complex array of social forces, economic resources and external contacts in which some new codes of social organization have been incorporated. Despite these new codes, group values have maintained much of their appeal both in rural and urban areas (Pellow and Chazan,1986:5). The argument is that forces of change have had an uneven impact on the life of the people, and historical values have shown resilience in the face of social change.

Thus, the social context of agriculture has been affected by agricultural policies and in turn determined policy performance. Given the importance of agriculture, the question, as Hansen (1989:191) correctly posed it, is not whether to intervene or not, but what kind of intervention will guarantee food security.

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the maternal kin. This is the descent system in the forest farming zone particularly in the Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo, Western and Central Regions (Busia,1958). Marriage in Ghana, is an alliance between "two bodies of kin based on their common interest in the marriage and its continuance, and in the offspring of the union, who will be, ... kin of both the two kin-groups" (Radcliffe-Brown,1965:46). The marriage conception brings into focus a range of obligations towards affinal relatives, to whom also loyalty and social identity can be established.

When the pace of commercial agriculture accelerated during the colonial era, changes occurred in the availability of resources (for example labour, land and credit). The challenge for the state was how to structure the relationship between policy and agricultural groups, especially cocoa farmers, to guarantee the state's revenue requirements.

For the colonial state, the task was more pressing if not a risky one. The colonial project was not a charity enterprise but the pursuit of economic interests without the creation of political chaos. The postcolonial state's major preoccupations also became the use of political initiatives to generate enough revenue in order to implement the promises of development that accompanied the anticolonial struggles. Given that the colonial and postcolonial state obtained their revenue from export crops production, both emphasized the enhancement of "a political order that would facilitate and underpin the spread of export crop production" (Boone,1994:113).

However, the state was also concerned about the impact of politically inspired policies on agricultural groups, and whether cocoa farmers in particular would be in good health to guarantee revenue availability. When governments pursue politically advantageous policies and at the same time are concerned about the impact of those policies on social groups in agriculture, "they are admitting, at least in part, the existence of limits to the state's ability to enforce compliance"

(Gyimah-Boadi,1985:32). The social dynamics of agricultural policy in Ghana can be examined in three main areas: the nature and structure of the state, the state and perceptions of development, and the state's relationship with social groups.

C. The Nature and Structure of the State

One relevant attribute of the colonial and postcolonial state is its "softness." According to Myrdal (1968:896), "soft" states scarcely enforce their policies.[21] The "softness" of the state lies in its inability "to coerce people in order to implement declared policy goals ... [because of] the power structure and a gap between real and professed intentions" (Streeten,1993:1282). Analysts create two contrasting descriptions of the relationship between the state and society.

In the first view, the colonial state is "strong" in bringing colonized people into line for attaining the colonial mandate: the maintenance of law and order and the exploitation of raw materials primarily in the interest of the colonial power and later for the benefit of the colonized people. The postcolonial state is the pervasive institution and reliable ally for development. The second view depicts the colonial state as "weak" and struggling to maintain a delicate balance among social forces

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[21] The concept of "soft" state is useful because it cuts across differentiations on the nature of the state, and takes into consideration the processes that limit the power of the state (Faaland and Parkinson,1991).

(groups socially relevant for agriculture and groups in agriculture) to attain the colonial mandate, while the postcolonial state fails as a developmental institution. Therefore, applying the idea of "softness" to the state raises a problem: How can the same entity reflect both "strong" and "weak" features?

Berman (1984:162), makes the argument that both characterizations of the colonial state (strong and weak) are valid as reflections of a single reality:

> The most striking characteristic of the colonial state was the ambiguous, indeed, contradictory character of its structures and processes. This reflected the contradictory social forces of colonial society, social forces which both determined the development of the colonial state and were in turn shaped and modified by it.

Writing with specific reference to the Gold Coast, Kay (1972:9) notes that the colonial order

> was managed by extreme caution. The political administrators of the colonial state were instinctively aware, if not fully conscious, of the frailty of their position and knew they could never maintain their power in the face of organized opposition among the mass of [the Gold Coast] people .... The attempt, wherever possible, to avoid such opposition by exercising deliberate restraint, runs like a thread through the official actions and statements: colonial administrators were practised exponents of the maxim that those who wish to rule must first learn to govern themselves.

In view of the fragile nature of colonial control, agricultural policies were calculated in political terms. This implies that costly political decisions would not be taken even if there would be potential benefits for agriculture. Every form of social change entails short-term difficulties for long-term gains. By sacrificing long-term benefits for short-term political gains, the colonial state did not confront problems of the colony with the seriousness required.

The handicaps of the bureaucratic structure of the colonial administration reflected the inability to initiate and implement effective policies. The territories to be governed were inhabited by people residing in remote locations. In the absence of reliable means of communication, governance was a potentially expensive undertaking. Colonial administrations operated under the principle of financial autonomy, whereby local administrations had to generate their own financial resources and not rely on financial support from Britain. To further lower the cost of administration, technical departments in agriculture, forestry, public works and transport and communication were run with a handful of British officials. It was, however, expected that this under serviced administrative structure would initiate policies conducive for the production of agricultural commodities and trade.

The colonial state was a political undertaking for economic purposes. In view of the barebone facilities of the administration, how did the state manage to govern? Lonsdale (1981:158) believes that the "politics of collaboration" adopted by the colonial administration implied governance through existing authority structures. Phillips (1989:11) explains the issues involved in the politics of collaboration as follows:

> Colonial rule could be sustained only through a complex of shifting alliances with local rulers .... Colonialism was necessarily makeshift. Its history was one of adjustment to conditions it could not dictate.... It is against this background that the formation of colonial policies must be understood.

The colonial state made makeshift alliances in the Gold Coast and other British West African countries,[22] under the system of indirect rule.

Indirect rule, as enunciated by Lord Lugard in Northern Nigeria, was the system in which the British administration ruled through indigenous political institutions.[23] Lugard envisaged the system as one where British and native rulers worked either separately or in cooperation. According to Lugard, the working relations were never in conflict because each party was cognisant of its power limitations (Lugard,1965:203). However, if there were no overt conflicts, there were covert ones.

Indirect rule operated on two levels, "national"[24] and local. The "national" level involved a Legislative Council, that was initially composed of appointed representatives and in later years by elected representatives. At the local level, indirect rule involved recognizing the chief's authority and bringing that authority under the jurisdiction of local commissioners. Through chiefs, the administration controlled vital sectors (mines, timber concessions) of the rural economy in which the chief previously exercised sole prerogative (Busia,1958). For indirect rule to succeed, British officials allied themselves with influential members of society, including chiefs who had some basis of authority and legitimacy. Through these intermediaries, it is was possible for the weak colonial state to extend control over the population and the political order required for economic activities, even if the order was a delicate one.

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[22] The other British West African countries were Gambia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria.

[23] Comprising courts and treasuries, indirect rule was what Hailey (1951) describes as the native system of British administration in the west African territories.

[24] National is used here in a restricted sense. Institutions of the colonial administration were not aimed at creating a nation in a collective sense, but related differently to various parts of the colony with the aim to divide and rule.

In return for their services, the colonial state rewarded the influential segments of the society in one form or the other. The rewards marked the beginning of clientelism and state patronage as a means of "welding fragmented and fissiparous ruling coalitions into regimes capable of maintaining a hold on state power" (Boone,1994:110). Specifically, "chiefs collected house and head taxes, keeping a cut for themselves.... In effect, chiefs were charged with manipulating personalistic relations of dependency, authority, and even fear to maintain order on the local level under the most oppressive of conditions" (Boone,1994:115). The alliances, in effect, limited the colonial state and its policies, but provided the forum to govern.[25]

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[25] The need for a workable forum was important because policy making was the product of "tension between the demands that were voiced and the fears of the future, and visions of political disruption were a continuing preoccupation" (Phillips,1989:160).

Indirect rule is often cited as a program to prepare "natives" to govern themselves after the departure of their colonial masters. Even so, indirect rule weakened existing political structures by subordinating them to the colonial state, but in such a way that local authorities could maintain control of the subjects. Indirect rule, its processes and uses, was more a tool of social and political control than any genuine effort to train people. It "made a nonsense of the concept of preparation..." (Tordoff,1993:31).

Apart from the paucity of staff and the ambiguities of indirect rule, the calibre of colonial administrators was also of concern. In recruiting for overseas service, Britain's Colonial Office accepted men for "service after an interview rather than an examination," emphasizing qualities of "character" rather than "brains" (Kulick,1979:20). The reasoning was that in the administration of "primitive" people, character and personality were more necessary than training and ability. Many people were drawn into colonial service out of adventure and had no experience or training in administration (Kulick,1979:31).

Then again, lack of qualified staff from the mother country did not mean the hiring of local qualified staff. Assumptions of cultural superiority denied qualified local people from working in colonial administration, especially when they were likely to have Europeans as junior officers. Davidson (1992:46-47) cites the case of Ghanaian medical officer Dr. J.F.C. Easmon and other African doctors who were excluded from the West African Medical Service on the basis of such assumptions. Therefore, even if the colonial state had any desire to train local people under indirect rule, Eurocentric attitudes affected such training. The absence of well-qualified staff in the bureaucracies definitely affected the efficacy of agricultural policies.

Another problem of colonial administrators was in the interpretation of local rules and customs. British authorities assumed social groups in the colony consisted of mutually exclusive socio-cultural units. Officials were under the impression that if colonial rule engendered some changes (which it did), working through existing traditional structures would lead to peaceful changes. The hope for peaceful changes called for information about traditional systems of law and authority (Berry,1993c:29-30).

In the absence of written laws, oral history about customary rights and practices was relied upon. But then, as Berry (1993c:30) argues, multiple and often conflicting accounts were given about rights and practices "because the past was in fact complex and changing, and ... officials' interest in tradition [made people] to offer evidence favourable to their own interests." To equip colonial administrators to be better prepared for these multiple accounts, they were "obliged to take examinations in native custom, although apparently they were not compelled to pass them" (Kulick,1979:51).

The above circumstances confronted the department of agriculture when it began in 1890, following the establishment of the Aburi Botanical Gardens (La-Anyane,1963:19). Since its inception, the department has suffered from centralization and understaffing, making it difficult to address problems facing farmers. These facts were noted by the West African Commission in 1938 and later in 1948 by the Watson Commission (Kay,1972:231-236). Because of the extensive distribution of farmers, the duties of the few officials operating from urban centres did not go far enough. The department was mainly embroiled in unresolved debates with the farming community. Colonial officials "were struggling with conflicting evidence about social processes which they misunderstood, ... [and local forces kept] redefining the rules and institutions on which colonial officials predicated their strategies of governance" (Berry,1993c:34). The lack of competent British administrators, or any system of training, difficulties in generating consensus with the local people over the interpretation of rights and practices intensified the relationship between the colonial state and collaborators.

British officials in the field relied on collaborators to the extent that their participation would suit the purposes and needs of colonial policies. Hence, the collaborators occupied a strategic spot in the colonial administration and used their position to influence conditions of access to resources in the community and from the state. Not surprising, the collaborators, in turn, pursued their own interests through the colonial system. In the process, they became "the focus of intense political struggles. Increasingly seen by the populace as creatures of the state..." (Berman,1984:189).

The relationship between the structure of the colonial state and society had two major implications for agricultural policy. First, policy-makers did not have a complete understanding of the socio-cultural and political context required for agricultural development. Secondly, it was difficult for the state machinery to enact, let alone implement effective policies to address agricultural problems without the fear of a negative reaction from farmers.

It was difficult for the colonial state to maintain a grip on the social and political imperatives required to attain the colonial mandate. "The fragility of colonial control" Phillips (1989:158) argues, "was such that proposals were abandoned on the faintest suspicion of [political] disaster." Aloofness and the lack of cohesion with the people affected by agricultural policies were important features of the nature and structure of the state, when the decolonization process began in the 1940s.

The decolonization process was precipitated by political, economic and social changes that occurred during and after the second world war. From the political perspective, the rise of nationalist movements like the United Gold Coast Convention under the leadership of J.B. Danquah and Kwame Nkrumah's

Convention Peoples Party created a broad anti-colonial movement.[26] The second world war also dealt a severe blow to the economic institutions of the colonial power - external market for agricultural exports and transport links. In the Gold Coast, social problems like rising unemployment, food shortages and difficulties in settlement schemes for ex-servicemen account for the 1948 riots, which is discussed in the next chapter.

Activities of nationalist movements and the politicization of almost every segment of the population tied social and economic problems into political demands. The colonial government, yielded to demands for change and began negotiating with local forces over the terms of power transfer (Austin,1964). Dramatic as these changes seemed, they also brought into sharp focus the inherent instability that characterized colonial rule all along (Phillips,1989:11). The important aspects of the conditions for the transfer of power was the promulgation of the 1946 Burns

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[26] The United Gold Coast Convention, formed in 1947 comprised mainly lawyers and concentrated its activities in urban areas along the coast. Formed in 1949, the Convention Peoples Party drew its membership from a broad range of social categories: teachers, storekeepers, petty traders and junior civil servants. In forming the Convention Peoples Party, Nkrumah who was invited to serve as secretary of the United Gold Coast Convention, broke new grounds in political organization by bringing together a broader coalition in the nationalist struggle. These movements cannot be treated as isolated attempts against colonial rule. In Asia, the earlier onset of anti-colonial struggles shook the foundations of colonial rule and by 1946, India, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) and Burma were almost politically independent.

Constitution and the 1951 elections that was won by Kwame Nkrumah and his Convention People's Party.

Although, the decolonization process had the potential to deconstruct the colonial administration, administrators still believed that institutions of the colonial state could play a role towards the development of a modern nation-state. Hence the system of indirect rule was reformed. In 1944, the Native Administration Ordinance regularized the appointment of chiefs and established a Treasury Department to monitor revenue collection (Crook,1986:84). The 1946 Burns Constitution and the Legislative Council to guide the reformed systems of indirect rule had limited powers. For example, the jurisdiction of the constitution extended only to the coastal and Ashanti regions. The Northern Territory was a Protectorate of the British Empire (Apter,1972:142). But more importantly, strengthening the chieftaincy institution within the context of secular institutions had contradictory aspects:

> The chief's powers [were] limited and defined by ordinances; both he and his subjects [were] under the control of the Government, which the people associate with limitless power, endless wealth, and a high prestige. By comparison [with the District Commissioner], the chief [had] limited powers, scanty wealth, and a lowered prestige, daily in evidence in his relationship with the District Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or the Governor (Busia,1958:117).

In the face of decolonization, the emerging governing structure also had to be reconciled with the role given the chiefs under colonial administration.

After working so closely with the chiefs, the colonial state had to negotiate the future role of the chief with the incoming nationalist politicians. This negotiation was necessary, because apart from few cases when chiefs and nationalist forces cooperated,[27] the colonial state recognised the former over the latter and by that effectively sowed a wedge between the two. Nkrumah and his Convention People's Party in the transitory stages to self-government in 1951, scrapped the native authorities in favour of elected government councils, and took steps to Africanise the civil service.

Through the Africanisation policy, 50 per cent of Africans occupied the civil service in Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone (Chazan et al.,1992:43). The program was not accompanied by any systematic training or careful transfer of power, reflecting the colonial practice of excluding local indigenes from administrative positions. Therefore, the postcolonial bureaucracy operated in an atmosphere where the "functional notion of government ... did not distinguish between decisionmaking and implementation roles" (Chazan et al.,1992:42). Without any structural changes, postcolonial administrative structures "and the concepts that guided their creation and operations, reflected the concerns of their colonial designers. These institutions, together with their underlying assumptions, were handed over virtually intact and constituted the organizational legacy of African states at independence" (Chazan et al.,1992:45). In an apparent haste to respond to the demands of self-government, institutions under the postcolonial state overcentralized and "overdeveloped" (Alavi,1972) their functions.

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[27] One striking occasion when the chiefs and nationalist leaders came together was in connection with the Land Bill of 1894. Details are provided in Chapter 4 under the section on Agricultural Labour and Land Tenure.

The centralized bureaucratic system of colonial administration proved to be inadequate to the many tasks of development facing the newly independent country, because of the lack of qualified personnel. Thus, the same bureaucrats initiated and implemented state policies, and "because of the incompetence of existing administrative agencies, political leadership respond[ed] by administrative shortcuts, and by setting up new and hopefully more responsive administrative units" (Berg,1971:210).

There was duplication, lack of accountability and by 1965, the state bureaucratic system in Ghana looked like an

> administrative jungle. There were thirty-one ministries. Statutory corporations were scattered all over the place. It [was] not certain that at any one time anyone knew just how many there were.... Agriculture was the best example; between the old ministry, the State Farms Corporation, the United Ghana Farmers Council, the Agricultural Wing of the Workers' Brigade, and twenty-five other agencies, lines of authorities were hopelessly tangled, coordination nonexistent, and personal access to political figures more important in decisions than technical or economic issues (Berg,1971:211).

The case of agricultural staffing offers a striking illustration. Between 1960 and 1965, there were about 100 agricultural graduates. Only 67 out of the total of 287 approved professional posts in agricultural institutions were filled, and the situation at the subprofessional level was no better; 900 of 1500 subprofessional posts were unoccupied (Berg,1971:212). The result was a huge gap between the availability of agricultural positions and qualified people. In 1990 a government report showed that staffing levels were still not satisfactory. The report indicated that the policy analysis wing of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture had about 30 technical and professional staff instead of 128, or 23 per cent of approved positions (Ghana,1990:70).

In some cases, expanding state institutions became dumping grounds for political appointees and targets of political interference. State officials used the proliferation of state enterprises to shore up clientelist and patronage relations, thereby expanding their power base. For example, in the last four years of Nkrumah's government (overthrown in 1966), employment was offered to people of "less stature and ability, and greater aptitude for sycophancy,..." (Rimmer,1992:71). Government employment, as Azarya (1988) notes, is highly valued because it increases one's social status. Increases in social status also implied increases in obligations to kinsfolk and the ability to dole out social and political largesse. Lacking clearly defined roles, and unable to separate responsibilities of working in state institutions from social expectations, the bureaucratic structure was characterised by red-tapeism, maladministration, nepotism and administrative corruption (Crook,1983; Price,1975; Le-Vine,1975).

Since the mid-1980s, the structural adjustment program has sought to prune the excessive and overgrown bureaucratic structure of state institutions. The major adjustment policies implemented to change the structure of state institutions have been diversification and privatization. However, more than a decade of policy reforms in Ghana have made little progress in reforming public institutions because of "political considerations" beyond "the public sector" (Leechor,1994:167). Privatization of state agricultural institutions has progressed slowly because the efficient performance of state institutions would compromise the state's unrestricted access to revenue. This restriction would make it difficult for the state to dispense patronage or purchase political loyalty, important processes state officials have to undertake to remain in power.

In view of the above processes, the implications of a "soft" state made for inadequate agricultural policies. Scarcity of qualified personnel impinged upon the quality of agricultural policies. As a result, agricultural problems remained as policies failed to improve conditions in the agricultural sector.

D. The State and Development

Development is a contested concept. As such, despite the many treatises written about it, social scientists do not agree on its dimensions. Significantly, however, Larrain (1989:1-2) maintains that development must be placed in a historical perspective with a focus on specific social conflicts over resource allocations. Underlying the social conflicts are issues of ideology, and the interplay between institutional structure and social action.

The British Colonial Office viewed the colonies they seized as their prized possession. As such, the colony's resources were used within the framework initiated by the colonial authorities. Colonial authorities presented colonial development as an obligation by metropolitan powers (Lugard,1965). The obligation relied on two principles, one economic and the other moral.

From the economic perspective, development was to be attained through trade in the export of agricultural raw materials. By incorporating local producers into a world economy, colonies imported industrial goods and food items from metropolitan countries. A vital component of the economic policy required the state to establish the infrastructure (railways, road and harbours) for British trading companies to participate in and profit from the export and import trade.

The moral or civilizing aspect of development became a critical part of the colonial development policy when the decolonization process began in the 1940s. As part of this process, both colonial and nationalist forces became interested in using revenue generated through trade to establish public health projects, water supply systems, housing, and schools. The sudden coincidence of interests was not accidental. Departing colonial officials and the incoming national government wanted to use their participation in the development process to control the terms of political independence (Young,1988:55-56).[28]

In view of the dual mandate underlying colonial development, "colonial states pressed African cultivators to allocate an increasing share of their productive resources to growing crops destined for Europe. Colonial states often relied on force ... to subject cultivators to the demands and pressures of colonial markets" (Boone,1994:112). The aim was to exploit and secure raw materials in agriculture, mining and timber for emerging industries in Western Europe. In the Gold Coast, development

> started to evolve when the natural resources of the forest belt began to be exploited and exported by [local] and foreign enterprise[s]. Capital started to accumulate around the cocoa, mining and timber industries, and strong migratory movements of labour, both internal and external, followed. Urbanization, the development of new services and the provision of social and economic infrastructure were largely restricted to the areas of favourable natural resources and the coastal centres which were the seats of administration and points of contact with the outer world (Szereszewski,1966b:104).

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[28] Colonial authorities "tried with considerable success to exclude radical social forces from the political playing field" (Boone,1994:120). The colonial state, therefore, negotiated with worthy successors to ensure continuity in development policy in protecting British long-term interests. Nationalist forces, who all along saw themselves as rulers-in-waiting, participated in the negotiations with the colonial state in order to hasten the decolonization process. In addition, the nationalists used the processes being initiated in the name of "development" to legitimize their ability to govern.

By targeting resource regions, development was selective and set into motion variations between rural and urban areas.

The two world wars (1914-1918 and 1939-1945) provided the watershed for development in the Gold Coast. Phenomenal increases occurred in trade before the First World War. Between 1882-1884 and 1910-1912, the average annual growth in exports from the Gold Coast increased by 29.4 per cent and imports by 25.7 per cent (Havinden and Meredith,1993:93 Table 5.1). The benefits of trade were one-sided and unbalanced, skewed in favour of the trading companies and a minority of the population, and not invested in socially fruitful ways (Havinden and Meredith,1993:99). A summary of the development situation in Ghana between 1898 and 1919 reveals the colonial state's practice:

> Expenditure on railways accounted for 24 per cent of total government expenditure and 88 per cent on economic services during this period. Health and education accounted for 9.7 and 2.4 per cent respectively of total government expenditure. A rough estimate of the development of these services by 1920 is that the health service provided hospitals for about 0.02 per cent of the population, while one child in more than 200 had the opportunity of attending school (Kay,1972:41).

The economy of the colonial state depended on the imperial country. However, for the colony to continue as a source of raw materials and a market for industrial goods, some conditions were necessary. Production systems needed to perform at a maximum level, and agricultural produce also had to fetch high prices in overseas markets. Events during and after the two world wars did not sustain these conditions. The war disrupted the external market for agricultural exports, upset transport links and reduced market prices and revenue.

When Governor Guggisberg's Ten-Year Development Plan of 1919-1929 (the Gold Coast's first major development plan) was faced with scarcity of funds, it also brought the politics of development policy to the fore (Chapter 4). Guggisberg's plan to extend railways to the northern sector of the country to boost the production and marketing of groundnuts and shea butter was abandoned because of shortfalls in cocoa sales (Kimble,1963:56). In contrast, the plan for the construction of an expanded railway structure and harbour in the south was implemented.

Farming in the north was undertaken by local people while British mining companies controlled the mines in the south. Although improvements in production in the north with the extension of a railway line were desirable, that would also affect labour requirements for mines in the south. The colonial state, by constructing the railway and the harbour in the south fulfilled the mandate to establish the infrastructure conducive for British companies. Thus, parts of the development plan were implemented to the benefit of specific a group according to the nature of the group's relationship with the state. The expectations of officials in concentrating on railway construction and the harbour were not met and the next chapter shows why this was the case.

The depression of the 1930s and the Second World War intensified an inherent conflict in colonial development policies between relative benefits received by the colony and the imperial power. During the depression, prices of imported goods were high and those of agricultural exports fell. Merchant firms merged their operations in an attempt to lower cost and remain profitable. Agricultural producers responded by boycotting trade with the merchant firms in the 1930s. Producers argued that the dual role of merchant companies as exporters and importers was a main reason for price differences (Chapter 4). Thoroughly alarmed, the state set up the Nowell Commission to investigate the impasse between the firms and farmers, and accepted the Commission's recommendation to take over the marketing of major export crops with the establishment of the Gold Coast Cocoa Marketing Board.

The idea behind the marketing boards was to stabilize agricultural prices, the income of farmers and give some dignity to farming. The Gold Coast Cocoa Marketing Board, however, turned out to be a money making institution for the colonial state. Revenue accumulated by the state increased from 14 million British pounds during the second world war (1939-1945) to 76 million British pounds in 1950/51 (Beckman,1976:42). Through a complex network of administrative controls, the bulk of the revenue was held in securities in Britain and not readily or easily available to the colony. The method of surplus extraction enabled the colonies "to finance their own conquest" (Young,1988:45). It is significant to note that, state intervention in the cocoa industry was at the level of marketing because of the difficulties of transforming production (Chapter 4).

In the post Second World War period, industrialization was associated with the reconstruction effort in Western Europe. The colonies, administrators argued, would definitely gain by using technology to change agricultural production (La-Anyane,1963:155). The Colonial Development Corporation, established in 1947 under the 1940 Colonial Development Welfare Act, was to spotlight schemes for primary produce production, in partnership with colonial or other Commonwealth governments (Havinden and Meredith,1993:229). The development corporation was a major shift in colonial thinking to the extent that it provided the machinery "for the promotion of industrial capitalism within the colonies" (Phillips,1989:151).

Despite the growing emphasis on technology and industrialization, the Watson Commission, which investigated the causes of the urban riots in 1948 noted few policy initiatives in that direction. The Commission therefore noted with surprise that "[a]t every turn, we were pressed with the cry of industrialization" (Kay,1972:77). In any case, the Commission dismissed the notion of any major industrialization program in the Gold Coast because of "an enervating climate" and, rather, warned of the implications of "unbridled private enterprise" for "future social strife" (Kay,1972:78). The nationalist movement perceived these recommendations as evidence of the colonial state's lack of interest in industrial development in the Gold Coast.

As will be shown in Chapter 5, Nkrumah and the Convention Peoples Party embarked on an ambitious agricultural modernization (through mechanization) and an industrialization plan. The commitment to technological changes led to the invitation to Arthur Lewis[29] in 1952 to write a special report on industrialization, making it a key component of development (Lewis,1953). As Killick (1978) argues, this perception of development was consistent with the prevailing theories of modernization that equated development with industrialization. This strategy led to the postcolonial state's involvement in the establishment of import-substitution industries and a host of public sector organizations in finance, transportation, and utility companies.

The postcolonial state played a dominant role in development because of two historical factors. First, the colonial state established the interventionist tradition since the 1940s and the postcolonial state simply followed that practice. The second factor, a by-product of colonial rule, was the absence of indigenous private investors. During the colonial era, administrators privileged expatriate firms over local ones in policy formulation. Participation by indigenous entrepreneurs was limited in the formal institutions of state (legislature) and informal ones (social clubs). Howard (1978:147-156) argues that, the colonial state translated decisions made at social gatherings into government policy. With limited participation by local entrepreneurs in formal and informal institutions, they had few opportunities to influence policy. The effect was the absence of a strong and viable group of local entrepreneurs.

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[29] Lewis, who by then was already a professor in economics at Manchester University, later became an eminent theorist in the field of development economics.

Postcolonial governments, beginning with Nkrumah, also stifled the emergence of a business class for fear of a business elite competing with the state. Accordingly, the postcolonial state "assumed not only the tasks of all modern states: protector of public order and property rights, provider of social and physical infrastructure, and macro-economic manager.... It also appropriated the roles of economic regulator, planner, and, to varying degrees, entrepreneur" (Sandbrook,1993:22) The expanded role of the state in development called for institutional capacity and resources. An important resource was revenue. Since the colonial era, the export value of cocoa was determined by world market prices, the challenge of synthetic substitutes, the attitude of buyers' cartels and tariff barriers in the supposed free world market. Between 1986 and 1990, the world market price fell by 54 per cent, making it difficult for Ghana to raise the expected revenue, even though cocoa exports increased by one-third (Sandbrook,1993:10).

In sum, the terms of trade have been uncertain for cocoa and subsequently state revenue. In spite of these difficulties, the structural adjustment program stresses the need for agricultural exports. Apart from the external difficulties of generating state revenue, the internal uses of cocoa revenue have equally undermined the contribution agriculture can make to state revenue, exposing further the relationship between the state and social groups.

E. The State and Social Groups

Ever since commercial agriculture began with cocoa, agricultural policies have had a differential impact and response from social groups within and beyond the agricultural sector (producers, buyers and consumers). Historically, small-scale farmers were the dominant producers of cocoa. Chiefs were a group with interests in agriculture and direct and close political, economic and social ties in the colonial administration. The colonial administration expected chiefs to use their authority in organizing the labour required for public works, mediating land claims and maintaining political order in their localities (Phillips,1989:157).

Marketing agents ranged from small local buyers and brokers to large British-based merchant firms. Although most of the foreign merchant firms participated in marketing, some diversified their operations into production, but obtained disappointing results. Unilever's oil palm plantations and those of the

United African Company folded by the end of the 1930s (Chapter 4).

Just as the colonial state governed through the existing structure of authority, the policy on agricultural production was also "to *modify*, rather than sweep aside, ... precolonial systems of agricultural production" (Boone,1994:112, italics in original). When the colonial state realized the importance of cocoa, it responded to its marketing and left production in the hands of small-scale farmers but sought a a certain degree of control over agricultural resources like land and labour. The ambiguities of indirect rule made it difficult for the colonial state to exert any control over production, hence the focus on marketing.

Any transformation of the system of production without the active participation of farmers would entail the potential for social disruption, an event the colonial state could ill afford. Thus the colonial state preserved the existing system of production in which farmers controlled their land and labour. It also needs to be stressed that the existing system of production was hardly equal. By building on existing conditions of land and labour organization, successes in the cocoa industry reinforced existing inequality in the rural economy, eventually creating challenges for the colonial state and exposing the contradictions of colonial agricultural policy.

The commercialization of agriculture provided income to many farmers who spent their money on imported goods. Favourable export conditions also enabled foreign merchants firms to participate in the export and import business. The colonial state also benefited from commercial agriculture through taxes from export agriculture, imported food and other consumer products. The problem, however, was how farmers responded to the uncertainties of the cocoa trade. Rich cocoa farmers, who Hill describes as "rural capitalists," were concerned with the pursuit of economic ends and focused on "*saving or accumulation*" (Hill,1963:3, italics in original). Rich farmers therefore took steps to secure their interests. They diversified their assets, invested in other commercial activities like providing agricultural credit to other farmers, sought education for their children and were also in the forefront at organised attempts to resist low cocoa prices during the 1920s and 1930s.

Wealthy and successful cocoa farmers posed problems for the colonial state by competing with British companies for resources such as labour, land and marketing arrangements. Access to land and labour were governed by socio-cultural norms. Rich farmers who lived within the communities and had considerable political leverage in the rural economy and within the colonial administration, used their status and power to enhance their access to resources and in the process enriched themselves. The colonial state had to negotiate for access to resources from rich cocoa farmers, some of them chiefs, under socio-cultural practices that were vague to the colonial authorities. It was therefore difficult for the colonial state to initiate, let alone implement policies especially for the expatriate farming interests. Although in some cases, expatriate companies negotiated with local power brokers over access to resources, the colonial state did not encourage that practice, because the failure of such negotiations would affect social order (Chapter 4).

The colonial state, in dealing with cocoa farmers, found itself in an economic and political dilemma:

> At one moment it was dependent upon the cocoa trade to generate revenue it needed, not only to fulfil its civilizing mission but more importantly to finance the apparatus of state and the social and economic infrastructure which British capital needed to do business in the colony. At the same time the very success of the cocoa industry undermined the opportunities it created, and the frailty of the colonial state ... made it impossible for the colonial government to impose any effective form of control over cocoa producers (Kay,1972:12).

To be sure, the colonial state expected cocoa farmers to be successful, but not to the extent that they would block opportunities for foreign companies or create political and economic problems with their wealth.

To ensure that the wealth of cocoa farmers remained within acceptable limits, the state distributed agricultural elements (better plant varieties, fertilizers, tools) required to increase the export crop, at subsidized rates. Producer prices were often set by the government with merchant firms, who, through their oligopolistic structure, did not offer any competitive choices to producers. Low prices reduced the capacity and the willingness of many farmers to undertake the risky or costly investments in export crop production (Boone,1994:115-116). Farmers reacted by boycotting trade (the 1930s trade boycott identified in the previous section), following low prices and what they perceived as unjust trading practices by merchant firms in collusion with the state.

Chiefs, the only group with a significant power base in politics and agriculture, protected their own interests. However, most chiefs lost some political leverage in the decolonization process and the emergence of nationalist groups. The nationalist movement comprised two distinct groups. One group consisted entirely of lawyers and merchant traders and resented the colonial state's dealing with the chiefs. The second wave of nationalists (after the Second World War) had elitist personalities as well. However, this group drew from the rank and file of middle-and-lower classes and had a tense relations with chiefs (Apter,1972; Austin,1964).

The second wave of nationalists perceived chiefs as reactionary elements, although that charge had to be placed in a context. Some chiefs were obviously powerful and anticipated a political role in the postcolonial era. To charge the chiefs as reactionary was therefore an attempt by the second wave of nationalists to consolidate their power by throwing the chieftaincy institution into disrepute and minimising the political significance of chiefs. Working closely with teachers, clerks and petty traders, the second wave of nationalists presented a united and pragmatic approach in mobilizing support to fight colonial rule. Nationalist leaders who saw themselves as rulers-in-waiting of the postcolonial state identified more with the evolving urban environment (Genoud,1969:49).

The political structure at independence comprised various coalitions (professional and middle to low level groups in the urban area and farmers in the countryside), fragile in their relations with the state (Ford and Holmquist,1988). Groups that had a significant power base during the colonial era "had a stake in reproducing power *already achieved*. They [political elites, teachers, clerks and petty traders] correctly perceived access to the postcolonial state as a means of doing so" (Boone,1994:121, italics in original). One group not effectively represented in this coalition was farmers. However, urban based groups had roots in the farming communities and did not hesitate to rely on such contacts to control the countryside or establish a political presence. The politics of the nationalist era intensified the need for state control of rural cocoa producers for purposes of revenue accumulation and consolidation of power in urban areas. Hence, the state's attempt and willingness to organize cocoa farmers (Beckman,1976).

It is important to note that in organizing farmers, the state exploited group differences to implement certain measures. For example, in 1954, the Nkrumah government wanted to pass the Cocoa Ordinance Act. Under this Act, government limited the rate of payment to cocoa farmers, irrespective of world market prices. The government argued that the need for state control of cocoa revenue was that such revenue should be used to improve the lives of all Ghanaians and not farmers alone. Since cocoa prices were favourable in the 1950s, farmers in the Ashanti Region resisted the measure, arguing that the Nkrumah government would use the excess profit for political patronage. Nkrumah's Convention Peoples Party exploited differences in the Ashanti Region between Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo farmers, promising Brong-Ahafo legislators their own region. With that support the measure was passed and the state fulfilled its promise and carved the Brong-Ahafo Region out of the Ashanti Region (Chapter 5).

The Nkrumah government, under agricultural modernization established multiple state agricultural institutions and integrated them with the Convention Peoples Party. State agricultural institutions also established large-scale farms in areas that supported the Convention People's Party. After the overthrow of Nkrumah, subsequent governments dismantled Nkrumah's agricultural institutions but added their own. Subsidies for large-scale, mechanized farming were available to those with close allies in government. In northern Ghana, during the 1970s, the military government guaranteed agricultural credit and machinery to serving or retired senior military and civil service officers with close ties to the government (Shepherd,1981).

Governments therefore spent enormous resources to consolidate their control and in some cases, soliciting destructive group behaviour. State support to large-scale farmers in the northern farming zone robbed local farmers of their farm lands.

In response, local farmers in the face of social differentiation and difficulties in access to resources burnt rice farms and machinery belonging to large-scale farmers (Goody,1980). Most of the large-scale farmers created out of these schemes, originally producing rice, have in the last decade diversified into the cultivation of non-traditional crops like pineapple, ginger and assorted fruits for export. Farmers in the non-traditional sector operated under a very attractive package, for example, they retained 100 per cent of their foreign exchange earnings (Chapter 6).

In the postcolonial era, state marketing boards and other state-sponsored trading institutions took over the role of foreign merchant firms in the marketing sector. Marketing boards, continued to engage in export-crop marketing because it provided an administratively easy source of revenue and control over economic transactions (Barker,1989:112). Since its inception, the state used agricultural surpluses from the Cocoa Marketing Board to promote political activities (Gyimah-Boadi,1989). Several private buyers licensed to buy crops on behalf of the state as Chapter 5 will show, have alliances within the state machinery and served as instruments of patronage and state power in the countryside.

Just as farmers resorted to boycotts under the colonial state, farmers reacted to marketing problems in the postcolonial era by a combination of withdrawal and parallel actions (Barker,1989:168). In the case of withdrawal, farmers abandon the production of agricultural exports and then concentrate on food crops for domestic consumption. Parallel market or informal activities involve the attempt by producers to sell their crops across borders, particularly in neighbouring countries. In the early 1980s, almost half of Ghana's cocoa crop was smuggled to neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire (to the west) and Togo (to the east) (Sandbrook, 1993:42). The impact of smuggling on the national economy is tremendous if one recognizes the fact that taxes from import and export trade constitute the principal source of state revenue.

To a large extent the growth of parallel market reflects the dynamics of the relationship between the state and social groups in general. Parallel markets are a replacement for failed public marketing institutions and demonstrate the ability of civil society to operate outside the public sphere. It must also, be stressed that

> the state has an interest in the persistence and growth of the informal economy, precisely because it serves the accumulation needs of its social base - the leading social [groups in] ... key political and administrative [positions] - for whom the formal sector does not provide adequate security (Ninsin,1988:273).

As Fatton (1992:84) also argues, the presence of the parallel markets is "functional to the rule of the higher circles: They [parallel markets] mitigate the political unrest that scarcity might provoke by co-opting potential dissent into the creative indiscipline of corrupt economic culture." Consequently, the parallel market offers a means of escape and the state tolerates or sanctions it.

Through a multitude of institutions, the state seeks to exercise control over farming communities. However, "the proliferation of state institutions [and programs] in rural areas [also] multiplied potential channels through which bureaucrats and farmers sought access to each other's resources" (Berry,1993c:57). In the final analysis, the state loses revenue from official channels, farmers spend their income paying off security guards at the borders and the expected contribution of agriculture to national development is not realized.

Agriculture's contribution to national development is further undermined when the gender dimensions of agricultural policies are considered. Gender is the social construction of roles between women and men. According to Jazairy, Alamgir and Panuccio (1992:273-274), rural women were triply disadvantaged. First as poor people, they lived under the same harsh conditions as some of their male counterparts. Secondly, as women, they suffered from cultural and policy biases that undervalued their work (Beneria,1982; Rogers,1980). Finally, when women became heads of households, they were faced with the same problems as their male counterparts in addition to carrying out the full burden of household management and production for which they got little support.

In Ghana, women constitute about 51 per cent of the country's total population and workforce, engaging in multi-activities including production, processing, and marketing (Mikell,1986; Obeng-Boampong,1978:7-8). Between 1970 and 1980, the number of women farmers in Ghana increased by 102 per cent compared to 92 per cent for men (Ghana,1990:48). Traditionally, women and men performed complementary roles in agriculture. Generally, men felled trees and stumps and cleared the land for women to plant, harvest and market crops. This arrangement, as Boserup (1970:17) argues, was certainly not a strict division of labour, because there were various combinations of labour between men and women.

The systematic construction of social roles, in which women undertook private or domestic roles and men performed public roles[30] began under the colonial state following the commercialization of agriculture (Staudt,1987a:193). Commercial agriculture had a differential impact on men and women. The differential impact, a product of policy was best exemplified in the case of access to land.

During the cocoa boom (Chapter 4) the need to expand production exerted strains on the land tenure system. Rogers (1980) believes that most women in Africa had ownership of land even though they did not control it. However, because of misinterpretation of the difference between ownership and control of land, the colonial state ascribed all rights to men and made it possible for men to put their names on land (Staudt,1989:75; Rogers,1980). With men having a secure access to land, the cocoa industry was also characterised by boom and bust conditions (Chapter 4). The changing conditions of the cocoa industry and differential access to land resulted in gendered socio-economic groups and changing relations between men and women (Mikell,1986).

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[30] The private-public framework is at the heart of Mill's (1959) sociological imagination. Mills (1959:8) sees the sociological imagination as the distinction between "'the personal troubles of milieu' and 'the public issues of social structure.'"

In addition to the differential impact of agricultural policies, other public policies, for example, hiring of labour for construction activities and the low level jobs in the civil service also benefited men. Armed with their own gender stereotypes from Europe, colonial officials saw the role of men in the public sphere. Men were the breadwinners who had to participate in the public sphere in which work had cash value. The colonial state conceptualized the domestic sphere for women under activities prescribed by Christian missionaries.

Early colonial governments did not invest in social programs like education but delegated powers to missionaries, who limited women's duties to family life, socialization and training programs for the home. Important aspects of training for the home included sewing, needlework, cooking. The state had no policy and program support for women farmers (Staudt,1987a:198). However, because women did participate in agriculture, it was difficult to limit their participation while opening it up for men alone.[31]

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[31] This difficulty compelled Lord Lugard, the influential colonial officer to write that "it is difficult converting people to agricultural practices where established custom

Overall, the policy framework incorporated women into a system in which monetary incentives were important to meet financial obligations to the state and society. Work within the home was not paid for, but that work was equally important to sustain the men who were paid for work outside the home. Because of the differences in reward, a natural tendency by women was to "minimize commitment or even withdraw their labour" (Staudt,1987b:42). In effect, commercial agriculture, policies on labour recruitment, the social and political ideology of the colonial state introduced gender differentiation in the rural economy. Because, "although many African men suffered under colonialism, new opportunities eventually appeared for them, while women's economic and political rights often diminished" (Parpart,1988:210).

The postcolonial state also worsened the social and political conditions for women. For example, the postcolonial state adopted the colonial state's codified laws on land tenure, setting the stage for postcolonial governments to marginalize women in economic activities. Women in Ghana played a dominant role in the nationalist struggle and the 1930s trade boycotts (Tsikata,1989). As retailers, women traders felt the merger of merchant firms would weaken their trading capacity, the implications of which included lower income for the household.

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regards it as proper for women" (cited in Staudt,1987a:198). Staudt notes that the term people referred to men, meaning women were not regarded as people.

Women traders also contributed financially to the organization of the Nkrumah's Convention People's Party. Once in power, Nkrumah's government thought women's groups must operate within a different framework.

The government centralized, merged existing women's organizations (Federation of Ghana Women and The Ghana's Women's League), mostly urban based into the National Council of Ghana Women and brought it under the ruling Convention People's Party (Tsikata,1989:78-79; Staudt,1987a:206). Ruling regimes after Nkrumah, especially the civilian ones also had women's wings which had brief life spans with the regimes that sponsored them.

No analysis of women's organization in the last two decades would be complete without a consideration of the National Council on Women and Development and the December 31st Women's Movement (Chapter 6). The former organization was formed in 1975 by the ruling National Redemption Council in conjunction with the United Nations Decade for Women. The Council was to increase the level of women's participation in public life at the national and local level; explore and remove all obstacles to such participation (Dolphyne,1991:44-47) The latter organization, December 31st Women's Movement, formed in 1982 was the political wing of the then Provisional National Defence Council (1981-1992).

Women's organizations have not seriously questioned the private-public assumptions underlying policies because of their ambivalent relationship with the state. Most of the women's organizations were urban-based and catered to the needs of their power base. In addition, the organizations were sponsored by the state in one form or another and the employees were "'in and against the state'" (Brown,1995:261). They were "in the state" by virtue of deriving their livelihood from the state and "against the state" when there is a change in government and the organization was abolished. The National Council on Women and Development and to some extent the December 31st Women's Movement have concentrated on changes in marriage and family inheritance laws while at the same time, women in marketing were being harassed (Manu,1993). By pursuing issues close to the source of their power, women's organizations in Ghana have not transformed the institutionalized practice of public (men) and private (women) roles.

Under the structural adjustment program, the World Bank (1989:103), after rediscovering the role of women in agriculture, argues that "women are perhaps the most important, and the most neglected, rural people." The adjustment program has maintained that women's contribution cannot be ignored; therefore "African women must have access to productive resources in order to increase their agricultural and economic productivity" (Okelo,1992:83).

However, the framework for accessibility to productive resources has been similar to what Boserup (1970:56) described more than two decades ago:

> It is the men who do the modern things. They handle industrial inputs while women perform the degrading manual jobs; men often have the task of

> spreading fertilizer in the fields, while women spread manure; men ride the bicycle and drive the lorry, while women carry headloads, as did their grandmothers. In short, men present modern farming in the village, women represent the old drudgery.

Women farmers lacked the resources and services to participate effectively in agriculture, as extension education on new methods of production and credit arrangements targeted men producing export crops (Rogers,1980:122-129; Boserup,1970:53-55). The constraining factors are the political context of women's organizations and the ideology in which there is still a disagreement on what constitutes a woman's work, how to measure and reward it and the continuing widespread and systematic sexual discrimination through policy and cultural biases in agricultural delivery systems (Whitehead,1990:62-62; Staudt,1987a:203).

F. Conclusion

This chapter has examined how the structure of the state, notions about development and relations with social groups can affect agricultural policy performance. Table 1 shows the important conceptual tools and their relationship in the social dynamics of a gricultural policy in Ghana. In both the colonial and postcolonial state, the complexities of state and society interactions led to varying levels of effective and ineffective agricultural policies. Policies favoured export crops over food crops and diverted resources to the former at the expense of the latter.

Table 1: The Social Dynamics of Agricultural Policy in Ghana: An Analytical Framework

Levels of Analysis (Colonial and Postcolonial State)	Conceptual Tools in State and Society Relations	Policy Outcomes
Nature and Structure of the State	Strong and weak. Institutional structure for administration. Collaboration with and resistance by social groups.	Short-term political gains and long-term difficulties. Scarcity of qualified personnel. Clientele and patronage.
The State and Development	The role of ideology. Institutional structure for social change. Collaboration with and resistance by social groups.	Infrastructural network. Income distribution. Access to non-agricultural services. Variations in rural and urban areas.
The State and Social Groups	Social context of agricultural policies. Access to resources and rewards.	Difficulties in initiation and implementation. Differential impact and reactions from social groups. Food insecurity.

The discussion so far supports the contention that Ghana's agricultural crisis results from the problems of export agriculture and "the rhetoric about the need to step up food production..." (Hansen,1989:218). The Ghanaian situation also strengthens the argument that policy performance is the result of "inconclusive encounters" between farmers and agricultural policies (Berry,1993c:45). Inconclusive encounters in the sense that although the state initiates policies, the consequences of policies are uncertain and cannot be understood or explained from their stated aims (Berry,1993c:46). Lacking qualified personnel, agricultural policies were ad hoc and inadequate for addressing agricultural problems.

Agricultural policies in Ghana do not reflect only technical concerns about agriculture. The policies are heavily influenced by group "interests and contrasting ideological positions that have prevailed within, or were in control of, the state apparatus at any point in time" (Hansen,1989:198). Thus, the analysis of agricultural policies in Ghana requires a context in which their goals (both intended and unintended) can be examined, and the ideological assumptions exposed. The analytical framework in Table 1 will guide the next three chapters which examine specific aspects of agricultural policies pursued from the colonial to the postcolonial era.

CHAPTER 4

AGRICULTURAL POLICIES OF THE COLONIAL STATE

A. Introduction

The argument of this study, as outlined in Chapter 1, is that ineffective agricultural policies are the result of induced and reinforced differential access to resources and rewards for social groups. The previous chapter identified the power structure that informs the relationship between the state and society. This chapter aims to demonstrate the above argument through an examination of the colonial state's agricultural policies, by analysing the social and political processes which influenced access to resources and rewards.

The chapter will isolate the features of the agricultural economy in the colonial period, the problems that faced agriculture and the policies adopted to address these problems. The chapter will also discuss the contradictions and inconsistencies in agricultural policies that made it difficult for the colonial state to address agricultural problems. The implications of agricultural policy performance for food security will also be explored. To provide a context for colonial agricultural policies, the next section presents brief background remarks on the agricultural sector.

B. Background

Colonial interest in the Gold Coast began when the Portuguese first set foot on the coastal town of Elmina in the Central Region in 1471. By the late eighteenth century, Britain emerged as the dominant power and began to consolidate its economic activities through systematic policies tied to crops, mineral and forest products. Britain created an agricultural sector that would guarantee the supply of raw material for British industries.

Tudhope, the Director of Agriculture, in 1910 underscored the above aim as follows:

> In European countries and in America, one of the aims of an Agricultural Department is to experiment, to educate, and to advise farmers, thus assisting them to produce large and good crops which for the most part are grown for home consumption. The aims of a tropical Agricultural Department are similar with this difference, that to be economically successful those crops which produce articles for export receive most attention. In the Gold Coast that is doubly true (cited in La-Anyane,1963:73-74).

Tudhope's goal was faced with two problems. First, the world market determines prices of agricultural exports and these prices are unpredictable. Profits made from export crops fluctuated for the colonial state and agricultural groups (producers, buyers and consumers). Secondly, the production of export crops changed the social conditions of access to resources and rewards. As argued in Chapter 3, the colonial state faced economic and political dilemmas in the cocoa sector. Consequently, problems in cocoa production and marketing acted as constraints on the extent to which cocoa revenue contributed to development.

C. The Agricultural Export Sector

Table 2 provides data on agricultural export crops and their contribution to total value from 1885 to 1939. The table reveals that the major agricultural export crops during the colonial era were cocoa, oil palm, palm kernel, rubber and timber which is not an agricultural crop in the strict sense of the word. Before 1904, oil palm, palm kernels and rubber each made a significant contribution to agricultural exports. From 1905 onwards, cocoa became the leading export crop, surpassing the total contribution of all other crops. The contribution of cocoa to total exports increased steadily from 1905, reaching a high point of 78 percent by 1929. However, before examining details of the cocoa industry some general remarks will be made on the other crops.

C.1 The Oil Palm Industry

The oil palm industry consisted of the extraction of oil palm, palm nuts or kernels, and later, palm wine from palm trees which grew in the wild. The oil palm industry's long history makes it an indigenous one (La-Anyane,1963:31). Harvesting and processing of the palm nut was along gender lines. Men collected the fruits and women processed the nuts into palm oil. Concentrated in the forest

Table 2: Major Agricultural Products as Percentages of Total Gold Coast Exports By Value, By Five-Year Averages (1885-1939)

Year	Cocoa %	Oil Palm %	Palm Kernels %	Rubber %	Timber %	Total Agric Exports %
1885-89	–	37	14	14	-	65
1890-94	0	26	13	30	5	74
1895-99	0	16	9	46	8	79
1900-04	9	23	12	23	6	73
1905-09	19	5	4	13	5	46
1910-14	41	3	4	5	5	58
1915-19	59	1	2	1	2	65
1920-24	73	0	1	0	nd	74
1925-29	78	0	1	0	nd	79
1930-35	60	0	0	0	1	61
1935-39	47	0	0	0	1	4

Source: Adapted from Howard:1978:70.

belt of the southern farming zone, the palm industry began in the Western Region, and extended later to the Eastern Region (See Figure 2).

Before the 1750 Industrial Revolution in Europe, palm oil was produced and consumed internally. After the Industrial Revolution, the demand for cheap vegetable oil in Britain and other European countries led to the commercialization of the industry. Between 1885 and 1889, oil palm made its highest contribution of 37 per cent of export value (Table 2). The kernel obtained from palm nut was originally of little value even for internal purposes, but the invention of margarine and the development of processing methods made kernel a valuable export commodity.

Unilever and other European firms began to establish oil palm plantations and processing factories, majority of which folded by the end of the 1930s, because of low wages, difficulties of securing labour to work on the plantations and competition from cocoa. These problems are discussed under the section on commercial agriculture (D.2).

C.2 The Rubber Industry

Rubber, like palm trees, grew in the wild. Local sources of rubber were the *Funtumia elastica* and the vine *Landolphia oweriensis* (La-Anyane,1963:46-47). Rubber processing methods were rudimentary, and rubber did not play any important role in the rural economy until 1880. The first recorded attempt to export rubber from the Gold Coast was in 1880, the year in which the vulcanization process was invented. This process, significant for the manufacture of tires, triggered a world-wide demand for rubber (Hart,1982:58; La-Anyane,1963:46).

Prospects of making profit from the growing demand for rubber enticed European merchant firms to invest in its production. Merchant firms acquired large tracts of land around Bunso, Ettokroom, Axim and Prestea in the forest belt of the Western Region, part of the southern farming zone (La-Anyane, 1963:47). However, global market conditions also led to the decline of the rubber industry in the Gold Coast. Local producers were not prepared to put in the maximum effort, when the cultivation of cocoa was more lucrative and involved less work (La-Anyane, 1963:49).

C.3 The Timber Industry

Timber is not an "agricultural crop" in the strict sense of the word. Trade in timber was, however, an important part of the export sector. Tree species included mahogany, sapele, odum and oware. Concentrated in the forest belt of the southern farming zone, timber exports first went to Germany before the First World War and, in later years, to Britain (Howard,1978:73). The industry required large amounts of capital and labour and was controlled by a few local people and merchant companies.

C.4 The Cocoa Industry

The recorded history of cocoa was in 1857 when Basel missionaries around Akropong-Akwapim, Aburi, Mampong and Krobo-Odumase planted the cocoa seeds they received from Surinam (Hill,1963:171). Most of the seeds died from pest attacks, and others were frequently destroyed during the protracted wars between the colonial power and local inhabitants (La-Anyane,1963:37). The successful introduction and popularity of cocoa began twenty-two years later when a Ghanaian, Tetteh Quarshie, returned home from Fernando Po with cocoa seeds and also settled around Akropong-Akwapim. From this area, cocoa farms spread into other areas within the forest belt of the southern farming zone, particularly the Eastern and Ashanti Regions and western parts of the Central Region (See Figures 1 and 2).

Cocoa production involves several steps (Hammond:1962). The initial step is thinning the existing forest, cutting and burning the unwanted shrubs. The next stage involves planting "umbrella crops" (most of which are food crops)[32] like cocoyam and plantain to provide shade and protection for young cocoa plants. Cocoa trees take about four to five years to mature and bear initial fruits. As a tree crop, cocoa continues to yield over several decades.

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[32] This is the context in which the perception that the production of cocoa and food crops can coexist can best be situated. The question which this perception does not address is whether with the maturity of cocoa seedlings, food crops can still be grown. Once cocoa seedlings mature there is no need for umbrella crops.

The cocoa fruit is harvested when there are sufficient ripe pods ready for plucking. The harvesting of cocoa is arbitrarily divided into two periods. A minor crop harvest occurs from May until mid-August, while the main harvest lasts from mid-September through January and, at times, till the end of February. Cocoa beans are placed in heaps covering a wide area, or in baskets and covered with banana or plantain leaves, then left to dry for about four to seven days, depending on the season (Rohan,1962). Dried cocoa beans are sorted: good ones are bagged, weighed and readied for sale while bad ones are discarded.

The first export of cocoa beans from the Gold Coast was recorded in 1885. By the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, cocoa exports exceeded 50,000 tons and reached over 200,000 tons by the end of the 1920s. A high point of over 300,000 tons was attained in 1936, when cocoa was the leading agricultural export crop, providing direct employment to one-third of all agricultural producers (Beckman,1981:143; La-Anyane,1963:206). Cocoa was initially produced by small-scale farmers; brokers and merchant firms marketed it; the state acted as mediator.

D. Agricultural Problems and Policy Responses: Analysis and Critique

The cocoa industry, while changing the agricultural economy, also led to several problems. As the sole crop with guaranteed market, cocoa provided revenue for the state, and income for producers and buyers. However, prices of cocoa varied, implying fluctuations in the incomes of all groups depending on the industry. Thus, the agrarian and monocrop nature of the economy was a major problem for the colonial state.

The cocoa industry also stimulated an internal migration into cocoa-producing regions, first from within the forest belt of the southern farming zone, and later from the northern farming zone and neighbouring countries. Cocoa production was so profitable that it affected labour and land requirements for other crops and economic activities, for example mining. Agricultural production occurred in a context in which labour was guided by socio-cultural values, and access to land was on the basis of kinship relations. However, because the colonial state preserved the existing system of production, people in positions of power used the changes in the rural economy to reinforce their power and social inequality (Chapter 3). The mines (gold, bauxite and manganese), required a stable labour force that worked under strict conditions while the timber industry required permanent ownership of land. The policy challenge was how to reconcile the socio-cultural and political basis of organizing labour and land, with the demands of commercial agriculture, the mining and timber sectors.

Revenue from cocoa sales monetized the agricultural economy and increased demand for goods and services. The four to five years cocoa takes to mature, called for revenue-collecting institutions and credit schemes to meet initial overhead costs.

Wealthy cocoa farmers responded to the credit needs of farmers, but many farmers were unable to repay their loans on time because of variations in prices of cocoa and high interest rates. Many farmers were therefore in debt, did not reap the benefit of their labour and the emerging pattern of indebtedness intensified social inequality in the rural economy. The state was concerned about the long-term implications of inequality for political order. Pests and diseases also affected cocoa tress in the 1930s, and the department of agriculture had no immediate answers to the problem.

Changes in the rural economy also had implications for food security. In the early years of cocoa success, nothing specific was done or said about local food production. Food crops produced were for household consumption. Commercial food production was non-existent because cocoa revenue financed food imports. Variations in cocoa prices also introduced uncertainty into the ability to import food.

The problems of colonial agriculture revolved around the following: fluctuations in cocoa revenue for the state and social groups in agriculture, changing relations in credit, labour, and land mobilization and organization, and finally diseases and pests that affected cocoa trees. Responding to these problems within the framework of agricultural policy became a major focus of the state. The state's response to agricultural problems can be addressed under the following categories: the agrarian and monocrop economy, commercialization of agriculture, labour and land tenure, and agricultural research and extension services.

D.1 The Agrarian and Monocrop Economy

Table 3 provides data on total import and export values. The table shows that between 1885 and 1939, there were fluctuations in trade resulting in positive and negative balances. From 1905-1919, the colony enjoyed a relatively healthy trade balances, entirely dependent on the performance of cocoa. A close study of Tables 2 and 3 provides an indication of the problems confronting an agrarian and monocrop economy. The high trade value of 8,313,000 British Pounds between 1915 and 1919 (Table 3) was earned when cocoa alone provided 59 per cent of export value (Table 2). When the contribution of cocoa increased to 73 per cent between 1920-1924 (Table 2), the balance of trade was minus 974,000 British Pounds. Instabilities and uncertainties worsen balances of trade when revenue comes from a single crop.

The healthy trade balances, especially from 1925 to 1939 (Table 3), should not obscure their context of a colonial economy. Cocoa revenue helped pay for the cost of colonial administration, but more significantly, cocoa surpluses were transferred to Great Britain and were critical for the health of the British economy (Howard,1978:86; Omaboe,1966a:31). Therefore, cocoa revenue and the healthy

Table 3: Gold Coast: Total Imports and Export by Value, By Five-Year Totals (1885-1939)

Year	Imports ('000 British Pounds)	Exports ('000 British Pounds)	Balance of Visible Trade ('000 British Pounds)
1885-89	1614	1577	-37
1890-94	3356	3522	+166
1895-99	5178	4633	-545
1900-04	9281	4539	-4742
1905-09	10333	11463	+1130
1910-14	20744	21165	+421
1915-19	25096	33409	+8313
1920-24	47476	46502	-974
1925-29	56119	63845	+7726
1930-34	29752	45100	+15348
1935-39	59846	70485	+10639

Source: Howard, 1978:86.

balances after 1925 were used according to imperatives determined by the colonial state.

Colonial authorities acknowledged problems the boom and slump of the cocoa trade posed for the local economy. Governor Guggisberg, in an address to the Legislative Council in 1919, noted how all the eggs of the colony were in one basket and asked what would happen "if anything [went] wrong with the cocoa crop or the cocoa market?" (cited in Killick,1966a:333). Clearly, then, the colonial administration knew "the danger of depending entirely on one main article of produce" (Kay,1972:51). Obviously, the state required a policy that would minimise the effects of the agrarian and monocrop economy.

Cocoa production was widespread in the Gold Coast. For reasons addressed in the discussion on commercial agriculture, the state left cocoa production to farmers and intervened only at the level of marketing. However, any policy on the cocoa industry was likely to affect production, and any negative reaction would not only create social and political difficulties but also an economic one. With no effective control in production, the problem of the state was how to enact a policy that would ensure the viability of the cocoa industry without creating social or political problems. In responding to the agrarian and monocrop problems of the economy, the state adopted an agricultural diversification policy.

The diversification policy evolved gradually in accordance with the pace of colonial rule. Three different strands can be identified: a reduction in the proportion of cocoa revenue to total revenue; a declining share of primary products in total exports, which implied efforts to start the processing of raw materials before export[33]; and an overall reduction in the dependence on imported commodities by developing locally produced substitutes and creating manufacturing industries within the colony[34] (Howard,1978 :75; Killick,1966a:333).

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[33] The notable effort at processing of raw materials was in the palm industry. The state presented oil-palm as "the next best product - if not a better one than cocoa,"

The state enacted the 1912 Palm Oil Ordinance to entice merchant firms to invest in the agricultural diversification program. The Ordinance gave monopoly power to companies in palm nut production and processing under the expectation that the former would provide continuous supply of palm nuts and the latter would ensure the quality of palm oil (Phillips,1989:91). Unilever, an Anglo-Dutch company, and a prime founder of the soap and margarine empire in Europe, responded to the diversification program by establishing oil palm plantation and processing factories at Seysie (near Sekondi-Takoradi in the forest belt of the southern farming zone).

Another component of the diversification program was state sponsored schemes on selected crops other than cocoa. Some of the selected crops were sisal, cotton, shea-butter and coconut. Despite the efforts of the Unilever company and the state, the diversification policy was faced with several problems and had a minimal impact on the agricultural economy.

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which could be enhanced with improvements in methods of production, railway and feeder roads in producing areas, and the establishment of processing and crushing centres (Kay,1972:51).

[34] This aspect of diversification was associated with the post-second world war period. See Chapter 3.

The state and merchant firms could not agree on the terms of investment in agriculture, nor were they able to elicit the support of chiefs and farmers. Under the 1912 Ordinance, independent producers had to bring their palm nuts to Unilever's factories and not to other European factories. Apart from Unilever's factories, farmers could not use any other mechanical means to process palm nuts.

However, Unilever's division of labour in the palm nut industry could only survive with the co-operation of farmers. The processing factory required labour to work on the plantations and a large and continuous supply of palm nuts to be profitable. Labour could not be recruited for the plantations because farmers preferred to work on their own farms, producing cocoa that earned them more income than the wages from palm-nut plantations. Independent palm nut producers did not deliver palm nuts because the factory's payments were lower than that for cocoa. Given these conditions (lower wages and prices for palm nuts and higher income from cocoa) many farmers started to cut down the palm trees for palm-wine production and cleared the land in order to produce more cocoa.

The United Africa Company,[35] attempted and failed to strike a joint partnership with chiefs to revive oil palm production. Chiefs, some of them cocoa producers with their own interests, were encouraged to participate in the joint ventures because of their control over labour supply. Chiefs, unsure of the financial gains to be made from working with United Africa Company, called on the state to bear some financial responsibilities. The state responded with the argument that "the provision of a factory is entirely a commercial matter and if private enterprise is not sufficiently attracted, it would be unwise for Government to go into the business" (cited in Phillips,1989:101). The conditions necessary for the profitable operations of processing mills were therefore not available and the Seysie mill and later mills by the United Africa Company operated below capacity, closing down by the late 1930s (Phillips,1989:101; Sutton,1983:469).

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[35] The United Africa Company was an amalgamation of companies previously owned by Unilever. By 1929, when the company's oligopolistic structure emerged, it included 26 previous companies and 29 firms. These holdings were further increased by another 29 companies by the end of 1938 (Howard,1978:94-98).

In spite of its objections to bear any financial responsibilities in commercial agriculture, the state ventured into the direct production and processing of crops like sisal, cotton, shea butter and coconut. Its initial effort in 1925 was a sisal plantation on the Accra Plains and a processing factory at Accra (the coastal region of the southern farming zone). Sisal exports experienced the same booms and slumps associated with other agricultural exports. The first export in 1925 met favourable prices, only to suffer from low prices the following year. By 1930, the state had lost 14,000 British Pounds and discontinued the sisal project (Howard,1978:76).

Diversification also suffered from the contradictions within colonial development policy. Guggisberg's Ten Year Development Plan (1919-1929), provides a good illustration of this problem (Table 4). In an economy in which agriculture was the main source of revenue, the original plan did not allocate revenue to that sector and the second revised plan in 1927 allocated only 1.5 per cent of the total expenditure to both agriculture and forestry. The government identified transportation as important to the agricultural diversification plan and allocated the highest expenditure to railway construction (Table 4).

Railways were to cover the whole country, particularly in the north, in order to enhance agricultural diversification. According to the architects of the Development plan, "the whole future of the Gold Coast [under diversification was] bound up with the development of the ground-nut and shea butter industries of the Northern Territories" (Kay,1972: 51-52). In supporting railways, the government argued that "With more railways we shall be safe for all time: without them our future is not only imperilled, it is doomed" (Kay,1972:144).

The first railway line from Kumasi to the port at Sekondi carried only a small fraction of cocoa because it was far away from cocoa producing areas (Figure 3). When a second railway from Kumasi to Accra passed close to Koforidua and the surrounding areas, there was an unprecedented increase in the volume of cocoa produced and shipped to the coast. In spite of this positive relationship between railway and agriculture (cocoa production), the plan to extend railways to the North

Table 4: Guggisberg's Ten-Year Development Plan
('000 British Pounds)

Items	Original Plan 1919	Revised Plan 1922	Revised Plan 1927
Harbour	2,000	1,840	3,551
Railways	14,581	6,076	5,948
Roads	1,000	750	1,619
Water Supplies	1,790	1,208	634
Town Improvements Drainage	1,850	300	740
Hydraulic and Electric Works	2,000	200	199
Public Buildings (including Achimota)	1,100	1,000	2,273
Posts and Telegraphs	90	422	336
Maps and Surveys	200	120	200
Agric. and Forestry	-	-	252
Takoradi Town	-	-	669
Miscellaneous	-	-	225
TOTAL	**24,611**	**12,016**	**16,646**

Source: Kimble,1963:56.

to boost groundnuts and shea butter production was never implemented.

Colonial administrators were not convinced about the export value of

Figure 3


N
ASHANTI
EASTERN PROVINCE
CENTRAL PROVINCE
WESTERN PROVINCE
Scattered patches of cocoa
Volta River
Kumasi
Obuasi
Nkawkaw
Koforidua
Kade
Accra
Winneba
Saltpond
Cape Coast
Sekondi
Takoradi
Tarkwa
Prestea
Gulf of Guinea
Railway
Principal cocoa areas
Producing gold mines
Developing/dormant gold mines
Diamondiferous areas
Diamond workings
Manganese ores
0
20
40
60 miles
0
20
40
60
80
100 km.
H. A. Shelley

- The Gold Coast Railway, 1945 (from Gold Coast Survey Department, Accra 1945).

Cited in Kay,1972:19

groundnuts and shea butter. For this reason, it was difficult to justify the cost of constructing a railway line to link the north to the ports on the coast. After the northern railway line was abandoned, the Sekondi-Kumasi railway line was extended to link the construction of a harbour at Takoradi. It is important to emphasize that the Takoradi harbour was to became an important gateway for the mining and timber interests in the Western Region.

While an argument can be made that strengthening revenue from other sectors was what the whole diversification program wanted to achieve, extending the railway line and the harbour construction exposed the biases in colonial development policy. British business interests had a close relationship with the colonial state (Chapter 3) and exerted pressure on the state to offer cheap port facilities for mining and timber companies (Kay,1972:21). In the case of minerals, the gold reserves proved expensive to explore and the quality of the bauxite deposits was not high enough to warrant mining (Killick,1978:6). As a result, mining operations could not provide sufficient freight to cover the cost of investing in the railway and harbour construction. There was a need, therefore, to secure revenue from another source in order to keep the port facilities cheap for mining and timber companies.

The government found the revenue source by constructing a third railway line, the Central Railway line. This line, completed in 1927, started from Kade in the Eastern Region and joined the Kumasi-Sekondi/Takoradi line at Tarkwa (See Figure 3). The line was to ensure that cocoa produced within the Eastern and Western Regions went by rail and ended up at the Takoradi port. The 1936 Carriage of Goods and Road Ordinance posted inspectors to prohibit the shipment of cocoa on roads parallel to railways (Kay,1972:194).

The third railway line and the use of posted inspectors did not go far enough in generating traffic and revenue. Apart from the difficulties of mineral exploration, the layout of the railway lines called for a system of feeder roads to link the railway lines. Further, the competition between railways and roads over haulage costs favoured roads. Instead of investing in roads, the government constructed another railway line, because British timber and mining firms required railway transport.

The third railway line defied an economic logic since freight and revenue from timber and mining operations were low. To ensure revenue from cocoa, the state posted inspectors to prevent cocoa movement by road. Thus, a situation emerged in which cocoa-producing areas did not have roads to link up with the railways, even though freight from cocoa was important to cover the cost of the third railway line and the Takoradi harbour. The Central Railway turned out to be a waste of resources, because "the harbour at Takoradi that it was intended to serve, was dependent upon the cocoa industry for solvency, but was not suited primarily to serve the needs of the [cocoa] industry" (Kay,1972:23).

In sum, diversification policies were caught up in complicated issues. Unilever was not successful in introducing new methods of oil palm production, partly because of the support the company received from the state. A year before Unilever was granted concessions under the Oil Palm Ordinance, government suppressed attempts to develop the small hand oil palm extraction machine invented by one "native", Gwira (Howard,1978:77-78; La-Anyane,1963:32). By suppressing this local initiative in favour of expatriate companies "it cannot altogether be claimed that the farmer or local worker lacked the ability to produce the invention to improve ... agriculture" (La-Anyane,1963:32), as colonial administrators often argued. Blocking the further development of the oil palm extraction machine and the granting of the concession sowed seeds of disharmony between the farming community and European processing factories.

Diversification was unsuccessful, as farmers preferred cocoa production because it remained profitable. The colonial administration also marketed cocoa "on such a comfortable level that the cocoa farmer had no incentive for growing other crops" (La-Anyane,1963:73). Furthermore, government interest in diversification or the agricultural sector normally took a lower priority when the economic situation was good and cocoa revenues were high. In such periods, there was little incentive to commit revenue to support agriculture. For example, by the end of 1915-1919, the balance of trade in the Gold Coast stood at 8,313,000 British

Pounds (Table 3). However, the agriculture and forestry sectors did not receive any revenue estimates under the original 1919 estimates of Guggisberg's Ten-Year Development Plan (Table 4). The interest in agricultural diversification was high in times of a slump, but then, revenue scarcity prevented the state from initiating any program of diversification. This practice is supported also with evidence from Guggisberg's Development Plan. When a lower balance of trade, 7,726,000 British Pounds was obtained for the period 1925-1929 (Table 3), the revised development plan of 1927 allocated some money (252,000 British Pounds, Table 4) to both agriculture and forestry. The diversification program was poorly implemented and the monocrop economy was faced with the added problem of commercialization in agriculture and the differential access by social groups in agriculture to production resources and marketing rewards.

D.2 Commercial Agriculture: Production and Marketing

With the growth of commercial agriculture, the state became concerned about the quality of agricultural products and their marketing conditions. As the earlier discussion indicated, the revival of the oil-palm industry was supposed to improve oil-palm's quality and marketability on the world market. Administrators kept their eyes on cocoa production and marketing because cocoa was the main source of revenue for the state and provided income from which farmers bought imported goods and kept merchant firms in business.

Cocoa producers comprised small-scale farmers and chiefs. The marketing of cocoa was a joint effort among brokers, merchant firms and their agents. Brokers, who maintained the first point of contact with farmers, resided mainly in the farming communities and some were cocoa farmers as well. Merchant firms were foreign owned and operated through their agents who lived in areas outside the farming zone. Merchant firms, after receiving cocoa from the agents, were responsible for transporting cocoa to the ports for export to London for sale at prices determined by the world market.

It is instructive to note that the resourcefulness of small-scale cocoa producers propelled the industry to great success, and this feat was attained without the involvement of merchant firms or of the colonial state (Beckman,1976:32). To the colonial state, as long as the cocoa industry proceeded smoothly, earning the major part of state revenue, there was no need for any intervention at the level of production. The department of agriculture, however, reasoned that the cocoa industry would be short-lived. According to administrators, local producers were not

> sufficiently intelligent to use Europeans methods,...[because they were] natives in a most elementary state of civilization, whose sole aim, as yet, appear[ed] to be the attainment of maximum amount of money with a minimum expenditure of energy - however uneconomical the system - and whose lack of foresight for the future welfare of the [cocoa] industry - and consequently of themselves - has not yet been compensated by adequate

legislative measures (cited in Kay,1972:239).

Merchant firms to a large extent also shared the above sentiment. In the 1920s, (1925 and 1926) a shipment of cocoa to the United States of America, was refused entry because of its poor quality (La-Anyane,1963:148). The rejection of cocoa beans from the Gold Coast economy, strengthened the argument by the Department of Agriculture and merchant firms about the poor-quality of cocoa beans and doubts about the long-term survival of the cocoa industry. Administrators knew they had to enact and enforce strict regulations on cocoa production and processing to ensure the quality of cocoa beans.

The government's response to the quality problem was two-fold. First, a fine was imposed on farmers who refused to report diseases, or did not take the necessary steps to keep their farms free from diseases. To strengthen enforcement, the number of European staff in the Department of Agriculture was increased under the assumption that Europeans were more likely to enforce the rules (Kay,1972:238). Since the colonial administration was a fragile one, in order to preserve the balance, the European agricultural officers had to work with chiefs, who played an important role in the colonial system of administration. The second response to the quality problem, consistent with one strand of the diversification program, was to encourage merchant firms to participate in cocoa production using European methods of cultivation.

The policy responses to the quality problem failed for a number of reasons. There were difficulties of enforcement, because the area of cocoa production was large, a fine "was no solution when virtually all farmers were potential offenders. Full implementation would have devastated cocoa production" (Phillips,1989:88). Any negative reaction by farmers to enforcement would also involve a wide area, with enormous social and economic consequences for political order. Chiefs, considered as partners in the implementation process, had vested interests in the cocoa industry, and benefited under the existing conditions of agricultural production. Hence, neither the increased number of agricultural officers nor the power of chiefs resulted in enforcing the fine.

The participation by European firms in cocoa plantation was a financial disaster. As Hancock (1942:188) observes, "it needed only a little experiment to convince would-be [European] cocoa planters that they would be wiser to avoid competing with the Native cultivators." Indigenous farmers, Kimble (1963:35) suggests, demonstrated a better awareness of cocoa cultivation than did European firms. As well, Europeans' desire for large-scale plantation farms was faced with peculiar problems in land and labour acquisition in the Gold Coast (See the section on Agricultural Labour and Land Tenure, D.3).

Both the colonial administration and the merchant firms gave the impression that the low quality of cocoa beans would spell the doom of the industry. The

Department of Agriculture habitually compared cocoa from the Gold Coast (the *amerlonado* type) to that of The West Indies (*criollo* variety). While the *amerlonado* is used in much greater quantities and makes a high proportion of the net bulk in confectionery products, the *criollo* is used in limited quantities and mainly for flavouring. Although the two were quite distinct, they had complementary but different roles in the confectionery industry. Thus, the two varieties of cocoa were not comparable in terms of quality and selling price (Kay,1972:14).

Merchant firms, supposedly concerned about the quality of cocoa beans, offered no reward for quality because they bought cocoa "on a basis of one grade only and at one price" (Kay, 1972:244). The firms also resented the idea of produce inspectors, licensed brokers and standards on weights and measurements and viewed such attempts as preventing them from "exploiting the illiterate producer" (Kay,1972:245). In the campaign to improve cocoa quality, the colonial state had few allies, as both chiefs and the private companies were not cooperative (Phillips,1989:89). The view colonial officials had about cocoa farmers being inefficient, lazy and lacking foresight continued to occupy directors of the Department of Agriculture. Even so, their policy recommendations could not be implemented because "the supposed inadequacies of ... production were never sufficiently proven to produce radical proposals for change" (Phillips,1989:91).

Quality control policies also failed because the colonial state displayed a poor understanding of the impact of commercial agriculture on the social conditions of agricultural production. The emergence of commercial agriculture did not mean all farmers had equal access to agricultural resources. Access to land and credit, for example are important for production. The more access one had to these resources, the better one's chances were of being a successful farmer. Cocoa farmers with better access to land and credit increased their production, became successful and rich. Differences in resource control gave rise to a great social diversity among cocoa farmers. For want of a better system of classification, these distinctions will be referred to as small-scale and large-scale cocoa farmers, the former being less successful than the latter.

Cocoa trees took about four to five years to become fruitful and many small-scale farmers had to borrow money to meet overhead costs and recurrent expenditures. A fledging money-lending scheme and speculative buyers emerged to supply credit to farmers. The large-scale cocoa farmer who took to money-lending as a form of investment "was often a farmer-*cum*-chief, or even a farmer-*cum*-chief-*cum*-broker" (Howard,1978:195, italics in original). Brokers or speculative buyers advanced credit to farmers in order to buy cocoa at the lowest possible price irrespective of the reigning marketing price.

Fluctuations in the price of cocoa and at times low prices, compelled many small-scale cocoa farmers to default payment. The money lenders (large-scale farmers, chiefs and brokers) were tied to the existing power structure, used their control over land and credit to generate substantial profit. Most of the money lenders became rich absentee landlords. The fluctuations in cocoa prices and the existence of categories of cocoa farmers crystallized and reinforced the existing social structure around groups of powerful landowners, money lenders, independent small farmers and migrant labourers (Hill,1963). However, the same vagaries in market prices that made some farmers rich also contributed at times in bankrupting them (Howard,1978:197). Indebtedness was a major problem by the end of the First World War (La-Anyane,1963:78). In one of the many reports on the credit situation among farmers, C.Y. Shephard, notes that in 1933/34 about 75 per cent of all farmers in the Gold Coast had pledged part of their crop to money lenders (cited in Howard,1978:197).

The colonial state was concerned about the growing indebtedness of both small and large scale cocoa farmers. Systematic polarities in the rural economy, the colonial state reasoned would create a group of dispossessed farmers who presented a danger to political order (Chapter 3). The colonial state therefore floated the idea of a cooperative movement to safeguard and prevent the disintegration of the "traditional" society from the effects of the world market and "what were perceived as unscrupulous activities by entrepreneurial Africans" (Howard,1978:198). Farmers' cooperatives had to assist their members with credit, organize production to insure adequate returns on their produce and avoid the services of speculators (Young, Sherman and Rose,1981:178-183).

The state also encouraged the department of agriculture to assist cooperatives with Agricultural Officers to help farmers produce quality beans for higher prices. When farmers realized the cooperatives could not provide them with credit to pay their debt, it seemed the movement had a poor start. The cooperative movement could not address the needs of its members because merchant firms did not reward quality cocoa and there were too few agricultural officers to aid the cooperative society in keeping records, carrying out sales or distributing proceeds (Phillips,1989:90). Farmers' indebtedness remained intact and became a major problem in the years before, during, and after the Second World War. Marketing problems compounded the difficulties of agricultural production.

The major marketing problems were fluctuations in the price of cocoa on the world market, and the complex relationship between producers (farmers) and buyers (brokers, agents and merchant firms). According to the Nowell Report (Chapter 3), in 1938, about 40,000 brokers and sub-brokers handled cocoa purchases, with the largest brokers handling as high as 1000 tons of cocoa per season (cited in Southall,1978:187). The merchant firms included United Africa Company (major cocoa marketing firm) and England based chocolate-manufacturing firms like Cadbury, G.B. Ollivant, John Holt and Company (Liverpool), and

Paterson, Zochonis and Company Limited (Dinham and Hines,1983; Howard,1978:99).

A critical component of the marketing process was how credit advances were made from the merchant firms, through their agents to the brokers and finally to the cocoa farmer. The line between farmers and brokers was thin, and many brokers were also speculative buyers and agents who exploited the credit arrangements to their advantage. Credit arrangements and changes in cocoa prices affected the relationship between producers and buyers.

Before the First World War, the terms of trade generally favoured cocoa exports, and farmers' incomes rose with the spread of cocoa production. Rising incomes stimulated demand for consumption goods, and merchant firms responded to demand by increasing their import activities. The marketing successes, however, fluctuated with changes in the global and local economic and political conditions. During the First World War, shipping space was affected, exports fluctuated, and farmers and merchant firms experienced economic difficulties. Although some improvements occurred after the war, the global economic depression of the 1930s, the appearance of the swollen-shoot disease and the Second World War, had devastating effects on cocoa prices and the incomes of farmers and merchant firms.

The booms and busts in the cocoa industry obviously had an impact on the profit margin of merchant firms, and on the income of farmers. Firms, brokers and producers had conflicting views on how to improve cocoa prices and each took unilateral actions to protect its interests. The merchant firms responded to price instabilities with the "Pool"[36]; a group of the principal expatriate merchants firms coming together to restrict competition in the highly uncertain world trade (Kimble, 1963:51). The important player in the "Pool" was United Africa Company, Unilever's amalgamated company. Whereas in 1915-16, 13 large and 23 small expatriate firms were engaged in exporting 89 per cent of shipments to the United Kingdom, by 1936-37, 14 firms handled as much as 98 per cent of overseas shipments (Southall,1978:197).

Members of the "Pool" agreed on both formal and informal basis on the quantity of export crop and the prices to be paid. A member whose purchases exceeded the quota had

> to make penalty payments in favour of those who [had] bought less than their agreed purchases. The penalty payments [were] calculated so as to deprive the payer of all contributions to overheads and profits on the excess purchases. The incentive to buy more than the quota [was] thus reduced or removed altogether (Bauer,1963:224).

The key to the survival of the "Pool" was information-sharing, price-fixing, arrangements in the purchase of export produce and the ability to impose sanctions.

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[36] A "Pool" can be equated to present day buying or selling cartels like the International Cocoa and Coffee Organization or the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

C

The formation of the "Pool" affected the relationship between buyers and producers (Southall,1978;197-198). The merchant firms could not operate without the brokers because the brokers used their extensive network to reach farmers in many farming communities. Brokers also had lower overhead costs and provided cost-efficient outlets to buy cocoa than merchant firms themselves. Farmers relied on brokers for credit and marketing services. If farmers pressed the brokers for higher prices they risked losing credit and marketing services. The brokers had buying agreements with the merchant firms and could not request price increases once the buying season began. Brokers, therefore maintained a strategic location in the marketing system that allowed them simultaneously to develop a degree of relative autonomy from merchant firms and pursue different interests from producers, at least in the short-term (Southall,1978:202).

Firms in the "Pool" were also the main importers of consumer goods and prices of such goods were increasing. The mergers and price increases of consumer goods when agricultural prices fell, reinforced the perception cocoa producers had that the merchant firms were responsible for low cocoa prices (Miles,1978:157; Kimble,1963:48-49). Cocoa producers charged that the "Pool" was against

> the first economic principle taught by British firms themselves, namely, that free competition was 'the soul of trade' and the main guarantee of fair price. It was felt to be profoundly unjust that the firms should thus try to fix prices on both sides of the trade, of the goods they sold as well as of the cocoa they bought (Simensen,1990:244).

In response, farmers also took an initial step in forming associations to participate in the export of agricultural produce and to guard themselves against "manifest exploitation" (Kimble,1963:49).

Akwapim farmers, who had a long history of cocoa production, formed an association in 1921 and reinforced group solidarity through the individual's swearing of allegiance to chiefs in their capacity as community and group leaders (Kimble,1963:49-50). Through group solidarity, farmers' associations went as far as prohibiting individual members from selling their produce to merchant firms (La-Anyane,1963:98). The determination of farmers' associations and some farmers to burn their produce rather than sell to merchant firms at low prices had revenue implications for the economy, which the state could not ignore.

The Department of Agriculture recognized the farmers' activities as a wake up call, and hoped that assigning agricultural officers would guide farmers and their associations through "proper channels" (Kimble,1963:50). The proper channels included teaching farmers the techniques of collective bargaining with merchant firms. Despite these efforts, cocoa prices continued to fluctuate in line with changes in the world market. In addition, the associations lacked information on shipping arrangements, experience and contacts in foreign markets. The farmers' associations were therefore ineffective institutions of change.

The state, cocoa producers and merchant firms all experienced difficulties in income and revenue when cocoa prices declined. Farmers joined brokers to demand an increase in the price of cocoa. These attempts, led to the "Gold Coast cocoa-hold ups" or strikes. A noticeable strike occurred during the 1920-21 buying season and two massive ones in the 1930s (1930-31 and 1937-38) involving many regions: Eastern, Ashanti, Central and Western (Simensen,1990; Miles,1978; Southall,1978; Howard,1976). The 1930s hold-ups were accompanied by the boycott of imported European goods, and that compelled the colonial administration to address the impasse among farmers, brokers and the firms.

D.2.1 The 1930s Cocoa Hold-Ups and Boycotts

The 1930s cocoa hold-ups resulted from a culmination of marketing problems and attempts by all the beneficiaries in the cocoa industry to preserve their interests. At the crux of the marketing problem was the fact that cocoa had no domestic uses and those depending on it had to live with the vagaries of prices decided in distant markets (Miles,1978:154). State actions or inactions also played a decisive role in what steps the other actors in the cocoa industry adopted. For instance, when farmers decided to form producers' associations and attempted to market their own cocoa, the state seemed to have given them moral support by assigning agricultural officers to teach them the techniques of collective bargaining. Adhering to its laissez faire policies, the state did not act when the merchant firms began their mergers.

The state's inaction gave farmers the impression of collusion between the state and the firms.

Brokers, who had maintained a strategic position in the marketing system also began to experience economic difficulties in their trading activities. Given the close relationship between the brokers and the firms, the brokers attributed their economic difficulties to the "Pool," and concluded that low cocoa prices could not be the effect of only external factors (Southall,1978:203). In addition, brokers saw a diminished role in the 1937 Cocoa-Buying Agreement[37] adopted by the firms (Howard,1976:474). Thus, brokers, some of them farmers, came together with other groups directly and indirectly in agriculture to support the hold-up (Howard,1976:471-472). Groups directly engaged in the hold-up included rich cocoa farmers, some of them chiefs, brokers, small scale farmers and migrant labourers. Indirect groups comprised drivers, women traders, surf-boat men of Accra and workers engaged to supply palm fruit to the United Africa Company's palm oil mill at Seysie.[38]

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[37] Under this agreement, the firms agreed among themselves on the quantity of cocoa each firm should buy. This decision was arrived at on the basis of past performance. Prices paid to brokers would also be streamlined and in some instances based on changes in the world market price. In addition, marketing costs submitted by brokers would be reduced.

[38] Since the Seysie oil mill was closed by the end of the 1930s, the boycott's effect on the closure cannot be overlooked.

The hold-up and boycott threatened to dry up government revenue from the cocoa trade and general commercial activities associated with the cocoa industry. Firms could not continue with their export and import trade, implying lost revenue. The widespread coalition of groups in the hold-up and boycott "created a mood of discontent and disillusion graver than anything before" (Miles,1978:169). The emerging social situation posed challenges to the structure of colonial rule, hence the establishment of the Nowell Commission in 1938. The Nowell Commission, was to inquire into the deadlock between the farmers and the firms and the whole question on the marketing arrangements of cocoa in British West Africa. Specifically, the Commission was charged

> to examine and report on the marketing of cocoa in the Gold Coast and Nigeria, with special reference to the situation which has arisen as a result of the Buying Agreement(s) entered into between certain firms; and to submit recommendations (cited in La-Anyane,1963:106).

The Commission came out with an informed analysis and several recommendations.

The firms were criticised for forming the "Pool," and the Commission called for its dissolution. It was also the opinion of the Commission that, the firms "committed an error of judgement in attempting to introduce the [Cocoa Buying] Agreement in such haste, particularly in view of the fall in the price of cocoa ... [at] the end of the previous main buying season..." (cited in Metcalfe,1964:655). The Commission was, however, sympathetic to the argument by the firms that high transaction costs by brokers lowered profit margins for farmers and the firms. The

Commission also noted the lack of dialogue between the producers and buyers in the local marketing arrangements.

Accordingly, the Commission recommended the need for laws to govern a new marketing arrangement. In the proposed marketing arrangement, farmers and firms should have direct interaction in the hope that such an interaction would strengthen the economic position and boost the morale of producers and firms. Assuming the government would be a better guarantor for farmers' interests, another recommendation was for a government-sponsored Cocoa Farmers Association to sell cocoa on behalf of farmers (Kay,1972:259).

The policy implications of the Nowell Commission were being debated when the Second World War broke out in 1939. Because of the war, the proposal to establish a new marketing arrangement to strengthen interaction between farmers and the firms was replaced by a statutory marketing board to control producer prices. With the argument that price control would stabilize farmers' income, the statutory marketing board effectively eliminated any trace of price competition. Under the marketing board scheme, the producer price was fixed by the state at the beginning of each cropping season irrespective of the reigning market price. During the war, the state racked in enormous surplus (Chapter 3). Not surprisingly, after the war, the government argued for retaining the marketing board to stabilize the income of farmers.

Government control was strengthened in cocoa marketing with the establishment in 1947 of the Gold Coast Cocoa Marketing Board. The cocoa marketing board had a joint marketing arm in London that undertook the actual sale of cocoa. Ordinance No. 16 of 1947 charged the marketing board:

> to secure the most favourable arrangements for the purchase, grading, export and selling of Gold Coast cocoa, and to assist in the development by all possible means of the cocoa industry of the Gold Coast for the benefit and prosperity of the producers (cited in Bauer,1963:280).

The Board had power "to control and fix the prices to be paid from time to time" to cocoa producers, and to appoint "Licensed Buying Agents" for the purchase of cocoa. In addition, the board could "impose conditions upon the grant of such licenses," cancel or suspend licenses for buying agents for breach of conditions "or other good cause" (cited in Bauer,1963:280-281).

The Second World War brought about an extenuating factor in analysing the impact of the hold-up and boycott on the farmers, brokers, firms, the state, and the future of cocoa marketing in the Gold Coast. For farmers, the only visible impact of the protest was the appointment of a commission of enquiry. Farmers income shrunk as state revenue increased during the war. The state retained its role in setting prices and low prices after the war, even though world market prices recovered. The farmers sent a delegation to London in September 1945 to protest against the maintenance of war-time controls and low prices (Beckman,1976:45). These protests changed nothing, and, in fact, the postcolonial state (Chapter 5), learning from the colonial state came to rely on control of cocoa marketing to generate revenue to carry out its developmental agenda, and thus sealed state control of cocoa marketing.

Some of the large cocoa farmers, who were brokers continued their role in financing cocoa farmers and increasingly became important political constituents in the decolonization process. Having realized the importance of the cocoa industry to the postcolonial state, cocoa brokers either aligned themselves with the state to fulfill their economic and political needs or contested state power when such interests were threatened.

Merchant firms which initially objected to the government-sponsored farmers association on grounds of government interference in the market, accepted the guaranteed purchase of total cocoa production by the state marketing board. The firms felt more comfortable with the assurance that the British government would absorb any eventual loss on the resale of cocoa abroad (Kay,1972:267-268). The colonial government and firms thus assumed a powerful position during the war period. The government set the producer price, and the merchant firms without any fear of incurring financial liabilities, transported the cocoa (Beckman,1976:41). The cocoa marketing board, created after the war, led to an unprecedented accord between merchant firms and the state, because the guarantees built into the import and export trade benefited merchant firms. Accordingly, the firms forever muted their objection to state involvement in the market (Beckman,1976:43-44).

The state, no doubt, benefited from cocoa sales during the war period by offering low prices. For most of this period, Britain continued to hold the bulk of the reserves in securities in British banks. Fitch and Oppenheimer (1966:42-47) insist, that British economic self-interest, not the desire to stabilize farmers' incomes, prompted the formation of marketing boards. The use of resources from the colonies to benefit the British empire was not limited to the events during and after the Second World War.[39] The implementation of a statutory marketing scheme for cocoa was a manifestation of a long-held idea. The idea was successful after the Second World War because of concerns by the departing colonial administrations and the incoming national government to generate revenue to initiate development in the colonies (Chapter 3).

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[39] Towards the end of the First World War, attempts were made to impose differential duties on agricultural exports from British colonies to countries outside the British Empire. The Empire Resources Development Committee established in October 1916, was to help in drafting such a legislation. The idea behind the Committee was "that certain of the empire's assets should be taken over and exploited on a large scale by the British government, and the profits so made be used to pay off Britain's war debts" (Havinden and Meredith,1993:134-135). In the Gold Coast, differential rates were to be introduced for oil palm exports. Opposition mounted against the bill, but was passed in 1919 and withdrawn in 1922 because the oil palm industry was overtaken by the cocoa industry (Kimble,1963:52-55).

D.3 Agricultural Labour and Land Tenure

The successful expansion of government public projects under Guggisberg's Ten-Year Development Plan, mining and commercial agriculture (cocoa) required a steady supply of labour and a secure access to land. The mines, for example, required miners that could be controlled and maintained for continuous work in underground operations, while cocoa farmers needed a secure access to land to guarantee stable investment on the farm.

Metcalfe (1964:434-437) cites the 1889 Report on Economic Agriculture in the Gold Coast, in which the colonial government assumed that the colony's labour force could be harnessed and mobilized in the interest of European-owned plantations and mining companies. The problem was that in the absence of a labour or land market, satisfying the above conditions led to several difficulties in labour mobilization and access to land. Labour mobilization and access to land were structured by socially constructed notions of work, authority and obligations. Key features of the social construction were flexibility by way of overlapping arrangements and negotiations rather than any strict adherence to market definitions of demand, supply and rewards (Berry,1993c:101).

Most of the economic activities which required labour were located in the southern part of the Gold Coast. It became apparent that labour would have to come from areas beyond the southern farming zone. The colonial government and private companies recruited labour from the north (Thomas,1973). To do so without disrupting the political order, the state invoked its alliance with the chiefs, who helped to recruit and mobilize labour on behalf of the state under the system of indirect rule. The state justified the recruitment of labour for public activities, like railway construction, as a form of taxation, and the return of labourers to their home regions generating further economic benefits (Phillips,1989:43). Even though, administrators argued on the economic benefits of recruiting labour for public activities, they were concerned about the long-term implications of recruiting labour for profit-seeking, private mining companies.

Mining companies had an urgent need for labour and exerted pressure on the state with requests for special quotas in the labour recruitment process. When the mining companies found the government slow in satisfying their labour requirements, they initiated their own recruitment process. The state was concerned that private recruiters would side-step the chief, and threaten "the fragile political order of the colonies" (Phillips,1989:43). Even though the mining companies did receive labour under government quotas, because of difficult and unsafe underground working conditions, the mines experienced a high rate of labour attrition (Thomas,1973:80).

The state did not give heed to demands by the mining companies for "long term contracts, harsher penal sanctions against contract breakers, and delegated powers enabling mine managers to deal with labourers living in mining villages who worked only spasmodically" (Thomas,1973:80). It was difficult for the state to impose rigid controls on the movement of labour as a long-term policy because it did not want to give any impression of practising a system of forced labour in the Gold Coast (Phillips,1989:46). As far as labour policy was concerned,

> the state had to choose between allowing companies to solve their problems in their own way, which could interfere with the emerging pattern of co-operation between government and chiefs, or it had to assume responsibility for the labour needs of the companies. Faced with this choice, the state usually opted for the latter... (Phillips,1989:44).

The labour problems in the mines created tense relations between the state and private capital, especially British capital.[40] The tensions were exacerbated by the differences in how labour needs evolved in the cocoa industry, public works and mining.

Cocoa farming was in the hands of the indigenous farmers and the colonial government had no coherent strategy on agricultural labour, even though cocoa provided the bulk of state revenue. However, government played a prominent role in recruiting labour to the mines, where labour was usually not well paid

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[40] The source of the tension was how to structure relations between Gold Coast and British capital, competing for similar resources (Kay,1972:12). In fact, the state was faced with the problem of how to address the interests of both sources of capital without sacrificing at least the pretence of neutrality.

(Sutton,1983:461).[41] The relationship between the employer and labour on the cocoa farm was structured around the needs of cocoa production and trends in the industry.

Hill (1963:187-190) identifies two stages in the relationship. In the first stage, farmers depended on family labour. Family labour comprised wives and members of the kin-group. The farmer, normally a man, therefore did not have labourers to pay in the strict sense of the word. Wives and members of the kin-group worked as members of the farm and shared in whatever profits were made according to their relationship with the farm owner, for example as a husband or an uncle.

The second stage "was reached when the farmer had successfully established a sufficient area of bearing cocoa *to support a labourer from its proceeds*" (Hill,1963:188, italics in original). Unlike the labourer working on public projects or the mines who was paid in cash, the labourer on the cocoa farm was paid in both cash and kind. In the first year of employment, the labourer was in charge of a plot of land which was used to grow cocoa and food crops. At the end of the farming season, "the labourer might be entitled to 'use' all the cocoa he plucked from the young farm on condition that he assisted the farmer in establishing new cocoa farms - which, later on, he would have a right to harvest" (Hill,1963:188).

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[41] This is another illustration of the biases in colonial policy that can only be explained in terms of power differences between farmers, mining companies and the relationship of each to the state. The earlier example was the diversification program which focussed on railway construction although revenue for the construction came from cocoa production, but did not have roads to link up with the railways.

In subsequent years, the labourer became established on the farm and the farm owner shared in the crop output. In the *abusa* system, the farmer and the labourer each received one-third of the output, and the final third covered the cost of production. A variation of this system, *abunu* offered the labourer and employer half each of the output, while the labourer was responsible for the costs of production. In each of the farmer-labourer arrangements, the farm owner continued to farm and by that action could demand a certain degree of effort from the labourer. Depending on what kind of working relationship was eventually established, the farmer could allow the labourer to establish permanently on a plot of land.

Abusa and *abunu* offered the farm owner and the labourer the opportunity to develop a common perspective towards the success of the farm. These varied, overlapping arrangements and negotiations reflected the long-term planning entailed in cocoa production. By allowing the labourer to settle in with the family, by the time cocoa trees began to bear fruits, the farm owner would have additional labour at no cost (Hill,1963:189).

Labour relations in agriculture differed from that in public works and mining in one key respect. Agricultural "labour was mobilized through existing social relations, [in which] farmers could undertake new agricultural ventures...without prior access to working capital" (Berry,1993c:143). The method of labour mobilization in agriculture does not suggest, that capital was irrelevant. The argument is that labour mobilization was within a social framework, which the state and mines could not control. Consequently, the role of labour in activities that did not consider the social context was limited.

In the absence of a labour market, satisfying the demand for labour by government (public), cocoa producers and mining (private) operations posed several difficulties (Phillips,1989:28). Labour's relations with the mine owners was tenuous and unstable while that with farm owners was relatively cordial. The cordial and diverse relations in cocoa farms between the labourer and the employer brought about a mutual commitment, albeit in varying forms to the success of the farm (Sutton,1983:471-473). Unable to create a free labour pool, the state preserved existing arrangements in which labour was mobile.

The problem of labour mobility was worsened by the land-tenure system. Agricultural activities occurred in a context where "land [was] not regarded as capable of being owned" (Ollenu,1967:251). The result, in theory, was an agricultural economy in which everyone had access to land (Pogucki,1962). In reality, however, land was vested in the group and not the individual. Membership in the kin group conferred access to land, and differences in status and descent practices created differences in land rights.

The institutions of social control (the family, lineage heads, chiefs) held land in trust for the community at large: "This possessory or usufructuary title which a member of the family or community [obtained was] the highest form of tenure an individual may acquire in land" (Ollenu,1967:255). The usufructural access to land did not distinguish between communal and private interest in land, and there were no secured titles to land to be transferred. Rights of the trustees were superior to that of the subjects and this made it possible for trustees, especially chiefs, to infringe on the rights of the subjects, when land acquired exchange value with the growth of commercial agriculture, timber and mining operations.

When oil palm and rubber, which used to grow in the wild, assumed commercial value, merchant firms were eager to establish plantations to produce agricultural raw materials on a large-scale. Plantations required large tracts of labour and land. The difficulties in recruiting labour for work on the plantations was discussed in connection with commercial production and the earlier discussion on labour mobilization analysed the problem further. Many labourers had access to land and thus could afford not to work on plantations. The serious problem, however, was that plantation agriculture required a large piece of land. This requirement was confronted with a social situation in which land was vested in the group and not the individual and the rights to land did not include freehold title.

Cocoa, the other commercial crop, was produced entirely by the indigenous population who had access to land on the basis of group affiliations. As the discussion above on labour mobilization showed, cocoa farm owners entered into various contractual arrangements on labour, including the possibility of offering a piece of land. Thus, migrant labourers or strangers in new localities had access to land on which they farmed and paid the tributes to the farm owner or trustee of the land. Since cocoa was produced by local farmers and it overtook oil palm and rubber in economic importance, the colonial government did not have the urge to change any aspect of the land tenure system, until travellers from the forest zone made reports about gold deposits.

Mining firms, predominantly British, wanted a land tenure system that provided full ownership as opposed to shared ownership or leasing. The argument for full ownership was that it would secure stable and heavy investment in the acquired land. Demands by the mining firms for land ownership, required a system in which land ownership was based on documentary proof. There was no system in place to provide such a document because nothing of that sort was in existence. Groups used landmarks for identification purposes and agreed on such features before land assumed a commercial value.

As land assumed a commercial value, chiefs and other trustees granted land concessions to mining firms and kept the proceeds for themselves. But land buyers faced uncertainties. Because of the multi-claims that can be made on any piece of land, other members of the kin-group could challenge the sale of land, especially when such sales were made by a sub-chief or unauthorized people. The land concessions were therefore the focus of litigations between towns and villages. In the absence of a land registry to establish the exact boundaries under dispute, land litigations took on a life of their own.

Within the forest farming belt of the Ashanti Region which possessed mining, timber and farmlands, litigation was rampant and a costly exercise. Chiefs who did not take steps to defend land under their jurisdiction stood the chance of being "destooled" and were compelled to carry litigation to the utmost limit even when chances of success were remote (Busia,1958:207). Although, the colonial state recognised the new field of mining as presenting opportunities for European enterprise, it also realised that the absence of documentary proof posed a major problem that had to be resolved (Kimble,1963:16). Concerned about uncontrolled activities of speculators and chiefs in granting land to investors, the state also feared the possibility of fraud in acquiring land and its effect on genuine investors (Phillips,1989:63).

The above social conditions of the land tenure prompted Governor Griffith to take advantage of a mining dispute in 1889, and proposed that all land should be taken over as Crown Land, administered for and on behalf of the inhabitants. This proposal was refined and submitted as the Crown Lands Bill of 1894 (Kimble,1963:330-357). The bill was "to vest Waste Lands, Forest Lands and Minerals in the Queen," control further exploitation of timber and mineral resources and safeguard existing grants and concessions. It was also to deprive chiefs of the right to grant land to "strangers," particularly Europeans investors. By taking away the power of chiefs to grant land, the Crown would ensure that only it, could grant concessions for wastelands, minerals and forests. This arrangement, according to colonial administrators, would give land-users security of usage within a valid and legal framework. The colonial state assumed that it was only taking on the functions exercised by the chiefs, and because rights of ownership were not abrogated, all interested parties in land would be better off buying into the proposed legislation.

The bill, on the contrary, aroused opposition from organized bodies such as the chiefs, churches, and local educated elites, creating the first collective local effort against the colonial authorities. This unprecedented collaboration led in 1897, to the formation of the Aborigines Rights' Protection Society, perhaps the first organized political opposition in the Gold Coast. The society sent letters and a deputation to London to oppose the bill, arguing that it went against the natural rights of the local inhabitants. Petitions also argued that all land was owned by groups and individuals and there was no such thing as "wasteland." What was being described as "wasteland," protestors contended, was land of economic importance being 'diplomatically enveloped' in the term 'waste' to be taken away in a manner which they described as 'civilised Robbery or British Brigandism' (cited in Kimble,1963:339).

In this atmosphere of political agitation, the state abandoned the idea of a comprehensive land legislation and settled in 1900 for a Concessions Ordinance meant "to obtain security of title for concession-holders, and to protect landowners from fraud" (Kimble,1963:356). The Ordinance provided mining and timber companies some leeway in their land requirements, but lacked provisions and regulations to control speculative activities by investors (Phillips,1989:69-70). The need for such provisions was one motivating factor for a land policy in the first place.

In 1910, the government in response to studies "that deforestation was becoming a serious problem" (Kay,1972:211), began work on a legislation to strengthen the Department of Forestry in protecting forest reserves. The Aborigines Rights' Protection Society resurrected memories of the 1894 Bill and objected to the 1911 Forest Ordinance legislation. For the sake of political order, the Forest Ordinance was also not implemented, as opposition "continued to inhibit the development of any constructive policy for conserving the forests or regulating dealings in land" (Kimble,1963:370).

The difficulties in passing comprehensive land policies demonstrate some of the ambiguities of colonial rule. In the initial stages of colonial rule, the state gave tacit approval to the idea of community ownership of land because it involved chiefs, who were incorporated into colonial administration under the system of indirect rule. There was therefore a political importance in upholding the "native" system of land tenure.

The 1912 West African Lands Committee clearly stated the relationship between chiefs and the land tenure system:

> Native rule depends upon the native land system. If it is the policy of the Government to govern the natives through themselves, subject to European supervision, retaining what is useful in their institutions, the native system of land tenure must be preserved at all costs" (cited in Grier,1987:35).

In supporting the principles of customary land ownership, the state also accepted the codification of such principles into customary law and legal statutes (Crook,1986:88-89). Hence, the usufructural access to land was embodied in a legal and sociological fact, that there was no such thing as absolute individual ownership in customary law.[42] The land belonged to the dead, living and those yet to be born.

By proposing to take over and vest land in the name of the Queen, chiefs and the educated elite that formed the Aboriginal Rights' Protection Society perceived the state as going against legal statutes it had accepted. That perception provoked the backlash from the public. Chiefs saw the land law as taking away their natural rights of social control over land while the educated elite saw the law as a first step in a grand scheme of events that would finally deprive local people of all their rights. It was also difficult to pass the land law because many European commercial interests in mining and general trading sent letters to London, protesting against the Land Bill. Within Britain, government was warned about the discouragement of British capital investing in the Gold Coast (Kimble,1963:344-346).

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[42] The works of Mensah-Sarbah (1906,1897) and Casely-Hayford (1913,1903), lawyers associated with the Aboriginal Rights' Protection Society, and later the anthropologist Rattray (1929), provided some of the legal documentation.

The above difficulties prevented the passage of any effective land legislation and the creation of a labour market. Land and labour, as Phillips (1989:59) notes, were two sides of the same coin and the absence of a "free labour market could never come into existence while communal land tenure guaranteed access to land." The ability of the state to create a free labour market and severe the communal attachment to land was contingent on the ability to follow through with significant social and political realignments. The state found most of these alignments politically costly or simply difficult to resolve.

D.4 Agricultural Research and Extension Services

Agricultural research has a long history in the Gold Coast. In a formal sense, agricultural research began with the establishment of the Aburi Botanical Gardens was devoted to cocoa, limes, and, to some extent, coconut (Kay,1972:236). Despite the long history of agricultural research and the economic importance of cocoa, when cocoa tress were attacked by diseases in the 1930s, the department of agriculture did not have specific solutions to the problem.

In 1938, a farmer at Effiduase in the New Juaben district of the Eastern Region (forest zone of southern farming belt) reported peculiar swellings on cocoa pods to the Department of Agriculture. Later on, surveys found the disease widespread in other parts of the Eastern Region, Western, Volta and Ashanti Regions. The disease, subsequently termed swollen-shoot, was misdiagnosed and government prescribed sanitation, proper shading and cutting down all infected trees, plus surrounding healthy ones. Cocoa farmers opposed the government's directives, interpreting the cutting of both healthy and infected trees as part of a deliberate attempt by government to destroy the industry and acquire the land for some other uses (Austin,1964:60).

The reasons for the misdiagnosis of the swellings and the reaction of farmers to suggestions to cut infected trees can be traced to the relationship between the agricultural research system and farmers. Even though cocoa was at the centre of agricultural policy, the West African Commission's 1939 report noted "that until 1937 there was no single agricultural station in the cocoa belt proper [forest zone in the south] at which research could be carried out on the requirements of the crop" (Kay,1972:231). The absence of agricultural research stations in the cocoa belt until 1937 was consistent with the colonial state's administrative policy. As argued in Chapter 3, the colonial state maintained a skeletal and understaffed administrative structure in order to save cost.

Closely related to the late establishment of cocoa research stations was how agricultural personnel related to farmers. The discussion on commercial cocoa production showed the condescending views colonial administrators had about cocoa producers. Integrating these views into the in-built ethnocentric ideas of the colonial administrative structure, would suggest that the agricultural research system did not have an adequate understanding of the social context of production. To the West African Commission,

> [i]t [was] difficult to see how any officer of the Department [of Agriculture] could be expected to offer correct advice on cultural or other treatments, as he [or she] had had no opportunity to acquire knowledge under the local conditions. Thus when diseases and pests became serious, the technical officers of the Department had no means of knowing how any remedial measures they might suggest would affect the general health of the trees (Kay,1972:231).

It was clear that the weak contact between researchers and farmers accounted for the misdiagnosis of the swollen shoot disease.

According to Dale (1962), a careful analysis of diseased trees shows that swollen shoot was a viral disease and its onset might not have been sudden as first thought. In other words, a closer contact between farmers and extension staff would have exposed the onset of this disease. It was not possible to detect the onset of diseases because extension services were shallow, and the Department of Agriculture, as the 1948 Watson Commission later confirmed, did not have close contact with farmers. Experimentation and extension services were weak, partly because of understaffing and centralization (Kay,1972:231-236). It is worth noting that for all their forecasting of disasters in cocoa production, the colonial government had no plan to confront the occurrence of disasters (Kay,1972:241).

E. The Colonial State and Food Security

The previous section discussed the state's policy responses to problems confronting the agricultural sector. These responses to address problems were to ensure improvements in export agriculture, particularly cocoa, in order to meet state revenue requirements and the market for imported goods. When available, agricultural experimental stations and extension services were devoted to improving cocoa seedlings. Farmers benefited from guaranteed export markets for cocoa, expanded their acreage and devoted resources to cocoa production.

Devoting farmland to cocoa production from which they made money, farmers preferred to buy food from abroad rather than produce it. In addition to the colony supplying raw materials, another aspect of colonial policy was to have colonies serve as markets for goods from the mother country. A consumer culture based on imported goods was encouraged even though its long-term implications for food security were negative.

Colonial administrators were fully aware of the dangers of a monocrop economy and even acknowledged its implications for food production. In 1889, a government study pointed out the irrationalities of food dependence and noted that the rice grown in the Gold Coast was more nutritious than the excessively clean variety imported from Europe (Howard,1978:84). Food was not the only imported item. Other imported items ranged from drinks, textiles, ornaments, liquor, to arms and ammunition. Cocoa prices were not determined in the Gold Coast. The fluctuating cocoa prices and the agricultural policy that gave priority to exports was pursued at the expense of crops grown for local consumption, leading to instabilities in food security.

Attempts by the state to craft anything close to food security were made in periods of difficulties such as the two world wars. After World War One, the state attempted to boost commercial production of food crops. A small power-driven rice-milling machine was installed at Esiama in the Western Region, but as La-Anyane (1963:142) argues, the rice-milling machine was to increase rice exports rather than to augment home supplies. Moreover, lack of suitable transport affected the cultivation of local food crops like rice, cassava, maize, and yams. Transportation was geared towards the movement of minerals and agricultural exports to ports on the coast. As such, transport was provided in export-crop-producing areas.

The initial policy to extend transportation to the northern sector of the country under agricultural diversification was abandoned because of several factors: agricultural production was in the hands of indigenous people, revenue scarcity, and the fact that the north lacked export crops, mineral or timber deposits. The north with the potential of being the country's food granary became a remote area under colonial development policies, without railways and roads to boost the production and marketing of food crops.

In 1926, William Ormsby-Gore[43] undertook a comprehensive survey of agricultural policy in the Gold Coast and Nigeria. The survey took cognizance of the long-term implications of existing agricultural policy for the development prospects of both the United Kingdom and the Gold Coast (especially in terms of food security), after the First World War. Ormsby-Gore's review drew attention to the fact that changes in agricultural export prices affected the ability to import food, and warned of the dangers of relying on a single crop. With specific reference to food, Ormsby-Gore noted that prices of foodstuffs were unduly high in the towns (urban bias) and stressed the need to focus on local food production in order to lessen the necessity to import food (Kay,1972:206).

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[43] A high official of the British Colonial office on tour of British West Africa.

However, by 1929, rice was imported from British Burma, India and Dutch Indonesia; wheat from America; canned meat and dried milk from Great Britain; and maize from French Western Sudan (Ewusi,1985:2). As A.W. Cardinal noted in 1931, more than 50 per cent of these imports could be produced or replaced by local production (cited in La-Anyane,1963:144). With the established means of production focused on export crop production, the problem was how to initiate policies to address the myriad of problems (farmers' indebtedness, lack of marketing infrastructure) in favour of local food production and thereby, "replace some of the many overseas imports with local produce" (La-Anyane,1963:144).

During World War Two, local food production again received some attention, largely to lessen food imports in order to free up space for military equipment. For the first time, the government intervened in food agriculture both at the level of production and marketing. The Department of Agriculture in conjunction with the military, organized production schemes highlighting "European vegetables" like carrots, lettuce and cabbage (Hansen,1987a:42). In marketing agricultural produce, a price system was enacted for food crops, and guaranteed purchases and transportation arrangements were established. Food production increased following this unprecedented support for food agriculture.

About 4,465 tons of cereals and 4.5 million tons of vegetables were produced and sold to meet the food needs of personnel engaged in the war, revealing that the policy on food production and marketing was geared towards external markets and not part of any coherent national food security strategy (Frimpong-Ansah,1992:30). Inevitably, therefore, the incentive structure was abandoned after the war (Hansen,1987a:42). The production increases, however, demonstrated "how better organization and management, together with the appropriate incentives, could increase productivity, even without improvements initially in technology" (Frimpong-Ansah,1992:30).

After the Second World War, the debate about the methods of cocoa production was restated and extended to the agricultural sector in general and food production in particular. Calls for technological changes occupied discussions on agriculture. The Department of Agriculture announced that:

> It [was] now becoming apparent that the peasant[s] had methods used in cultivating and preparing crops which will have to give way to mechanization if the country is to ... progress rapidly (cited in Hansen,1987a:37).

To follow through with the calls for introducing technological changes into production, government reports portrayed small-scale farmers as short-sighted and who cannot be relied upon to increase production, because of an inherent inefficiency (Ewusi,1985:3).[44]

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[44] Chapter 5 will demonstrate that the postcolonial state, under agricultural

In the post-second world war period, food supplies were inadequate, an indication that the drive for technological changes in production had not made a positive impact. The excessive attention to export crops and neglect of food production, high food prices and urban unemployment, created political challenges to the state. Nationalist forces also began to question the legitimacy of colonial rule.

Demands for self-rule intensified following agitations by the returning military personnel from the Second World War, who questioned why they had to go to war abroad to fight for freedom which was denied them at home. These political discussions portrayed the colonial state as uncaring and exploitative. The prevailing social and political environment provided a conducive atmosphere for agitations. In 1948, riots began in the urban areas and quickly engulfed the entire colony. Government appointed the Watson Commission to examine the reasons behind the riots. In its report, the Commission criticised the colonial state for the absence of plans for the colony's future development.

The Commission called for a program to increase food production and drew attention to the increases in food production that occurred during the second world war. To the Commission, it was possible to increase food production. The Commission, therefore deplored the concentration on export crops and made a

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modernization, followed through with this perception and introduced technological changes and large-scale farms to replace small-scale farmers.

strong case for a higher priority for food crops, arguing "it should certainly take precedence over - or at least rank on a par with - any further development in export crops" (Kay,1972 :236).

F. Conclusion

The colonial state, through the cocoa industry, generated revenue to aid the mother economy and local administration. Local farmers responded to the opportunities created by cocoa as a cash crop. Farmers and merchant firms participated in a monocrop-dependent economy integrated into the world economy. The long-term reliance on cocoa revenue for development was a problem because of world market constraints. Policies to resolve problems in agriculture were crafted to satisfy the competing and sometimes contradictory interests of the major actors in the local economy. Subsequently, the policies were indecisive in diversifying the agrarian economy and improving conditions of access to resources.

In a perceptive analysis, Beckman (1981:143) argues that the manner in which cocoa farmers (majority of whom were small-scale farmers) were integrated into the world market to ensure surplus extraction was important to the colonial state. The process, Beckman continues, was most thorough and successful in the Gold Coast. By preserving small-scale production under unstable conditions of the world market, post-colonial governments faced an uphill task in their agricultural policies.

Post-colonial governments had to address the structural factors involved in the monocrop agrarian export economy and an agricultural economy dominated by small-scale farmers producing cocoa and local food needs. At issue would be how the emerging structure of power relations between the state and social groups affect the availability of the revenue required for national development. The account of the post-colonial state's agricultural policies is provided in the next two chapters.

CHAPTER 5

AGRICULTURAL POLICIES OF THE POSTCOLONIAL STATE

A. Introduction

The previous chapter traced the ineffective performance of colonial agricultural policies to the dynamics of the power structure that conditioned access to productive resources and rewards for social groups. This chapter and the next one examine postcolonial agricultural policies and the implications for food security. From 1951, when Nkrumah assumed the title; Leader of Government Business, to the present, various forms of government (civilian or military, constitutional or non-constitutional) have ruled Ghana. Irrespective of form, postcolonial governments had a patterned relationship with the agricultural sector.

Agricultural policies have targeted cocoa production in order to generate revenue for national development. Beyond the cocoa sector, policies on other crops involved one or two of the following: state-sponsored large-scale mechanized farming; encouraging private sector investment in large-scale mechanized farms; and improving conditions for small-scale farmers. The government related to the agricultural sector through an elaborate institutional network. These institutions opened and deepened the extent to which state and society relied on each other, in a relationship geared towards political objectives. The social group which controlled agricultural resources, how the resources were used, and the effects on patterns of production, marketing and consumption are key factors in analysing agricultural policy performance.

This chapter will show how the dynamics of power relations have contributed to the ineffective performance of postcolonial agricultural policies. Agricultural groups had access to resources and rewards through patronage, clientelism and cooptation. As a result, agricultural policies failed and the contribution of agriculture to national development was not attained. To substantiate the above argument and the context to analyse postcolonial agricultural policies, the next section outlines conditions of the agricultural sector at the dawn of postcolonial rule and the structure of power relations that determined agricultural policy performance.

B. Background

The state of the agricultural sector at the beginning of the postcolonial era can be summarized as follows: shifting cultivation and mixed farming were the dominant systems of production; inferior technology (hoes and cutlasses) were the major tools for production; the institutional framework for agricultural development was weak. The post second world war political changes also had an economic dimension - how to improve agriculture.

The colonial state's post second world war response to economic difficulties, for example unemployment, and demands by nationalist forces for political participation created the social conditions that led to the 1948 Riots. The riots which began in the urban centres before engulfing the entire colony, established one powerful lesson for future governments, "the key to political survival is to minimize the discontents of urban lower classes" (Leith and Lofchie, 1993:228). Nationalist forces, seized the momentum from the riots to intensify anti-colonial sentiments.

Formed after the riots in 1949, the Convention People's Party eventually led the country to political independence in 1957. Under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah, the Convention People's Party pledged to improve agriculture in order to put the country on a path to rapid development. The first nationalist government, like the colonial one, left cocoa production to farmers, concentrated on marketing, underpaid cocoa farmers and kept the surplus. Under agricultural modernization programs, the government focused on state-sponsored large-scale mechanized production of export crops (apart from cocoa) and food crops by establishing a multitude of organizations.

When the Nkrumah government was overthrown by the military government in 1966, the new and first military government, the National Liberation Council, tried to abolish all the politically-inspired institutions of the Nkrumah government. The military government handed over power to the second republican government of K. A. Busia and the Progress Party in 1969. Both the National Liberation

Council and the Progress Party were determined to encourage private sector investment in commercial agriculture with subsidies. Even though the two governments abolished Nkrumah's institutions with the view of having a minimal state presence in agriculture, they also set up state institutions of their own. In the process, they established an intricate relationship between the state and private capital, which will be explored under the discussion on liberal agricultural policies.

Busia's Progress Party had been in office for slightly more than two years when it was overthrown in January 1972 by Ghana's second military coup. The National Redemption Council, as the coup makers called themselves, later changed its name to the Supreme Military Council. From 1972 to 1982, the political landscape in Ghana was characterised by instability and uncertainty reflected in rapid changes in government (Table 5).

Adapting Ninsin's (1989a) periodization, postcolonial agricultural policies will be examined as follows:

a) The Agricultural Modernization and Statist Era (1951-1966)

b) The Liberal Era (1966-1972)

c) The Era of Economic Decline and Political Instability (1972-1982)

d) The Ultra-liberal or Structural Adjustment Era (since 1983).

Table 5: Changes in Government (1972-1982)

Government	Date in Power	Type	Leader
NRC/SMC 1*	1972-1978	Military	Col. Acheampong
SMC 2	1978-1979	Military	Lt-Gen. Akuffo
AFRC	1979 (June-Sept)	Military	Ft-Lt. Rawlings
PNP	1979-1981	Civilian	Dr. H. Limann
PNDC	1981-1992**	Military	Ft-Lt. Rawlings

Notes:
NRC/SMC 1* : National Redemption Council (NRC), the original ruling council was reorganized in 1975 and took a new name, Supreme Military Council (SMC). In 1978, Akuffo replaced Acheampong as Chairman of the SMC. SMC 1 refers to the post 1975 ruling council and SMC 2, the post 1978 one. NRC/SMC will refer to the whole period 1972-1979.
AFRC: Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.
PNP : Peoples National Party.
PNDC: Provisional National Defence Council.
** : The PNDC government handed over power to President Rawlings and the National Democratic Congress under the Fourth Republican Constitution in January 1993. The National Democratic Congress is currently in its second four-year term of constitutional rule with Rawlings still as President.

C. The Agricultural Modernization and Statist Era (1951-1966)

The Convention People's Party's program of agricultural modernization had roots in the colonial administration's "Ten-Year Plan for the Economic and Social Development of the Gold Coast." In 1949, the colonial state, in line with the prevailing mood to bring superior technology (machines) to agricultural production established the Agricultural Development Corporation. As part of this move, the

Gonja Development Corporation, sited in the savanna zone of the northern farming zone, was arguably the foremost attempt at agricultural mechanization in the Gold Coast.

The Gonja Development Corporation, charged to develop an area of about 30,000 acres at Damongo in the Gonja District of the Northern Region had a primary and secondary mandate. Its primary mandate was to undertake experimental mechanized farming and raise the output of foodstuffs for the region and the country at large. The secondary objective was to develop the scarcely populated Gonja District as a resettlement area for farmers from the near-by overpopulated Frafra District. The Gonja Development Corporation, for reasons examined later on, run into financial losses and was liquidated in 1957.

The Convention People's Party shared the colonial state's view of superior technology changing agricultural production.[45] The party's 1951 election manifesto, stressed the state's role in addressing the swollen shoot disease that affected cocoa trees. Farmers would also control funds of the cocoa marketing board. Railway lines would be doubled and expanded, roads modernised and industrialisation would be carried out with all the energy required.[46] Large-scale mechanized farms and state-sponsored agricultural institutions in production and marketing were highlights of agricultural modernization and statist policies.[47]

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[45] The coincidence of policy positions by the nationalist government and the departing colonial administration was one indication of continuity. More importantly, by accepting the conclusions of the colonial administration's development plan, which simply assembled projects before seeking how to finance them, the nationalist government, as Omaboe (1966b:441) admits, was faced with the problem of coordinating projects in relationship to state finances and the likelihood of a series of uncoordinated projects.

To generate the revenue to finance agricultural modernization, cocoa production was reorganized. From 1952 to 1962, the Ministry of Agriculture launched a systematic inspection and spraying program to resuscitate cocoa production. Through the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board, farmers received loans and subsidized inputs like cutlasses, machinery for spraying pests and pesticides to attack the swollen shoot disease and destroy the capsid bugs (Johnson,1962; Killick,1966b:245-247). Taking advantage of a comprehensive compensation program, farmers cut down diseased cocoa trees and cooperated with efforts encouraging the vigilance of farmers in controlling plant diseases.

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[46] Other aspects of the Manifesto, *Towards the Goal*, can be found in Austin (1964:130).

[47] Agricultural policies were contained in the First Five-Year Development Plan of 1951-1956, The Consolidated Plan of 1957-1959 and the Second Five-Year Development Plan of 1959-1964. Note that the Nkrumah government decided that the Ten-Year Plan should be implemented in five years, hence the Ten-Year Plan adopted from the colonial administration was transformed into the First Five-Year Development Plan.

Agricultural modernization and statist policies aimed at the integration of mechanized agriculture into existing systems of production, centralization of production processes and state monopoly in marketing. With the emphasis on technological infusion, the First Five-Year Development Plan (1951-1956) "proposed to undertake special agricultural experimental schemes *to ascertain the possibilities of large-scale mechanized farming in relation to local conditions of climate and soil and social organization*" (Gold Coast,1951:4, italics added).

The proposal for experimental schemes suggested an awareness by the government that successful integration and adoption of mechanized agriculture into existing systems of production should be a gradual process. Lessons from the experimental schemes on mechanization would therefore help to prepare farmers for the successful adoption of technological changes in agriculture. An example of the institutional framework required for the gradual changes in existing systems of production was found in the Agricultural Development Corporation, established earlier by the colonial government. The Nkrumah government adopted the Agricultural Development Corporation and required it to undertake large-scale estate projects in pineapples, groundnuts, oil palm, rubber, plantain, tobacco and cotton.

The centralization of institutions for agricultural production was intensified in 1962. Centralization was part of the socialist or statist ideology announced by

Nkrumah in his famous Dawn Broadcast of April 8, 1961. Centralization was based on an assumption that agriculture still played an important role in the economy, but it had to be reorganized (Dadson,1973:195). A reorganized agriculture would also initiate "major structural changes [in the relationship between agriculture and the general economy] in order to escape the debilitating dependence on cocoa trade" (Beckman,1981:147).

The centralization program linked all institutions of production and marketing to the government's party, a move the government presented as the means to rapid national development. Existing production institutions were centralized around the following: the State Farms Corporation, the Workers' Brigade, the United Ghana Farmers' Cooperative Council and the Youth Farmers' League (Ghana,1964).[48] The government charged State Farms Corporation, nerve centre of the centralization strategy, to introduce new and proven techniques of production in uncultivated areas of the country (Ghana,1964:70). State farms produced export crops like rubber and tobacco and food crops like rice, maize and yams (Miracle and Seidman,1968:21-39).

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[48] Most of these institutions were not new. The Workers' Brigade was established in 1957. The United Ghana Farmers' Cooperative Council was a follow-up organization from the United Ghana Farmers' Council formed in 1953. The statist policy provided the forum to centralize existing organizations and bring them under state control.

The government's interest in marketing has roots in the colonial era during which a state institution was in charge of marketing cocoa. In 1952, the government established the Cocoa Purchasing Company as a licensed buying company of the state marketing board. The company competed with other licensed buying agents (mostly foreign) in the cocoa industry until large-scale financial irregularities led to its liquidation in 1957 (Beckman,1976:59). After the dissolution of the Cocoa Purchasing Company, the United Ghana Farmers' Cooperative Council took over its assets. By 1962, the farmers' cooperative council had muzzled all other buying agents in the cocoa industry, including the foreign ones.[49] The state's interest in marketing also extended to food crops with the formation of the Food Marketing Board which bought and sold food crops, but mainly in urban areas.

C.1 Policy Outcomes: Analysis and Critique

The massive cocoa disease control programs launched in the early 1950s yielded dividends, and cocoa production increased from 262,000 tons in 1951/52 to 317,000 tons in 1959/60. A peak of 572,000 tons was attained in 1964/65 (Beckman,1976:279). Ghana contributed about two-fifths to world cocoa exports in the latter part of the 1950s and early 1960s. World cocoa prices also improved during the 1950s. Cocoa alone accounted for an average of 62 per cent of total government revenue in direct and indirect taxes (Frimpong-Ansah,1992:88).[50]

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[49] For a detailed analysis of how the foreign firms conceded to the farmers' council, see Beckman (1976:78-107).

However, with Ghana producing two-fifths of world exports and the demand for cocoa growing slowly, excess cocoa production automatically led to falling world-market prices (Rimmer,1992:75). Ghana was not the only African country producing cocoa, let alone the only producer in the world. Unlike the merchant companies during the colonial era, who came together to protect their interest, Ghana and the other cocoa producing countries could neither present a united force nor agree to control their production in order to influence world market prices. Attempts by Ghana and some selected producing countries to withhold production were defeated by the willingness of other countries to give in to the lure of higher prices (Fitch and Oppenheimer,1966:85-86). However, world market prices for cocoa began to fall from 1959 onwards and by 1965, stood at 90 British Pounds per ton compared to 247 British Pounds per ton in 1957 (Young, Sherman and Rose,1981:170). Low cocoa prices had financial consequences for Ghana.

As cocoa production increased and world prices declined, the consequent fall in state revenue dwindled the surplus for reinvestment in public projects and other social programs government had in mind. Between 1951 and 1961, with the exception of maize, there were dramatic increases in imports for rice, wheat, fruit, vegetables and other food items (Ghana,1964:55). Since food imports were financed from cocoa exports, the dwindling surplus and widening deficits led to a decreased food import capacity (Rimmer,1992:81 Table 5.5; Jones,1976:244). The 19 percent of total import expenditure on food in 1962, declined to 15.6 per cent in 1966 (Kraus,1988:110).

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[50] The important question, however, is not how much cocoa revenue was available to the nationalist government but what resources were available to the agricultural sector. The nationalist government and the departing colonial administrators in the name of continuity agreed to keep cocoa reserves in Britain. In effect, considerable constrains existed on how much of cocoa revenue was available to the nationalist government and its use (Fitch and Oppenheimer,1966:46-47).

Cocoa prices were favourable for the greater part of the 1950s and agricultural modernization programs also addressed food production. The question then is this: what happened to the revenue made during the time of favourable cocoa prices and the agricultural modernization program? The answer to this question lies in analysing the operations of state-sponsored agricultural institutions, and conceptions of development. The centralized production and marketing institutions which carried the promises of agricultural modernization for national development turned out to be exercises in political mobilization, patronage and clientelism.

Beginning with the cocoa industry, the state's desire for control of production and marketing found full expression in the relationship among the United Ghana Farmers' Cooperative Council, the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board and the Cocoa Purchasing Company. The United Ghana Farmers' Cooperative Council, proclaimed by the state as the mandatory institution for all farmers, was in fact an integral part of the Convention People's Party, the ruling party. As the farmers wing of the ruling party, the farmers' cooperative council monopolised the distribution of subsidies on agricultural credit, and inputs to cocoa farmers provided by the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board.

With the farmers' cooperative council in charge of input distribution, only farmers who belonged to the cooperative council and by default the Convention People's Party had access to productive resources. The party faithful, through the various branches of the cooperative council, had a better chance than did non-party farmers of obtaining productive resources. In this way, access to resources was politicized and used to reward party members, who suffered no penalties even when their loans, for example, fell in arrears. Non-party members, as a form of discrimination, could not have access to these resources.

With a foothold on production through the farmers' cooperative council, the state intensified its marketing interests in the Cocoa Purchasing Company. The Cocoa Purchasing Company, owned and operated by local farmers (under the auspices of the ruling party) was described by a party official as "the atomic bomb of the Convention People's Party" (cited in Fitch and Oppenheimer,1966:48). The main task of the Cocoa Purchasing Company was to destroy foreign buying firms and take over their operations.

During the colonial era, foreign merchants, their agents and local buyers were the main licensed buying agents of the state cocoa marketing board. Some cocoa brokers became senior members of the government and realised their interests in the cocoa industry could be achieved through state power. Through the alliance between the government and the farmers' council, an orchestrated campaign and pressure was brought upon the state cocoa marketing board to get rid of all foreign licensed cocoa buying agents. The protestors contended, among other reasons, that profits made by the foreign companies were not invested in the country (Beckman,1976:79-91).

The Cocoa Purchasing Company endeavoured to pay farmers promptly so as to be perceived in a positive way from the other buying firms. Most of the funds to pay the farmers came from state institutions. Indeed, the government ordered the state cocoa marketing board to finance the buying operations of the Cocoa Purchasing Company (Beckman,1976:61).[51] However, since the Cocoa Purchasing Company and the Farmer's Cooperative Council were instruments of the Convention People's Party, they paid a closer attention to the needs of party members. Non-party members had no reliable outlet to market their crops as the farmers' council and purchasing company controlled inputs for cocoa production and marketing arrangements.

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[51] The Cocoa Processing Company purchased about six percent of cocoa beans in the 1952/53 buying season. For about three more years, its market share increased to 18 percent before large-scale financial irregularities led to its liquidation in 1975 (Beckman,1976:59).

The Cocoa Purchasing Company also cheated cocoa farmers by exploiting the differences between weight measurements for cocoa, the so-called "bush" weight and the Accra weight (Arhin,1985:42). The "bush" weight was heavier than the Accra one. The company bought cocoa from farmers using the "bush" weight and sold with the Accra weight at the same price. Since the "bush" weight was heavier, and the company sold cocoa at the lighter Accra weight, the company made profit simply by exploiting weight differences. It was this financial pool, in addition to funds from the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board that enabled the state institutions in cocoa production and marketing to advance credit to cocoa farmers in the Convention People's Party controlled areas.

Wealthy cocoa farmers, who previously provided credit irrespective of political orientation, were not allowed to do so any longer, and their influence declined in the farming communities. The declining influence of wealthy cocoa farmers lead to an acrimonious relationship between the state and cocoa farmers, when the government attempted to pass the Cocoa Duty Ordinance of 1954. The Cocoa Ordinance, essentially a tax on cocoa exports, froze the producer price of cocoa for four years in anticipation of increased government revenue and profits from cocoa trade. In the context of rising world prices in the 1950s (cocoa prices began to fall from 1959), the Ordinance and the close relationship between the state and farmers' associations created widespread discontent among farmers, particularly in the Ashanti Region.

Cocoa farmers in the Ashanti Region, accounting for about 50 per cent of the national output, quickly rallied against what they perceived as a trend of political dominance by the Convention People's Party. The farmers argued that the state appropriated resources for partisan purposes, while presenting them as national interests. Ashanti farmers submitted grievances through the local branch of the farmers association. The protest "marked the beginnings of a definite revolt against the Convention People's Party within the farmers' associations" (Austin,1964:257).

The National Liberation Movement which emerged to contest the passage of the Ordinance, demanded a federal system of government that would allow the Ashanti Region to control its own resources. Exploiting a long-standing rivalry between Ashanti cocoa farmers and the Brong-Ahafo people, the government promised a separate Brong-Ahafo Region if representatives of Brong-Ahafo farmers supported the Cocoa Ordinance Bill. With the support of Brong-Ahafo representatives, the bill was passed and the Brong-Ahafo Region was carved out from the Ashanti Region (See Figure 2).

After winning this battle, the state consolidated its power, signalling to many constituents the benefits to be derived from joining the government and its party.

Using agricultural resources, in this case revenue from cocoa, to reward political constituents, the actions of the Convention People's Party confirmed a prediction made by Bauer (1963, first published in 1954) when marketing boards were being formed after the Second World War. Bauer's observation was that the government's easy access to revenue through the board presented

> a great opportunity to politicians to entrench their position, extend their control and increase their power. It [was] not unlikely that African political leaders gaining power [would] use the machinery and funds of the boards to further the general political aims of the parties, and that they [would] neither abolish the system nor greatly moderate the boards' policies (Bauer,1963:315).

The Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board, as the above discussion showed, financed the Cooperative Farmers' Council and the Cocoa Purchasing Company.

The close integration between the farmers' organization and the state (cocoa marketing board) served a mutual purpose. The cocoa marketing board paid an annual subvention of 100,000 British pounds to the farmers' organization and also played a major role in financing the construction of the headquarters of the farmers' council. In return, the council on behalf of the farmers made what were considered as "voluntary contributions" to the government. One such contribution was the donation of 17 per cent of the producer price of cocoa to support the Second Development Plan (Beckman,1976:72-73).

The state cocoa marketing board was therefore organized in such a way that directly or indirectly, it became an instrument for promoting government policies and "operated in order to pursue a number of, not always compatible, objectives" (Killick,1966c:371). Because cocoa was the mainstay of the national economy, given how the industry was administered, it was not difficult to understand why revenue made during periods of favourable prices were not available to cushion the impact of unfavourable prices. The above analysis also begs the question, what role cocoa farmers played in running the industry.

Cocoa farmers in the Ashanti Region resisted the way the Convention People's Party was running the industry, but their appeal for a federal government in which the Ashanti Region would control and use its resources was treated by the Convention People's Party as a narrow focus for national development. The Convention People's Party presented its case for control of cocoa revenue in the name of developing the whole country. Indeed, during the 1950s, the bulk of state expenditure went into a social infrastructure (schools and hospitals) as shown in Table 6. The problem was that some of the infrastructural programs were sited in areas for political purposes.

Cocoa farmers were also not a homogenous group. Differences among cocoa farmers led to differential impact and responses (Chapter 4). Most of the large and wealthy cocoa farmers had non-agricultural interests, particularly in transportation and mercantile activities. For many successful cocoa farmers, the non-agricultural activities had become primary areas of concern. The continued success of these

Table 6: Per Cent Allocation of Investment Expenditure (1951-1969/70)

Development Plan	Plan Period	Agric.	Industry	Infrastructure
First 5-Yr. and Consolidated Plan	1951-1959	5.0	6.2	88.8
Second 5-Yr. Plan	1959-1964	20.3	n/a	79.7
First 7-Yr. Plan	1963-1970	14.2	23.1	62.7

Source: Adapted from Akoto,1987:245.

non-agricultural activities depended on connections with the state machinery. As a result, any political agitations by wealthy cocoa farmers would jeopardize their non-agricultural interests. Once cocoa farmers began to make political cost and benefit analysis, it was difficult for them to present a united front to contest state agricultural policies.

Equally important in analysing agricultural modernization and statist policies was what resources were available to farmers. Funds to agriculture relative to other sectors (industry and infrastructure) were inadequate (Table 6) and how the funds were used was also significant. In defining development, Nkrumah equated industrialization with technology, insisting on a complete break with existing methods of production arguing that the small-scale farmer could not be depended upon to meet the demands of the rapidly growing population. As a result, small-scale farmers had to make way for "gigantic agricultural schemes" (cited in Killick,1978:46). The emphasis on technological changes in agriculture was to provide the basis for industrialization. Nkrumah's emphasis on technology also sought a "complete revolution in agriculture [and]... a total break with primitive methods and organizations and with the colonial past" (cited in Killick,1978:186).

Nkrumah, in his introductory statement to the Second Five-Year Development plan (1959-1964), stated:

> [A]lthough our emphasis is on helping the small Ghana farmer, we have also had no difficulty in concluding that it would be helpful to have some sort of large-scale modern agrarian projects in this country, partly to demonstrate to farmers the profitability of new crops and new methods .... We propose therefore to encourage the establishment of such projects under government auspices geared towards the needs of the country (Ghana,1959:6).

The intention of the above introductory remark to set up large-scale agricultural confirms the argument, at least to the government, that small-scale farmers, could not handle the demands of agricultural mechanization. The statement also reflected a shift from the earlier concern of exploring the possibilities of mechanized farming in relationship to the social conditions of agricultural organization. This shift signalled government's dissatisfaction with the failure of the initial mechanization project at the Gonja Development Company.

However, the failure of the Gonja Development Company cannot be attributed solely to the inability of small-scale farmers to use tractors. For policy makers, the failure of the Gonja Development Company indicated the incompatibility between traditional methods of agriculture and modernized techniques (Killick,1966d:232). Nevertheless, there was also evidence to show that in some cases new methods yielded favourable results (Wills,1962:212). The question then is not whether modernization of agriculture would succeed or not within the traditional setting, but how to incorporate new methods into existing ones. The apparent haste of the Nkrumah government to modernize agriculture precluded any such considerations.

The centralized state agricultural institutions did not increase production because of the conditions under which farmers had access to resources. Faced with the existing land tenure system, the Nkrumah government resorted to a series of legislative measures which basically accepted the tenets of the communal land tenure system.[52] The legislative measures gave power to the state to acquire land for public and private purposes,[53] regulate the collection and use of revenue from land originally controlled by chiefs, thus subordinating chiefs to the power of the state (Ninsin,1989b:168).[54]

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[52] The laws drafted included the *Local Government Ordinance of 1951, the State Council Ordinances of 1952*. Direct laws on land include *The Stool Lands Control Act, 1960 (Act 79) and The Administration of Lands Act, 1962 (123)*.

[53] A thin line separated land acquired by the state for public and private purposes. Land could be acquired ostensibly for public use and handed over to private individuals. Although the desire for private ownership of land was great, the state could not implement a full blown private ownership of land tenure because, in the cocoa sector for example, variations of tenure existed. Preserving the land tenure with its variations was an indication that the state was unsure of how changes would affect social relations in cocoa production and any negative reactions would affect cocoa revenue on which the government relied.

State power was critical in acquiring land for the state farms, workers' and cooperative farms, at times without compensation. In some cases, farmers in areas considered hostile to the government were faced with the most difficulties. The purpose behind state involvement in agricultural production was to

> [break] down the customs and traditions of the villages and their social cohesion, which were felt to threaten the rule of the President and his party. The peasants were shown 'where power lies' by the seizure of village lands without compensation, and by a calculated and ostentatious waste of resources - of land, labour and capital (Gordon,1970:577).

Thus, state-sponsored farms created intense animosity in farming communities. The tension favoured the Convention People's Party in terms of political mobilization and patronage, but affected the usefulness of agricultural labour.

The Convention People's Party recruited managers of the State Farms Corporation, on the basis of loyalty to the party. Managers were under considerable pressure to implement "the policy of hiring large numbers of redundant labourers in an effort to reduce unemployment" (Miracle and Seidman,1968:44). The

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[54] Land was the economic base of the chiefs. The desire by the Convention People's Party to weaken the chief by bringing land under state control was a by-product of the anticolonial struggle and how the power base of the Convention People's Party perceived the role of chiefs in that struggle. Some chiefs considered as powerful chiefs also belonged to groups like the National Liberation Movement that opposed the Convention People's Party in the 1950s.

Workers' Brigade also collected the unemployed labour from the urban areas and gave them the opportunity to return to the land. In the process, the brigade enlarged the scope of patronage of the Convention People's Party and provided the means to reward

> supporters for past favours and get rid of them [from the cities] at the same time. Not unnaturally, one consequence of this use of the Brigade was that many who enlisted and rose within its ranks regarded the official aims of the Brigade with cynicism and indifference (Jones,1976:225).

The United Ghana Farmer's Cooperative Council and its cooperative farms extended the role of the council and that of the Convention People's Party into the countryside. While the Youth Farms were designed to convince the youth of the dignity of farming, its political duty was "to instruct its members of the Party's socialist programme" (Dadson,1973:196). In view of the politics of their operations, state-sponsored farms had enormous labour costs exceeding the value of crop yield and, generally, operated at a loss.

Perhaps, the troubling aspect of state-sponsored large-scale farms was the high budgetary commitment[55] and their lower productivity compared with small-scale farmers (Miracle and Seidman,1968:19). Machinery and implements imported for the large-scale farms proved unsuitable, and when they broke down, more of the same types were imported only to be discarded again. In other words, there was a high overhead cost which did not match the returns. Large-scale mechanized farms were hampered by under-utilization of labour and machinery, poor coordination, and inadequate planning. In reality, state-sponsored farms were exercises in political mobilization and patronage than any novel approach to improve agriculture (Hansen,1989; Dadson:1973; Due,1969; La-Anyane,1963:170-171).

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[55] According to Nyanteng, between 1961 and 1962, state farms received approximately 90 per cent of the agricultural budget (cited in Bates,1981a:46).

Industrialization, an important component of Nkrumah's vision of development, received considerable state support.[56] In the Seven-Year Development Plan, industry's per cent allocation (apart from 1951-1959), surpassed that for agriculture (See Table 6). The industrialization program was supposed to offer employment to people leaving the land, following agricultural mechanization. However, as agricultural mechanization programs failed, labour was not offered the employment, hence the political context of the industrialization program.

The industrialization program was pursued with little regard to its social context. By the 1960s, Ghana had, at best, a weak relationship between agriculture and industry. The industries established, import-substitution industries, relied on foreign input and technologies and failed to establish any meaningful economic linkage with local input supply. Industries were sited in areas because of the political relevance of those areas. Otherwise, how can one explain how and why a tomato-canning factory was established in an area without tomatoes and a mango-processing factory had a capacity far beyond the total world trade in canned mango products (Killick,1978:199). Low capacity utilization of the industries implied that, excess labour following the rural-urban migration could not be employed. Rising unemployment created political embarrassment to the government and a nuisance to ministers. Hence the creation of the Workers' Brigade to send labour back to the land, but because the brigade was a patronage institution, it never succeeded in increasing agricultural production.

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[56] The construction of a dam on the Volta River at Akosombo in 1964 to generate hydro-electric power was a clear indication of the commitment to industrialization. The power from this dam was expected to be cheap and provide the needed boost for industrial development.

With policies generating conditions in which land accessibility and labour utilization led to instabilities in agricultural production, the prospects of food security were bleak. Cocoa, which provided the bulk of state revenue used to import food and to finance agricultural modernization, faced price fluctuations on the world-market, and its production and marketing were hostage to social and political struggles. When subsidies on spraying machines and insecticides were cancelled in 1962, cocoa farmers, without any incentives abandoned their farms and went into food production.

Nevertheless, the haphazard changes at the Ministry of Agriculture disrupted efforts to produce food on a commercial basis. The technical and professional staff of the Ministry of Agriculture were transferred to "production fronts" and placed under the United Ghana Farmers' Cooperative Council as coordinators and advisors to the export crop production units and not to small-scale food producers (Harris:1973:178). With all the available effort on export crops, extension services did not have much information on new or improved productive techniques to extend to food producers (Killick, 1978:192). Some analysts maintain that, if the government had spent

> the same amount of money and organizational talent that were expended on the state farms program, to develop techniques and provide incentives for small farmers, there would probably have been a far greater increase in domestic food production (Miracle and Seidman,1968:46).

The neglect of the developmental needs of the small-scale sector contributed to its inability to feed the rising population when shortfalls in cocoa revenue made it difficult to import food (Micah,1989:490).

The effect of instabilities in food supply was noted in the 1961 National Nutrition Survey, the first comprehensive study of nutritional status in Ghana. The study involved about 43,000 respondents of all ages from about 71 towns and villages. Davey's report on the nutrition study noted the prevalence of anaemia and malnutrition in different parts of the country (cited in FAO,1989:8). Specifically, malnutrition levels were higher in the savanna farming zone in the north, some urban areas, farming communities and lower in fishing communities in the coastal areas of the southern farming zone.

After years of agricultural modernization and imported machinery to increase food production, it was difficult to link food shortages to production. The Minister of Agriculture therefore blamed the distribution system for food shortages and was quoted as saying, "There is adequate food in the country. The problem has been the failure of food agencies to get them [sic] to the market. I intend setting up a separate body within the Ministry of Agriculture to take up the distribution of food" (cited in Killick,1978:188). Subsequently, the Food Marketing Board handled food crops, but it managed only to handle small quantities of maize and rice. Most of the marketing initiatives were to shield the urban worker from high food prices.

The government encouraged state institutions to provide food at subsidized prices for urban dwellers. The Workers' Brigade, for example, embarked on a scheme to sell *kenkey* (a maize product and popular dish) at prices below the prevailing market price. As state production enterprises could not produce maize,[57] the Workers' Brigade had to buy it at the prevailing market price, but process and sell it at subsidized prices. In the midst of economic difficulties, subsidies were irregular, and the Workers' Brigade incurred financial losses. Hence, the political imperative to provide urban dwellers with cheap agricultural produce could not be sustained (Bates,1981a:46). The combined effect of growing urban discontent over economic conditions and high cost of food contributed to the euphoria surrounding the military overthrow of Nkrumah and his policies on 24 February, 1966.

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[57] By 1965, the Workers Brigade Farms and other state farms provided only 0.5 per cent of the country's food supply despite all the attention and investment in them (Jones,1976:250).

D. The Liberal Era (1966-1972)

The military government, the National Liberation Council, that overthrew Nkrumah's government, and the civilian government, Busia's Progress Party, that assumed power three years later, had a great deal in common. Both governments had strong roots in the power structure in cocoa-growing areas of the Ashanti, Eastern and Brong Ahafo regions and had political obligations to create favourable conditions for private ownership in agriculture. For the cocoa industry, the challenge was not only to offer cocoa farmers an adequate reward, but also to restore the contribution of cocoa to government revenue.[58]

Agricultural policies underlying the military decrees and development plans aimed at disengaging the state from production and marketing, and encouraging large-scale mechanized farms run by indigenous and foreign entrepreneurs.[59] To follow through with minimal state presence in agriculture, the United Ghana Farmers and Cooperative Council was abolished, its operations and assets taken over by the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board and the Ministry of Agriculture. Many state enterprises, including the State Farms Corporation, Workers' Brigade and cooperative farms, were either disbanded outrightly or sold to private individuals. The state retained interest in some agricultural institutions when there were no private buyers. Even so, the number of state-owned farms dropped from 105 in 1966 to 66 in 1967 and 33 in 1971 (Kraus,1988:86).

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[58] The Progress Party, is considered an offspring of the National Liberation Movement that contested the Convention People's Party's cocoa prices in the 1950s. Therefore the urge of the Progress Party to create a favourable climate for cocoa producers cannot be overemphasized.

Agricultural policy, not surprisingly, focused on the cocoa industry. To improve cocoa production, there was a campaign to improve the delivery of spraying machines and eradicate diseases. While taking steps to revamp production, the government privileged the large-scale, private, so-called "progressive" farmers with generous loan facilities and tax concessions to import agricultural machinery. The Agricultural Development Bank[60] on instructions from the Bank of Ghana, insured agricultural loans for all farming operations not exceeding 100 acres (Opoku-Owusu,1973:166). Theoretically speaking, all farmers, small-scale or large-scale, could benefit from the credit program. One particular aspect of the credit scheme gave farmers a 50 per cent subsidy for inputs like high-yielding seeds, fertilizers and tractor services, and encouraged farmers to "focus and concentrate" on selected areas and on specific crops (Kraus,1988:87).

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[59] The major policy documents were the Two-Year Development Plan: From Stabilization to Development 1968-1970, and the One-Year Development Plan, 1970-71.

[60] The Agricultural Development Bank grew out of the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Bank which had been established in 1965 by an Act of Parliament under Nkrumah's government. Agricultural Development Bank was charged with the provision of credit facilities for the development and or modernization of

Conscious of the country's precarious foreign exchange situation, the government also entered into various agreements with international development and financial institutions and foreign companies. Such agreements encouraged the foreign institutions to import capital, technical expertise and superior management skills, mainly in joint programs with the "progressive" farmers (Dadson,1973:200). The Ministry of Agriculture, in conjunction with the United States Agency of International Development, initiated a number of projects to identify "key farmers" and teach them how to prepare "management plans," use fertilizers and improved seeds. A World Bank sponsored project for small-scale farmers involved the rehabilitation of cocoa farms (Beckman,1981:152-153). The government and the

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agriculture and allied industries. The bank was also to initiate, participate, mobilize financial and human resources in order to develop the agricultural sector to meet the needs of the country (Adjetey,1978:28). Large-scale farmers benefited more than small-scale farmers in receiving loans from the bank because of collateral guarantees. Assessments of the bank's activities are available in Owusu and Tetteh (1982), Nweke (1978a) and Opoku-Owusu (1973).

Standard Bank of West Africa also established a commercial rice farm in the northern savanna farming zone (Gyimah-Boadi,1989:230).

A broader approach to assist small-scale farmers was adopted under rural development (Brown,1986). Unlike the policy of promoting large-scale farms at the expense of small-scale farms during the era of agricultural modernization and statism, the liberal era stressed the need to develop small-scale farms alongside large-scale ones. The dual focus was to diversify agricultural production for exports and increase food production. The goal of the rural development program was to provide incentives to producers by improving living conditions in rural areas through the provision of social amenities like safe drinking water and electricity. In providing these facilities, the government's policy objective was to eliminate labour shortages by encouraging the youth deserting agriculture to either stay in or return to the rural area.

The government continued with its role in cocoa marketing. The state cocoa marketing board collaborated with the Cocoa Services Division of the Ministry of Agriculture in the distribution of insecticides and spraying machines to cocoa farmers. Cocoa marketing was reformed. The monopoly role of the produce buying division of the cocoa marketing board was abolished. Private companies were granted licenses to buy cocoa on behalf of the state marketing board (Gyimah-Boadi,1989:227). New regulations compelled the state marketing board to license buying companies with a capacity beyond 5000 tons. In the local food market, the state's role also increased with the creation of a Task Force for Food Distribution in 1970. The Task Force was charged with the implementation of guaranteed minimum[61] prices for selected crops for urban consumers.

D.1 Policy Outcomes: Analysis and Critique

Administrators persisted in their belief that large-scale mechanization schemes controlled by the private sector would increase the possibilities of economies of scale, diversify the agrarian economy, and improve food production. However, cocoa was still the source of national income, and production stagnated around 400,000 tons per annum until the liberal era ended in 1972 (Kraus,1988:107). The stagnation in cocoa production reflected the industry's neglect since the mid-1960s.

While cocoa production was stagnating, food crops production did not fare any better. Between 1970 and 1972, the per capita production of major cereal and tubers was declining (Figure 4). Food imports were high and accounted for 19 per cent of total imports in 1970 (Kraus,1988:110). The increase in total food imports

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[61] As the name suggests, guaranteed minimum price was the price at which state institutions in marketing bought food crops. The assumption behind the minimum price policy was to enable farmers, to at least, break even in their farming operations.

Figure 4



Raw Data for Food Crops from Agric. Stats & Census Div., PPMED, MOFA., Nov. 1993 and Dec. 1994 was a consequence of world market prices for cocoa. Although cocoa production did not increase dramatically, favourable world prices improved foreign reserves. The Task Force on food marketing was ineffective, for it lacked operating funds to stabilize either food production or food prices.

In explaining the above outcomes, it is easy to discern continuities with the previous era, in terms of how cocoa revenue was used and which social groups had access to resources and rewards. Favourable world market prices for cocoa led to a massive imports program. Total import value increased consistently, from 308 million Ghanaian cedis in 1967 to 443 million cedis in 1971 (Killick,1978: 307). Most significantly, 76 per cent of the imports went to consumer goods (Frimpong-Ansah,1992:104). Registrations of private motor cars went up 73 per cent between 1968 and 1970 and were still increasing in the early part of 1971 (Killick,1978:308). Thus, revenue obtained from periods of favourable prices had been spent on satisfying the consumption needs of entrenched powerful urban interest, but not on productive activities. Majority of cocoa farmers, who generated the revenue, did not benefit from the import bonanza.

The policy of disengaging the state's role in marketing did not address the problems of cocoa marketing but gave a useful insight into the relationship between the state and private capital in Ghana (Beckman,1981:151-152). In the name of market competition, the state abolished the monopoly of the state cocoa marketing board in cocoa purchases. Under a new arrangement, the private licensed buying agents were paid only when cocoa was delivered to the central stores of the state marketing board. However, many cocoa buying agencies did not have enough capital and received operational funds from the state marketing board.

Regrettably, many buying companies used the loans and income from cocoa sales on non-agricultural purposes and defaulted payments to either the board or cocoa farmers. Payments of some of the operational funds to the state marketing board were still outstanding in 1973/74, and cocoa farmers had to be content with a promissory note, called a "chit" (Arhin,1985:46). The companies disregarded payment to state marketing board and the farmers because most of these companies were formed by members of the ruling party or people with considerable political clout.

Consequently, the state became an accomplice in a scheme where companies buying cocoa, received operational funds from a state controlled marketing board, but defaulted on loan payments to the board and cocoa farmers. The result was considerable confusion in the cocoa industry in the early 1970s as the attempt to create a competitive market for cocoa farmers turned into a nightmare because of patronage and corrupt practices. The poor performance of private marketing companies in cocoa showed the weakness of local private capital hence, the encouragement given to foreign investors under joint investment schemes.

Workers, however, resisted the sale of state agricultural interests and both the military government (National Liberation Council) and the civilian government (Progress Party) had to take notice of such grievances. The host of institutions established under the agricultural and modernization era provided employment to workers. Workers had come to associate state institutions with secure jobs and were not sure how their circumstances would change with the sale of government enterprises. In addition, there were no local buyers for the state enterprises, and attempts to involve foreign investors in joint agricultural and non-agricultural enterprises came up against organized opposition from some university faculty members (Beckman,1981:151).[62]

The workers' agitation and the inability to sell state institutions, produced a sobering effect on the National Liberation Council and Progress Party governments (Frimpong-Ansah,1992:102). The sobering effect was a poignant illustration of the potency of the Convention People's Party's legacy in the role of the state in development, even if state involvement produced minimal results. Unable to sell, the Progress Party government kept an interest in agricultural institutions and in the process created new ones.

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[62] Frimpong-Ansah (1992:115) cites the example of Jones Ofori-Atta, then a Lecturer in Economics, at the University of Ghana who led an attack on the sale of state enterprises to the private sector.

Still publicly owned, the Workers' Brigade was changed into the Food Production Corporation. A National Service Corp, similar to the Youth Farms of the statist era, was created in each region (Dadson,1973:199). In 1970, the Grains and Legumes Development Board was established under the Ministry of Agriculture. The Board has been undertaking applied and adaptive research mainly on maize and cowpea in collaboration with the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research.[63]

While creating new agricultural institutions, the funds allocated to state agricultural institutions were declining (Table 7) and machinery deteriorated on many state-owned agricultural farms as the liberal era continued as new versions of past practices (Kraus,1988:86; Killick,1978:300). From 1965 to 1971/72, expenditure on agriculture was on the decline (Table 7).

Table 7: Public Expenditure on Agriculture As Percentage of Total Expenditure (1965-1972/73)

1965	**1966**	**1967**	**1968**	**1969**	**1970/ 71**	**1971/ 72**	**1972/ 73**
10.8	10.1	8.1	7.1	6.9	6.5	6.3	6.8

Source: Hansen,1989:202.

The commitments made to food production under rural development programs did not improve production, because of difficulties food producers experienced in the access to productive resources. Having correctly defined agricultural credit as one of the major constraints facing food producers, the Commodity Credit or Credit Guarantee Scheme of the Agricultural Development Board was theoretically commendable. The Agricultural Development Bank aimed to advance credit to a group of farmers growing specific crops (for example rice, maize, cotton, ginger etc) sanctioned by the government. The Commodity Credit Schemes resulted in a 62 per cent increase in agricultural credit between 1969 and 1971 and the Agricultural Development Bank, for example, increased agricultural credit by 181 per cent (Kraus,1988:87).

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[63] The Council Scientific and Industrial Research's role in agricultural research is further discussed in Chapter 6.

Despite these increases in institutional credit, "[e]xcept for the maize scheme,... only insignificant proportions of the numbers of farmers growing [other crops] were reached" (Nweke,1978a:44). Small-scale farmers did not benefit from the scheme, because the underlying philosophy of the Agricultural Development Bank's Commodity Credit Scheme was to promote large-scale rather than small-scale farmers. Thus, although all farm sizes not exceeding 100 acres should have guaranteed loans to all farmers, in reality, many small-scale farmers did not receive these loans.

The group-lending scheme was over-crowded, resulting in delays in the processing and release of funds. Many small-scale farmers complained about inadequate amounts and untimely delivery of credit for seasonal cropping activities (Owusu and Tetteh:1982). Large-scale farmers who received credit used their loans for non-agricultural activities, especially urban-based mercantile activities, and, in some cases, as loans to small-scale farmers. With interest rates as high as 100 per cent, small-scale farmers were trapped in a debt cycle (Nweke,1978a:40).

Several analysts note the beginning of private state-sponsored large-scale capital intensive farming from this era. The farmers in this group comprised serving or retired senior officials in the military, civil service and politically connected individuals (Micah,1989; Hansen,1989; Kraus,1988; Shepherd,1981: Goody,1980). Many of the subsidies in agriculture went to these farmers. In the northern savanna farming zone, many subsidized farmers went into the production of rice, yet Figure 4 does not show any increase in cereal production between 1970 and 1972. Many of the new breed of farmers who acquired resources were not committed to agriculture and thus, could not contribute to food production. The per cent growth rate in cereal production, in particular, registers negative growth when compared with rates of growth in population and tuber production (Figure 5). State production and marketing institutions could not address the problems of farmers.

The politics of agriculture and revenue use affected how cocoa revenue was dispensed and what groups had access to agricultural resources. When world cocoa prices collapsed in the 1971/72 buying season, the government was faced with

Figure 5



Raw Data for Food Crops from Agric. Stats & Census Div., PPMED, MOFA., Nov. 1993 and Dec. 1994
Population Data from FAO 1997 (FAOSTAT)

severe balance of payment and debt difficulties. Because cocoa revenue, when available, was squandered on the consumption needs of urban elites, the collapse in cocoa prices made it impossible for agriculture to finance development. With high prices of food, workers began to agitate for increases in minimum wages, as the real minimum wage by 1970 was only 55 per cent of the 1960 level (Callaghy,1990:272). The government responded to the economic and social difficulties with a drastic devaluation of the national currency.

Protests over food shortages and rising prices sealed the fate of agricultural policies pursued during the liberal era in addressing problems in agriculture and food security (Bates,1990:156; Beckman:1981). In 1972, a combined force of the military and police, staged a coup d'etat and overthrew Busia's Progress Party government. The combined force, it needs to be stressed, acted on its own behalf and those of the powerful social groups, together with whom they experienced economic difficulties.

E. Political Instability and Economic Decline (1972-1982)

1972 to 1982 was a decade of dramatic socio-political events including urban discontent and rapid changes in government (See Table 5). During this unstable period, agricultural policies[64] demonstrated the desire to improve the production and marketing of crops; increase regular supply of farm tools; expand and improve extension services. Agricultural policies did not show any significant difference from previous policies, only changes in emphasis occurred (Hansen,1989; Kraus,1988; Beckman,1981;Girdner et al.:1980).

One new emphasis was self-reliance, a development strategy to place Ghanaians in control of their economy (Hutchful,1989; Rothchild,1980). President Limann (1979-1981) for example stated that "agriculture will be our first priority now, and for the foreseeable future," arguing "[i]t was unacceptable that a country which abounds in arable land should import food or else go hungry" (cited in Chazan,1983:311).

A feature of agricultural policies of the previous era was the over-centralization of functions. Another aspect of the new orientation was the move towards decentralization, which in reality was dispersion of institutions, because power remained with institutions in the Accra, the national capital. However, regional and district institutions emerged; the former led to the establishment of Regional Development Corporations and the latter activities involved organs of mass mobilization. Regional Development Corporations were established in 1973 to initiate and engage in sound commercial business activities ranging from agriculture to industry. Regional corporations could participate alone in these business activities, or in partnership with the private sector, or with other governmental institutions (Rothchild,1980). The activities of regional corporations were monitored under giant integrated rural development projects: The Upper Regional Agricultural Development Project, The Northern Region Rural Integrated Program, and the Volta Regional Agricultural Development Project.

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[64] The major policies were contained in the National Redemption Council's Five-Year Development Plan for 1975/76 to 1979/80, People's National Party's Two-Years of Rehabilitation and Redirection and The Provisional National Defence Council's Program for Reconstruction and Development, 1982.

The rapid changes in government in the decade under review spanned a number of politically-inspired mass organizations. In the early 1980s, defence committees became dominant institutions for mass mobilization. Created by the Provisional National Defence Council (See Table 5), there were two types of defence committees: the People's Defence Committees and Workers' Defence Committees.[65] The People's Defence Committees were involved in the mobilization of civil society in both urban and rural areas while the Workers' Defence Committees provided the forum to express shop-floor militancy. Workers' Defence Committees were at the forefront in the struggle between workers and management over the role of labour in the production process (Hansen,1987b:179). As politicized institutions of mass mobilization, defence committees were characterized by populist rhetoric and slogans like "power to the people," "popular justice" and "participatory democracy." Throughout the country, defence committees functioned as important organizations for local-level political participation and channels of political communication between local and national levels of government (Ray,1986:79-80).

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[65] The National Defence Committee, coordinated the activities of the defence committees. Other active organizations included the June Fourth Movement, the New Democratic Movement. For an extended discussion on these organizations and their organizational structure, see Hansen (1987b) and Ray (1986:39-57).

A new and final emphasis was the increased involvement of multinational companies in agriculture, a feature which began during the liberal era. The Special Scheme for Participation in Agriculture encouraged multinational companies to produce industrial crops like cotton, oil palm, and coconut and invest in the production of food crops, especially, rice and maize, The state guaranteed land and other concessions to the Volta Aluminium Company, (a foreign-based company and the major consumers of the hydro-electric power from the Akosombo Dam), to establish a 30 million US dollars rice farm jointly with a local investment bank, the National Investment Bank (Beckman, 1981:157).

State institutions continued to provide the framework for agricultural development during this decade. Beginning with export crops production, the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board and the Ministry of Agriculture assumed responsibilities for coffee production in addition to cocoa. The Cocoa Rehabilitation Project which began in the Eastern Region during the era of liberal policies, was extended to other regions. The National Redemption Council (See Table 5) created a whole ministry devoted to cocoa affairs. While this move appeared as an indication of government's dissatisfaction with the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board, the analysis will show the real motive behind the policy.

Existing state agricultural production and marketing harmonized their activities with the Ministry of Agriculture in pursuit of self-reliant agricultural development (Agyemang-Mensah and Beegle:1987). For example, the State Farms Corporation, the Food Production Corporation and the Food Marketing Corporation merged to form the Ghana Food Distribution Corporation. Through these institutions, state involvement in agriculture surpassed previous levels (Beckman,1981 :154).

Within the context of self-reliance, encouragement was given to small-scale farmers, but the attention was once again on large-scale private-mechanized farming under military-like agricultural operations which unfolded in three phases.[66] The first phase of the program was called "Operation Feed Yourself," the second one was "Operation Feed Your Industries" and the third one was called "Operation Feed More Than Yourself."

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[66] One way to address the contradiction involved in encouraging small-scale farmers and shifting attention to large-scale farmers is to analyse the dynamics of agricultural policy. Such an analysis is crucial to explain, if any, differences in policy outcomes.

"Operation Feed Yourself" was launched with great fanfare and optimism in February 1972. The program was devoted to the production of food crops like rice, maize and cassava. As the name suggests, "Operation Feed Your Industries" concentrated on providing local industries with agricultural raw materials like tobacco, oil palm and cotton. The momentum generated by these two programs was expected to translate into "Operation Feed More Than Yourself." At that stage, subsistence agriculture would be a phenomenon of the past, and large-scale production would satisfy internal and external markets programs.

These military-like organizations showed another dimension by which the state interacted with society. The agricultural programs had an elaborate structure, stretching from the administrators at the national level through regional bodies and finally to the farmers at the local level. Through this structure, government bureaucrats and technocrats, on one hand, provided expertise for regional, district and community initiatives in agricultural development (Girdner et al.,1980). On the other hand, the coming together of state institutions and farmers also highlighted the politics and complexities of state and society relations, which determined and in turn affected agricultural policies.

For example, the state acquired land for agricultural projects, but most of the land went to large-scale farmers. In addition, subsidies were available to large-scale farmers on inputs and services, duty-free importation of agricultural machinery and spare parts, tax-breaks on profits, and guaranteed access to institutional credit (Rothchild,1980:471). For small-scale farmers, an innovative scheme of rural capital mobilization, called the Rural Banks,[67] began in July 1976 under the auspices of the Bank of Ghana.

The state continued its role in marketing and distribution of agricultural inputs. An attempt was made in cocoa marketing to reform the operations of licensed buying agents. To ensure that licensed buyers paid cocoa farmers, the buyers deposited an amount of money with the Produce Buying Agency of the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board as security against possible default (Gyimah-Boadi, 1989:232). The Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board was involved in the distribution of agricultural inputs and rural development programs such as feeder-road construction (Gyimah-Boadi,1989:237). The Ghana Food Distribution Corporation became a prominent institution charged with bulk food purchases for sale at subsidized prices.

The military governments dominating this era also embarked on a number of mobilization techniques to supplement distribution. Army units constructed access roads in some areas, and student groups participated in the evacuation of cocoa and other agricultural produce from the hinterland. In addition to their political functions, defence committees participated in agricultural production but were most noticeable in the distribution system. Defence committees thus served as alternative channels of distributing goods, replacing weak or non-existent state distributing institutions.

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[67] By definition, a Rural Bank is a localised unit of a bank established for the purpose of providing simple banking facilities for the rural community in which it is located. It is owned, managed and patronised by the local people. Rural Banks operate no branches and the savings mobilised in the locality are invested in local businesses through loans to small-scale farmers, the fishing community and other local entrepreneurial activities (Adjetey,1978:37). In existence for over two decades, Rural Banks have experienced problems of capital mobilization, and the lack of personnel to respond to the large numbers of farmers. For details on the performance of rural banks, see Obben (1992;1991).

E.1 Policy Outcomes: Analysis and Critique

Cocoa production experienced a precipitous decline in the decade under review. Production levels stagnated at an average slightly above 350,000 metric tons between 1972/73 and 1976/77, and fell further to 250,000 metric tons by 1981/82 (Kraus,1988:107). It is significant to note that world-market prices for cocoa were favourable during the 1970s, reaching a peak in 1977; that was nine times the level in 1971 (Rimmer,1992:143).

Producer prices paid to cocoa farmers varied with world prices and the whims of the state. Between 1972-1974, the real value of cocoa (in terms of 1963 value) fell from 84.5 per cent to 49 per cent by 1977/78 (Kraus,1988:91). In reaction to the low income value of cocoa, farmers resorted to selling cocoa across the border into Togo or Côte d'Ivoire, where higher prices prevailed (Boahen,1992:11).

The shortfall in cocoa production was worsened by the short-lived reforms initiated in cocoa marketing. The Produce Buying Agency of the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board, supposed to work in the interests of cocoa farmers and discourage Licensed Buying Agents from issuing "chits," was engaged in the same practice (Arhin,1985:46). With the cocoa industry in turmoil, a severe strain was exerted on the country's foreign reserves and balance of trade.

Ghana's foreign exchange situation also took a turn for the worse when the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries increased the price of oil in 1973 and again in 1979. After 1974, Ghana was under considerable pressure from creditors to keep-up on debt-servicing. The country was unable to service her mounting debt burden in the midst of low exports. In addition, Acheampong and his National Redemption Council decided not to make payments on some loans contracted during the Liberal Era, especially those they considered questionable. By July 1979, Ghana's short-term loans had fallen into arrears to the tune of 1190 million Ghanaian cedis (Rothchild and Gyimah-Boadi,1986:259). The state's inability to keep-up on debt servicing and the refusal to make payments on selected loans led international institutions to freeze credit lines to the country.

Outcomes during this decade reveal the extent to which effective policy performance is the result of how the dynamics between the state and social groups affect access to resources and rewards. While cocoa production was stagnant between 1972/73 and 1976/77, food crops production improved between 1972 and 1974 and fell afterwards (See Figure 5). The production of both cereal and tubers increased in comparison with population growth rate. Food production increased because it captured national attention, public appeals and concerted efforts were made to dignify farming. By making farming popular, urban dwellers -- civil servants, workers, professionals, took to backyard gardening and commercial farming, although partly in response to salary declines and inflationary pressures (Lawson,1980).

The "Operation Feed Yourself" program, though ambitious, went beyond the narrow confines of previous agricultural polices (Hansen,1989:203-204). The program had a specific focus on food crops and apart from rice and maize, it selected a variety of crops including plantain, cassava and yam. Enthusiasm generated by the program was pursued within a well defined administrative structure and, specific targets to be attained were accompanied by increased budgetary allocation. The government spent 36.6 million Ghanaian cedis on agriculture in the 1972/73 financial year. Subsequent increases of 41.3, 76.3, 101.1 and 220.6 million cedis were allocated to each financial year from 1973/74 to 1976/77 (Bequele,1983:244). Thus, agriculture registered increased growth rates of 4.5, 6, and 7 per cent for 1972, 1973 and 1974, respectively (Boahen,1992:9).

The era of political instability and economic decline also demonstrated how far ineffective performance of agricultural policy can be attributed to the politics of resource allocation and rewards. After so much talk of diversification, the continued importance of cocoa in the economy was an indication of how little the structure of the economy had changed since the colonial era. While the state continued to extract revenue from the cocoa industry, it refused to provide farmers with the resources required to sustain the industry. Calls by cocoa farmers for improved supply of inputs were ignored. In 1975, the cocoa seed multiplication program produced about 1 per cent of the required seeds, the amount of insecticide available could spray only 9 per cent of the area under cocoa and supply of sprayers could cover only about 3 per cent of the total cocoa area (Bequele,1983:243-244).

In protest against low prices, cocoa farmers resorted to the smuggling of cocoa. Cocoa smuggling led to the loss of state revenue and the lack of financial resources required to satisfy political interests in the urban area. Furthermore, cocoa smuggling undermined the ability of government to take advantage of the favourable world market prices for cocoa during the 1970s. There could not be a better example of how conditions of access to resources and rewards determined policy performance.

The changing economic circumstances affected the state, its functionaries, and contributed to political instability. To minimise the economic hardships for privileged sections of the urban population, the state intensified the patronage network and cooptation strategies. Because military governments dominated the 1970s, military officers occupied top positions in the civil service. Both the military and civil officers were exposed to changing economic circumstances which followed declines in cocoa exports and the country's foreign exchange.

The state's first response to the changing economic circumstances for top military and civil servants was to change the character of the ruling military coalition. In 1975, the National Redemption Council changed its name and became the first phase of the Supreme Military Council (See Table 5). The new council was made up entirely of military officers, a move which enlarged the network of beneficiaries. In order to reach the civilian population, a second move was the emergence of several state-sponsored organizations.[68]

Closely associated with the above measures was the state's ability to create an environment to control sources of revenue and dole political largesse. Thus, the creation of the Ministry for Cocoa Affairs in 1975 and changing the name of the National Redemption Council to Supreme Military Council in the same year, was more than an expression of government's dissatisfaction with the Ghana Cocoa

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[68] The proliferation of state-sponsored organizations included the Ghana Peace and Solidarity Council, National Redemption Charter Committees, "Special Aides" of Acheampong and The Society of Friends (Boahen,1992:18, Ocquaye,1980:85-86). Ocquaye (1980:27-45) carries in details various aspects of state patronage and the distribution of largesse.

Marketing Board. The government, aided by the creation of the new Ministry of Cocoa Affairs, began a systematic campaign of deception and political use of financial resources of the cocoa marketing board.

The patronage system manifested itself in several forms (Chazan:1983, Ocquaye:1980). For example, concerned about its own security and legitimacy, the first phase of the Supreme Military Council government launched the ill-fated Union Government[69] referendum in March 1978. Funds to finance the Union Government campaign came from the state cocoa marketing board. The funds were used to buy drinks distributed to chiefs for their support, and other dubious and illegal "donations" to pro-government organizations (Gyimah-Boadi,1989:235; Ocquaye, 1980:47). Taking advantage of the political use of funds and the economic difficulties, officials of the state cocoa marketing board paid themselves bonuses and allowances when farmers did not have spraying machines or insecticides (Bates,1981a:27-28).

In the midst of corruption and mismanagement, the high prospects raised by the Regional Development Corporations soon gave way to doom, as many of the corporations began to experience acute financial difficulties. Some of the projects conceived by the corporations became white elephants because they were not conceived of seriously. Subsequently, many corporations abandoned production activities in the primary and secondary industries by venturing into service industries like hotels and entertainment bands (Boahen,1992:10).

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[69] Union government, as a system of government, was to be composed of civilians and members of the security forces. The Supreme Military Council offered Union government as the answer to political instability in Ghana. Details of the Union Government debate are available in Ocquaye (1981:67-110).

The state provided funds to support the Ghana Food Production Corporation and the State Farms Corporation with disappointing results. In 1974, the Food Production Corporation alone had a supervisory and managerial staff "equivalent to 28 per cent of the national agricultural extension staff, and its planting materials budget was 27 per cent of that used by the Ministry of Agriculture to supply materials [to farmers throughout the country]" (Nweke,1978b:205). Yet, both the Food Production Corporation and State Food Corporation cultivated only 2 per cent and 1 per cent of the total area for rice and maize respectively (Nweke, 1978b: 205).

In the midst of economic difficulties, public officials diverted funds for production to pay old debts, salaries and allowances of the bureaucratic personnel and not the acquisition of capital items for production. The underlying reason for the mismanagement of resources, was the fact that officials received their income irrespective of the success of the crops or the performance of agricultural production institutions (Nweke,1978b:206).

Private large-scale farmers, did not also make any positive contribution to food production. In 1974, the estimated 1,200 large-scale farmers in food production, produced not more than 1 per cent of the total food output (Nweke, 1978a:39). Large-scale farmers who received credit had no enthusiasm for agriculture, and rented their subsidized agricultural machinery at prohibitive rates to small-scale farmers (Hansen,1989:206). In view of the difficulties some farmers, especially small-scale producers, were facing in access to available resources, the progress attained in food production in the early 1970s quickly turned into disaster from 1974 onwards (See Figures 4 and 5).

After local large-scale farmers failed to increase food production, the Special Scheme for Participation in Agriculture encouraged foreign investors to participate in food production. However, the response of foreign investors was slow, since most of the foreign companies were interested in agricultural exports and not food crops (Hansen,1989:221). Ironically, while foreign investors and large-scale farmers were enjoying various forms of guarantees and access to agricultural resources, cutlasses and hoes, the most basic instruments of production were not easily available to food producers (Hansen,1989:212).

Government appointees in charge of the distribution of inputs used the scarcity to deepen their alliances with influential sections of the rural community. Micah (1989:471) cites an incident, during the rule of the People's National Party, about the supply of cutlasses. The District Chief Executive in the Dormaa District of the Brong Ahafo region in July 1980 supplied a local politician with one carton of cutlasses and reneged on an earlier promise to supply the same equipment to farmers.

The People's National Party, unable to ensure the availability of such basic inputs, saw it fit to celebrate the country's 25th Independence Anniversary by spending scarce resources on the construction of a national Hall of Fame (Boahen,1992:34).[70] Most of the contracts on the projects to be undertaken as part of the Anniversary celebrations were awarded to members close to the state structure, while tools for production, if available, went directly to politicians and not farmers.

The lack of resources for production was also felt in marketing and distribution. Marketing and distribution of crops was hampered by the breakdown of the transport network, vehicles without spare parts and an impassable road system in many agricultural regions (de Wilde,1980:148). Particularly in food supply, the state sponsored food production agency did not have money, vehicles and storage facilities to penetrate the hinterland, buy and store food crops. Whatever few food crops the agency procured were supplied through a close network of depots to privileged groups in the urban areas and government institutions like the army (Marshall,1976).

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[70] State "softness" also contributed to the problems of the People's National Party. For example, the government backed down from loan arrangements totalling 400 million US dollars from the International Monetary Fund because of conditionalities, specifically devaluation of the national currency (Jonah, 1989a:110). The government believed devaluation would trigger consumer price increases and reduce funds for social welfare programs.

The failure of state marketing institutions left women food-traders as the dominant players in food distribution. Because of difficulties of production and marketing, food prices were high in the urban centres. Not surprisingly, the political authorities have blamed women traders for high food prices. Nyanteng (1978) has explored the relationship between food traders and farmers in order to answer the question whether women traders were accountable for high food prices.

According to Nyanteng (1978), food producers admit women food traders performed vital functions in the food market. Women food traders, did venture out to a wider area to buy food, easing the problem farmers were faced with in marketing their crops. Women traders, unlike the state institutions made prompt payment on purchases and loaned funds to farmers. By financing the production of food crops, food traders bought crops at prices which they could well influence. Nyanteng (1978:14) also reports that farmers appreciated the difficulties under which women traders' work. It is significant to note that while producers were sympathetic to the plight of women traders, government, because of urban consumers, did not share similar conclusions.

During the short-lived era of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (See

Table 5), the structural factors affecting the role of women traders in food marketing were not considered.[71] The belief that women traders were responsible for high food prices was so intense that in August 1979, the main market in Accra, the Makola Number One market was destroyed on the orders of the government (Robertson,1983). The idea of the political authorities that women traders accounted for the high prices of food and the destruction of the Makola market, apparently to punish women, touched on the relationship between women and agricultural policies in Ghana. Details of this relationship will be examined in the next chapter.

The negative implications of agricultural policy performance for food security were felt not only at the level of production and marketing, but also for consumption. A UNICEF (1988:93) study noted that food ratios in relation to basic consumption requirements declined from 83 per cent in 1964-66 to 71 in 1978-80 and only 60 in 1982. Changes in food consumption were felt in all the farming zones. A small survey on food consumption in Adzen Kotoku in the Greater Accra Region of the southern farming zone, indicated that children between the ages of 1 and 5 had only 40 percent of their energy and 86 per cent of their protein requirements (FAO,1989:5).

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[71] The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council was more concerned with restoring what they believed was a tarnished image of the military in politics, than developing any long term policies. The concern for long-term policies fell on Limann and his Peoples National Party.

In the late 1970s, nutrition and health related diseases like yaws and yellow fever began to reappear with major epidemics in the Northern and Upper regions of the northern farming zone in 1977,1981 and 1983 (UNICEF,1988:102-103).[72] Studies by Orraca-Tetteh and Watson, and by Ewusi in the 1970s on the nutritional status of children also showed prevalence of malnutrition in the forest sector of the southern farming zone (cited in ISSER and Centre for World Food Studies,1993:81). In their study, Orraca-Tetteh and Watson found that 46 per cent of children were seriously undernourished while Ewusi reported that about 70 per cent of the children were undernourished with about 22 per cent being seriously undernourished.

By the end of 1981, the whole country showed evidence of neglect in development. The performance of the People's National Party (then in charge of government) undermined state legitimacy because it could not provide resources for production. The result was a precarious grip by the government on the institutions of state (Hansen,1987b:170). It was against this background of "social stillness," so to speak, that the change in government occurred on December 31, 1981.

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[72] Tripp (1981) shows that women in the northern savanna farming zone who earned money through market trading were able to invest it to feed their children better than women who did not. Tripp's findings established the argument that the primary determinant of nutrition for children was not household income per se, but who controlled the income.

The Provisional National Defence Council brought back as its leader Jerry Rawlings who led the earlier Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. The Provisional National Defence Council was a populist government, it relied on ad hoc measures and mobilization tactics without showing any understanding of the underlying structural problems on agricultural development. Towards the end of 1982, it was clear that ad hoc policies were no match for the policy vacuum and institutional problems facing the agricultural sector. There was a need for a new policy framework for agriculture to make the expected contribution to national development. A major initiative in that direction was the adoption of ultra-liberal or structural adjustment policies, focus of the next chapter.

F. Conclusion

From 1951 to 1982, agricultural policies and outcomes did not show any marked departure from those of the colonial era. Agricultural policies subordinated the cocoa industry to the state. By taking charge of revenue from the cocoa industry, the state controlled the income of cocoa farmers, who reacted through smuggling and leaving the sector when their income fell. Evidently, the diversification program pursued by the postcolonial state could not provide answers to the monocrop agrarian economy. This failure and the continued dependence on cocoa further exposed the fragile nature of the economy. Increasing foreign exchange difficulties and politicized subsidies on agriculture, implied growing scarcity of funds, and agriculture resources were allocated through a patron-client network.

Attempts by governments to disengage their involvement in agricultural development, rather led to intense involvement. State institutions used available funds to pay salaries while public expenditure on agriculture declined. Agricultural policies on food production aimed at changing the structure and group of producers from without and neglected the needs of the existing group. Agricultural marketing was also in disarray. Marketing bottlenecks in transportation and agricultural prices encouraged the growth of parallel markets controlled by women traders, who were blamed for high food prices in urban areas. The failure of agricultural policies was evident in the prevalence of malnutrition in all farming zones.

State incapability to effect changes in agriculture became obvious as the 1980s wore on. Addressing agricultural problems and improving food insecurity would call for reassessing the state's capabilities in policy initiation and implementation. Accordingly, in 1983, ultra-liberal or structural adjustment policies were adopted to present a fundamental rethinking of the role of the state in agricultural development. The question, however, is the extent to which ultra-liberal policies can change the state's role in agricultural development and create conditions of access to resources and rewards for agricultural groups without recourse to patronage, clientelism, and cooptation. These issues are the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 6

THE AGRICULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF THE STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM

A. Introduction

In 1983, the Ghanaian Government adopted the structural adjustment program to tackle the problems of agriculture and reverse years of economic stagnation. Prior to 1983, the production of export and food crops had been falling. Cocoa exports fell from 397,300 metric tons in 1975 to 246,500 metric tonnes in 1981 and Ghana's share of total world production for cocoa dropped from 24.4 percent to 15.4 percent (Hutchful,1996:143). The production of food crops like maize, rice, cassava and yams also declined. Declining cocoa exports led to decreases in foreign exchange and government revenues. The lack of government revenue signified an inability to import food and the fall in local food production created shortages and affected levels of food consumption. The social and political implications of the precarious economic situation called for a new policy direction. The framework for this new policy direction was the structural adjustment program.

Sponsored by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the structural adjustment program was a major paradigm for development in many African countries in the 1980s. The program's emergence was connected to changes in the global economy and political thinking, particularly in developed capitalist economies. The 1973 oil price increase by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries led to excess 'petro-dollars', in the international financial system. With excess funds, a major monetary boom led to enormous expansion of lending to many developing countries. In many African countries, increased borrowing also increased their indebtedness. The second oil price rise in 1979 and high inflation indicated the seriousness of the indebtedness of developing countries and the threat to the stability of the international financial system.

Between 1979 and 1981, conservative governments gained power in the United States and Britain. These conservative governments launched an attack on inflation, called for a minimal role of the state in economic activities and took steps to address the instability in the international financial system caused by the indebtedness of many developing countries. The above economic and political events catapulted the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund into the centre stage in global financial and economic restructuring.

The presidency of the World Bank, for example, changed from the liberal McNamara to the conservative Clausen to chart a new path to confront the global financial instability and economic recession (Brown,1995:65). In Africa, the World Bank's influential 1981 study, *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa,* was a primer on minimal state involvement in economic activities. The study was also accompanied by significant financial resources for countries prepared to initiate structural adjustment reforms.[73]

Structural adjustment is both an economic policy and a political process. From the economic perspective, structural adjustment calls for the creation of a macroeconomic framework in which there is minimal state involvement in the economy and the market serves as the major system to allocate resources. In creating the appropriate economic framework, structural adjustment involves two distinct though interrelated processes, stabilization and structural change. Stabilization aims to reduce balance of payment deficits and control the rate of inflation. Structural change aims to improve the incentive structure for producers, so that increases in production will also lead to increases in export and foreign exchange earnings. The political dimension of structural adjustment involves conditionalities the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have used to persuade countries to follow market-driven economic policies.

Structural adjustment stresses the importance of a minimal state and an increased role for the market, under the assumption that previous development practices that promoted state intervention in the economy paved the way for political considerations and distortions in the allocation of resources. A minimal state will give the economy the chance to operate under the discipline of the market. In Ghana, the structural adjustment program had a specific focus on the agricultural sector, because of the sector's importance in the national economy.

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[73] In 1980-81, the World Bank initiated a lending facility for structural adjustment programs. African countries were encouraged to take advantage of special facilities, for example, withdraw resources outside the 500 percent available to members. In 1985, a one billion US dollars Special Facility was created for Sub-Saharan Africa (Herbst, 1993a:35).

This chapter addresses the agricultural dimensions of the structural adjustment program. The chapter assesses the extent to which the structural adjustment program addressed the problems of agriculture in view of the prevailing social and political context which informs agricultural policy performance. It is found that adjustment agricultural policies improved conditions of access to resources and rewards for some farmers producing export crops, at least, in the short term. However, for most producers and buyers, the long term implications of adjustment policies in terms of access to resources and rewards was one of uncertainty. Thus, there are problems in the extent to which structural adjustment can improve food security. Before discussing the agricultural measures of adjustment policies and the implications for food security, the next section examines the social and political forces that led to the adoption of the structural adjustment program.

B. Background

The military take-over of power on December 31, 1981 (See Table 5), occurred against a background of severe political, economic, and social problems.

The change in government also brought into sharp focus the competing ideas of two social groups on how to transform the Ghanaian society (Hansen,1987b). According to Hansen, one group was made up of the urban workers, the students of post-secondary institutions, and some members of academic institutions. This group, which Hansen calls the left, shared the conviction that addressing the economic problems facing the postcolonial state would involve

> termination of the control of the local economy by foreign multinational companies, changes in the structure of production and production relations,… creation of political forms which would make the interests of the broad masses of people predominant and realisable and a programme which would initiate a process of improving the material conditions of the mass of the people (Hansen,1987b:174).

The other social group was represented by sections of professionals in law, medicine, academia and senior officials of the civil service and military establishment, and some influential chiefs. Hansen calls this group the right. To this group,

> there was nothing basically wrong with the nature of the country's structure of production or production relations or the nature of our economic relations with Western capitalist countries or the structure of power,… or the nature of state power and that only certain aspects of its functioning needed to be reformed (Hansen,1987b:174-175).

Clearly missing from each group are farmers. However, as argued in Chapter 3 and demonstrated in the two previous chapters, members of urban based social groups have roots in farming communities and use their presence in these groups to further their power base in the farming communities. In fact, it is a source of pride for farming communities to have ties with members in urban based social groups.

Because, changes in the economic life of farmers are based on the power of the urban group that they support. It is important to note that the two social groups do not exist in water-tight compartments. The relevance of these social groups for the discussion is to explore which group's views dominated the Provisional National Defence Council. This exploration involves understanding the character and nature of the military intervention.[74]

When the Provisional National Defence Council came into power, it declared its mission to be nothing less than a "revolution." The Council proposed to break the chains of imperialism and neocolonialism, re-create state institutions through effective participation by the people and ensure that the national interest was attained at all times (Ghana,1982). These policy declarations placed the government within the views of the social group identified as the left. The initial policies on setting up organs of mass mobilization and their accompanying populist rhetoric also conveyed a left bias (Chapter 5). However, the unfolding dynamics of government policies, especially those on agriculture would show whether the transformation of society would take place according to views of the left.

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[74] The military take-over was the collective effort of soldiers (active, dismissed and retired) and civilian activists. Some of these soldiers were associated with the previous Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (See Table 5) and considered their dismissal or retirement by the new civilian government (the Peoples National Party) as the result of their association with the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. The civilian ties came from the range of political organizations like the June Fourth Movement, also associated with the short rule of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Hansen,1987b:172-173).

The government's policy framework on how to transform the society involved short and long-term measures. As far as agriculture was concerned, the short-term policies began with the role of mass organizations like defence committees in the distribution of agricultural produce. In cocoa marketing, students of post-secondary institutions volunteered their time in a program to haul cocoa from the hinterland to the ports for export. In food marketing, the defence committees, especially those in urban areas, used force to enforce price controls on the distribution of farm produce (Clark,1990).

Even though the overzealous activities of some defence committees turned out to be harmful to agriculture as Hansen (1987a:55) argues, their activities contributed substantially to the legitimacy of the military rulers. Price control, within the context of the populist note of the government, secured the support of urban-based workers. In addition, price controls portrayed a concern for civil society and a capacity to organise and allocate resources, at least in the short term (Green,1988:9). The perception about societal welfare provided the coup makers with an essential credibility, critical for the transformation of the society (Rothchild and Gyimah-Boadi,1989:221).

However, the effect of short-term policies on distribution and the use of force, deprived farmers and food traders of income and plunged the agricultural sector and the country into further economic difficulties. For Ghana, the effects of the global depression in 1982 and 1983

> were unbelievably bad - little water and electrical power due to a severe drought, little food, no cigarettes, no beer, no fuel, no spare parts, nothing in the stores, and widespread hoarding. Real GDP dropped 4.6% in 1983 alone, and real GDP per capita fell 7.1%. Inflation, which had averaged just above 40% in the 1970s, shot up to 123% (Callaghy,1990:274).

The above characteristics of the economy called for long-term policies to revamp the economy.

The emergence of long-term policies was the product of several factors. In early 1982, severe drought and bush fires raged across much of the land, destroying cocoa and food crops. Cocoa prices had been falling from the early 1980s and farmers lacked motivation even to harvest the crop. Even though there was an urgency to grow food for local consumption, the poor state of the country's transportation system and the price control activities of defence committees made it difficult to transport food to the urban areas. The result was intense hunger in the urban areas which exerted a strong political pressure on the government. In the midst of this fragile situation, Nigeria imposed an oil embargo on Ghana and further expelled almost one million Ghanaians without valid residence permits domiciled in that country.[75]

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[75] The move by Nigeria was similar to the expulsion order by Ghana of unregistered residents in 1969. In both cases, the expulsion order was executed under the

The two main social groups (identified as the left and right) struggled with each other in an attempt to control the government's long-term policy framework. The left, on one hand, insisted that the defence committees and organizations of mass mobilization presented an opportune political mechanism to be tapped into and used for national development. The right, on the other hand, charged that the development capacity of defence committees was limited because

> the problems of the country were economic and not political...and that the defence committees [as political institutions] were nothing more than vigilante groups who were only anxious to appropriate and share what others had worked hard to accumulate...and asked when hard work and success became crimes (Hansen,1987b:195).

The right also criticised the government on issues of human rights and autocratic methods of governance.

In June, 1982, three senior high court judges and a retired army officer were kidnapped and later murdered in circumstances which looked like political murder. Critics used this incident to arouse revulsion against the government. Between November 1982 and June 1983, segments from both the left and right tried but failed to overthrow the government. In the midst of series of plots and attempted coups, swift changes took place in the composition of the ruling coalition, as individuals perceived as radical (leftist inclined) were replaced with moderate ones (mostly from the right) (Ray,1986:103-112).

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impression that foreign elements had a stranglehold on the economy.

While the changes in the composition of the ruling Provisional National Defence Council appeared to give the right a presence in the ruling coalition, neither the right nor the left was strong enough to impose an agenda. Meanwhile, because cocoa revenue was declining, the state machinery had no money. This situation affected the life-chances of powerful sections of all social groups that depended on revenue appropriated by the state. Both sides of the political spectrum realised "[s]omething [urgent] had to be done" (Callaghy,1990:274) in order to secure some revenue for the state.

Hansen (1987b:193) identifies a turning point on how to raise funds, when one prominent member of the right establishment "who was virtually the economic adviser to the government succeeded in getting Standard Bank [a multinational banking institution] to advance credits to the government." It then became obvious that the source of funds could well dictate the nature and forms of policies to be adopted. The left, as Hansen (1987b:193) correctly argued, "was manoeuvred into a position in which its contribution to the transformation process was measured in terms of its ability to attract financial assistance." When attempts to secure financial help from Libya and the Soviet Union (countries deemed as sympathetic to a leftist transformation) failed, the right pointed to the availability of capital within the international financial system. The claims by the right were boosted by significant changes in the international political and financial system. Conservative governments in advanced capitalist societies, favoured "strong deflationary measures" (Mosley et al.,1991:23) and threw their political and financial might behind the two major international financial institutions, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

While analysing the conditions conducive for capital mobilization, it is important to note the following: changes in the composition of the Provisional National Defence Council between November 1982 and June 1983, the right's role in securing some credit lines from the Standard Bank, and the changes in the international political and financial climate, all had one significant conclusion. There was the possibility of obtaining assistance from the international financial institutions, if the government undertook measures conducive not only to the right within, but also to the international financial institutions. Indeed, the government took steps in that direction.

The first step was a series of measures to minimize the political significance of the defence committees, their populist rhetoric and anti-capitalist slogans. Chairman Rawlings, for example, derided the activities of the defence committees and called for "populist nonsense to be replaced by popular sense" (cited in Ninsin,1987:33). According to Botchwey,[76] meeting conditions for external financial assistance called for measures "to manoeuvre [the state policy-making machinery] around the naivités of leftism and the crudities and rigidities of monetarism" (cited in Callaghy, 1990:275). When the influence of groups from the left was minimized, a major opposition to the government dealing with international financial institutions was also removed (Jonah,1989a:111). The government then indicated to the World Bank, its determination to promote private economic activities in the country. The World Bank promised support, arguing that "the economic framework [for private enterprise]...would certainly be effective provided the general political and social milieu [was] favourable" (cited in Jonah,1989a:112).

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[76] The then secretary of Finance and Economic Planning, Botchwey was in office for 14 years and presided over the implementation of adjustment policies. However, after leaving office he characterised government agricultural policies during the adjustment period era "largely inefficient" for failing to create mechanisms to

In April, 1983, Ghana's long history of brief and mostly insignificant association with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund was turned into a more fruitful and lasting relationship (Jonah,1989a; Hutchful,1985). Ghana's relationship with the international financial institutions has survived more than a decade and the country has become a test case for structural adjustment programs in Africa (Rothchild,1991:3).

C. Agricultural Adjustment Policies: Outcomes, Analysis and Critique

Since 1983, Ghana's agricultural policies and institutions have become an

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channel credit to small farmers and women (Ghana Drum,1996:9-10).

integral part of the structural adjustment program. The policies have followed the World Bank's prescription for agriculture in Africa as set in two main policy documents. The first was the 1981 World Bank study mentioned earlier, and the second, the 1989 report, *Sub-Saharan Africa, From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*. Highlights of the two reports included a negative assessment of the state's role in agricultural marketing and pricing. Agricultural producer prices, one report stressed, should be recognized as of "overriding importance" (World Bank,1981:55). As such, steps should be taken to reform prices and marketing in order to influence the farmers' "willingness to produce and to sell" and ensure a certain degree of "predictability of prices; the efficiency, fairness, and stability of marketing arrangements..." (World Bank,1981:55).

The government adopted an exchange-rate reform, through devaluation of the national currency to eliminate price distortions and restore macro-economic balance. The essence of devaluation was to reduce the value of the local currency in relationship to the value of imported items. It was assumed that reduction in the value of export crops, would make export goods cheaper and thus stimulate demand.

In addition to price reform, was the restructuring of state institutions in marketing, and the opening up of input supply for private sector participation. The idea here was to reduce government's role in the productive sector, and improve the performance of agricultural institutions under the management of the private sector.

For example, given the failure of agricultural research "to provide answers to the problems which confront African agriculture" (World Bank,1981:69), the agricultural research and extension system in Ghana was restructured so that "future agricultural research programs" can "focus on social and economic aspects as well as technical considerations" (World Bank,1981:71).

With respect to farmers, small-scale farmers came up for special mention with the argument that apart from their statistical majority in food production, they were effective managers of resources and provided a cost effective way to raise the output of some crops (World Bank,1981:50-51).[77] It was, however, stressed that "[p]riority to smallholders [did] not mean that *only* they warrant attention" (World Bank,1981:52, italics in original). This caveat was in recognition of the dualist nature of agriculture with the existence of large-scale farmers. Thus, depending on the level of agricultural intensity, "larger farmers can be used to spearhead the introduction of new methods" (World Bank,1981:52).

The main thrust of policies recommended was the creation of an "enabling" environment in which the role of the state machinery will be one of "providing market and price information, promoting private and cooperative marketing activity, building market infrastructure, ... and establishing a legal framework that permits the development of competitive market activities" (World Bank, 1989:92). Part of the legal framework was to recognise the role of women in agriculture, strengthen farmers' associations and redefine land rights.

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[77] The 1980s was not the first time the World Bank stressed the importance of small-scale farmers. In 1973, Robert McNamara, then President of the World Bank, in his famous Nairobi speech acknowledged the importance of small-scale farmers and called for their active participation in rural and regional development programs. The call was not heeded to for theoretical and ideological reasons. See Galli (1992), Kitching (1982) and Williams (1981).

The need for land rights was in recognition of the fact that increases in population make it difficult to allow long fallow periods to improve land fertility. Securing land rights, would also give farmers the incentive to improve their land and use the security to "help rural credit markets to develop, because land is good collateral" (World Bank,1989:104). The ultimate goal of adjustment policies was to have a minimal and efficient state structure in an environment were the market reigned supreme.

The agricultural dimension of adjustment policies amounted to nothing short of "fundamental changes in the way the state operates" (Herbst,1993a:2). Historically, the participation of the Ghanaian state in agriculture has been to extract revenue for purposes of political mobilization and patronage and in the process introduced uncertainty in the allocation of resources and rewards. As such, the structural adjustment philosophy of withdrawing state's participation in production and marketing for the private sector, and insisting on market forces to allocate resources and rewards posed peculiar problems to the Ghanaian state. Would the state implement policies that will restrict its access to revenue? In minimizing the role of the state, would the market and private sector prove capable of improving access to agricultural resources and rewards?

Improvements in condition of access to resources and rewards are of immense significance in evaluating the agricultural adjustment policies. The analysis of adjustment policies in the next section is organised around proposed reforms, levels of implementation and accompanying trends in the following areas: export crops; institutional reforms and input delivery; labour and land tenure; agricultural research and extension services; and women farmers.

C.1 Export Crops

The export crops that received the most attention under the adjustment program were cocoa and non-traditional crops like pineapples, bananas and ginger.[78] The emphasis on these crops was on price reforms and restructuring of marketing institutions. Prices paid to producers of export crops is a product of four main factors. The first factor is the world market price for the crop, second how much the state institution in charge of marketing the crop decides to keep, third whether producers are paid in local or foreign currency and finally, the social characteristics of the producers.

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[78] The non-traditional sector began in the era of Agricultural Modernization and Statism (1951-1966) under state control. Private sector participation through subsidies encouraged the growth of the sector during the Liberal Era (1966-1972) and the Era of Economic Decline and Political Instability (1972-1982).

Under the assumption that cocoa farmers received low prices because of excess taxation by the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board, the adjustment policy on the cocoa industry involved two main measures: increase the domestic price paid to farmers and reduce the cost of running the cocoa marketing board through restructuring. In April 1983, the government increased the domestic producer price for cocoa. Producer prices for cocoa were increased because it was part of the conditionality the World Bank attached to making funds available to rehabilitate agriculture, and the government itself was committed to reforming the cocoa sector (Toye,1991:173).

For the World Bank, reforming cocoa prices was an incentive to farmers to increase production and export to address balance of payment problems. In the words of the then World Bank representative, Seung Choi, "The main prescription of the ERP [was] to shift the whole incentive structure in favour of the productive sectors..." (cited in Jonah,1989b:146). Government's interest in reforming the cocoa industry, also to improve revenue accumulation, started in cocoa marketing. In the 1982/83 cocoa season, the notorious 'chit' system (Chapter 5) was abolished and replaced by the *Akuafo* (farmer's) cheque system. Under the new system, cocoa farmers were given a cheque signed by the produce clerk and the treasurer which could be cashed through a bank of their choice. A spin-off of this system was the increase in the number of rural banks in cocoa producing areas.

In addition to producer price increases for cocoa, the Cocoa Rehabilitation Project[79] reorganized the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board and gave it a new name, COCOBOD, in 1984. In the past, policy makers have used state agricultural institutions to shore up their prestige, influence and power. A typical feature of the cocoa marketing board was excess labour. By the early 1980s, COCOBOD had a labour force of about 105,000 to handle a crop half as large as that which a labour force of 50,000 handled in 1965 (Young,1988:27). Therefore, the critical component of the Cocoa Rehabilitation Project was to retrench the expenditure on labour. By the end of 1985, 16,000 of the workforce had been laid-off. COCOBOD's workforce stood at 50,000 and 42,000 by the end of 1987 and 1991 respectively (Hutchful,1996:159; Toye,1991:175).[80] Other aspects of the reorganization of the COCOBOD involved the Cocoa Research Institute.

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[79] The Cocoa Rehabilitation Project was part of a larger program, Agricultural Services Rehabilitation Program, that began formally in 1987. The program aimed at strengthening the institutional framework for the formulation and implementation of agricultural policies and restructuring the role of public-sector services in the supply of agricultural inputs (Ghana,1990:52).

[80] The World Bank anticipated a much leaner workforce. This anticipation was not realized and the reasons are discussed in the section dealing with Agricultural Labour and Land Tenure, C.3.

The Cocoa Rehabilitation Project was also to encourage private sector participation in the distribution of inputs, purchase, collection and marketing of cocoa. There was little commitment to private participation in the distribution of cocoa inputs, and policy implementation was slow (Gibbon, Havnevik and Hermele,1993:109; Commander, Howell and Seini,1989:111). However, after persistent pressure from the World Bank, in December 1991, five private licensed buying companies entered into cocoa marketing to compete with COCOBOD's marketing arm, the Produce Buying Company. The licensed buying companies began operations in 1992 and for the 1993/94 cocoa season bought only 20 per cent of the harvest and COCODOB's produce buying company purchased 80 per cent (World Bank,1995:62). While resisting the participation of private traders in cocoa marketing, the state renewed the mandate of the Ghana Export Promotion Council to arrange the marketing of non-traditional crops.

What has been the impact of these changes on export crops? Cocoa production showed the characteristic fluctuations in production (Table 8). Table 8 shows that, from a low point of 159,000 tonnes in 1983/84, cocoa production increased to 227,000 tonnes in 1986/87. However, production declined to 188,000 1987/88 before climbing to 300,000 tonnes by 1988/89. From then on, production did not hit the 300,000 ton mark until 1992/93. The most important question is how cocoa farmers fared with the changes in production levels and why?

Table 8: Cocoa Bean Production and Prices in Local Currency (1983/84-1993/94)

Year	Production ('000 Metric Tonnes	Producer Price (Cedis/metric ton)
1983/84	159	20,000
1984/85	174	30,000
1985/86	219	56,000
1986/87	227	85,500
1987/88	188	150,000
1988/89	300	165,000
1989/90	295	174,400
1990/91	293	224,000
1991/92	242	251,000
1992/93	311	258,000
1993/94	240	308000

Source: Hutchful,1996:161.

Before 1983, cocoa farmers received between 15 and 40 per cent of world market prices (Leechor,1994:156). Farmers smuggled cocoa to neighbouring countries, particularly Côte d'Ivoire where prices for cocoa were higher. In response to producer price increases, the extent of smuggling declined, official marketing of cocoa improved and so did state revenue (Anyimadu,1993; Hutchful,1989). One goal of increasing the producer prices of cocoa was to provide cocoa farmers with 55 per cent of the international price by 1988/1989 (Commander, Howell and Seini, 1989:112). However, in 1993/94, cocoa producers received 41 per cent of world market prices while the COCOBOD and government took about 59 per cent of cocoa proceeds (World Bank,1995:64).

Cocoa producers did not experience any appreciable improvements in real income following the increases in domestic prices because devaluation of the national currency was largely responsible for the government's ability to raise the real price of cocoa (Alderman,1994:39). The point was that cocoa prices did not increase on the world market after 1983. Cocoa exports from Ghana together with production increases from other cocoa-producing regions (Côte d'Ivoire, Brazil and Malaysia), led to market surpluses and a major slump in world market prices. Cocoa prices fell to an all-time low in six years, well below the floor price set by the International Cocoa Organization, producing a situation in which a chocolate-lover's dream of a low price became the nightmare of a cocoa-producing country (Loxley,1991:47; Hutchful, 1989:116).

Since the local currency was cheap in relationship to major world currencies, the government had massive reserves of local currency. In addition, prices of imports were high in the local currency. The effect was that increases in local producer prices for cocoa did not translate into real producer price increases (Loxley,1991:87). The fall in world cocoa prices and the declining real income for farmers was a grim reminder of the nature of agricultural exports and the fact that cocoa prices are determined in distant places. As such, the reliance on cocoa alone for state revenue is not a sound development strategy. Declining world market prices for cocoa could not justify increases in the producer prices paid to farmers and with the exception of the 1992/93 season, cocoa production has been falling since 1988/89 (See Table 8).

The benefits of producer price increases for cocoa also varied with farm size (Boateng et al.,1990:22-23). In a survey of a cocoa area in the Ashanti Region, Commander, Howell and Seini (1989:123) found that the net income per acre for the two largest farm size groups was nearly 60 per cent higher than for the two smallest farm size groups. From this finding, Commander, Howell and Seini (1989:125) caution "against any oversimplified view that raising producer prices will have a uniformly beneficial impact on farmers." In effect, price reforms have disproportionately benefitted large-scale farmers. While the differences in income shows that "big is better", it also points to equity concerns, for example, in the land tenure system.

The licensed buying companies did not make any meaningful impact in private sector participation in cocoa marketing for several reasons. COCOBOD continued to fix the internal price for cocoa, and remained the only legal buyer and institution for marketing cocoa abroad (Gibbon, Havnevik and Hermele,1993:23). The privatization of cocoa marketing proceeded slowly because a similar attempt in

Nigeria resulted in the adulteration of cocoa beans (Loxley,1991:40). It can be inferred from the Nigerian experience that the resistance of Ghanaian officials to privatization of cocoa marketing was to preserve the quality of cocoa beans from Ghana. The inference, if correct, has merit. Nevertheless, that is not the whole story.

Privatization of cocoa marketing would have jeopardized the monopsony role of the state in cocoa marketing. The loss of this position would signal the irrelevance of COCOBOD as an institution, and the inability of policy makers to use funds from cocoa marketing to buy political loyalty. The slow pace of private sector marketing was also confronted with concerns about the ability of private investors to participate in cocoa marketing independent of state support. If private investors have the working capital, it would avoid a repetition of the past mistake in which state support to private marketing agents simply went to prop weak private agents and brought chaos into the cocoa industry (Chapter 5).

Government's support for the cocoa industry was inevitable. However, the difficulties of rewarding cocoa farmers because of the interest of the state in maximizing revenue from that sector, account for resistance to privatization of cocoa marketing. The internal problems of the cocoa industry and weaknesses of the international cocoa market called for some form of export crop diversification. Hence the focus on non-traditional crops. In an era of minimal state presence, the government renewed its commitment in the Ghana Export Promotion Council. The export value of the non-traditional sector increased from 1.9 million US dollars in 1984, to over 60 million US dollars in 1991 (Euromoney,1992:18).

The question is how non-traditional farmers and the state fared in the export market. Farmers in the non-traditional sector engaged in large-scale mechanized farming. As a group, non-traditional crop farmers are articulate, well organized with extensive political affiliations within ruling coalitions. Given their social characteristics, it is not surprising that the Bank of Ghana allowed non-traditional farmers to retain 100 per cent of their foreign-exchange earnings and claimed a similar percentage on imported production material (Euromoney,1992:19).

Policy reforms, no doubt, were beneficial to the state, large-scale cocoa farmers and producers of non-traditional crops. The anticipated fairness and stability of price and market reforms under structural adjustment did not minimize the state's role in agriculture. Government institutions remained the legitimate instruments to carry out agricultural policies. The state therefore continued to benefit from and implement policies favourable to its own interests and those of powerful social groups.

C.2 Institutional Reforms and Input Delivery

The restructuring of agricultural institutions and the privatization of input delivery began from COCOBOD and extended to several departments under the Ministry of Food and Agriculture. The aim of restructuring and private input delivery in agriculture was to reduce government expenditure and increase efficiency in input delivery. Government expenditure on the agricultural sector which stood at 10 per cent in 1983 fell to 5 per cent in 1989 (Gibbon, Havnevik and Hermele, 1993:31,Table 7). Institutions restructured under the Ministry of Food and Agriculture included the following: the State Farms Corporation which was offered for sale and the Ghana Seed Company which was abolished. Subsidies were cut on agro-chemicals, agricultural machinery and equipment, farm tools and other implements. In 1985, the 60 per cent subsidy on fertilizers was reduced to 15 per cent in 1989 and finally removed in 1990 (Jebuni and Seini,1992). What has been the impact of these policies on input supply? Fertilizers provided an important insight into the privatization of input supply.

Farmers use fertilizers to replace lost soil nutrients, especially in many farming areas where pressure of population increase and the expansion of cash-crop farming have reduced the fallow period. As a result, fertilizers if available and used properly can contribute to productivity. Notwithstanding its importance, fertilizer usage in Ghana is low. The 1987 Ghana Living Standards Survey found out that only 13.52 per cent of farmers use fertilizer (cited in Jebuni and Seini,1992:27).

As an imported commodity, the price of fertilizers is a product of the exchange rate. The devaluation policy[81] that depreciated the value of the national currency also increased the price for many agricultural inputs. While it is true that devaluation lowered the price of cocoa in relationship to major world currencies, the previous section showed that increases in cocoa production by other producing countries led to market surpluses. The result was a fall in cocoa prices and cocoa farmers reduced fertilizer usage because of high prices of input and declining incomes (Commander, Howell and Seini,1989:122). Even before the policy of zero subsidy on fertilizers was implemented in 1990, fertilizer consumption fell from over 50,000 tonnes in 1989 to about 23,000 tonnes in 1990 (Asenso-Okyere, Ankomah, and Gyekye,1993:19). With high fertilizer prices and low prices for agricultural producers, the already low demand could fall further.

When the subsidy on fertilizers was finally removed in 1990, the private sector consisting of individual traders and non-governmental organizations[82] took over the importation, distribution and sale of fertilizers. Private traders anticipated benefits for participation and entered the retail end of the fertilizer business. Sasakawa Global 2000, was the most prominent non-governmental organization during the adjustment era.[83]

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[81] In October, 1983, the system of multiple exchange rates was abolished and replaced by an across-the-board devaluation and a unified exchange rate to address the overvaluation of the national currency. These measures were taken to provide a realistic and market determined exchange mechanism (World Bank,1987:14).

[82] There is an ideological compatibility between non-governmental organizations and the adjustment program. The program is seen as promoting a division of functions between government, profit, and non-profit institutions. With free enterprise as the driving force, "governments provide infrastructures and a regulatory apparatus, and non-governmental organizations secure equity by targeting and assisting groups that are marginalised by the adjustment process" (Fowler,1991:79).

Sasakawa Global 2000 is a joint-sponsored organization of the Sasakawa Africa Association of Japan and Global 2000 Incorporated of the United States. The organization started its operations in Ghana in 1986. Sasakawa Global 2000 aimed at demonstrating that

> given access to simple technology ... small-scale farmers can dramatically increase the yield of staple crops and that, with proper support, national extension services can deliver this technology with remarkable effectiveness" (SG 2000,1993:5).

The "proper support" also included credit facilities to secure fertilizers and improved seeds.

In terms of performance, many private traders found it difficult to stay in business (Pearce,1992:42). As Jebuni and Seini (1992:17-21) point out, many traders had already begun to complain about the seasonal nature and low demand for fertilizers, its transport and storage problems. Traders also complained about what they perceived as unfair competition from their main competitors; the extension division of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture and Sasakawa Global 2000.

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[83] Other important non-governmental organizations in Ghana during the structural adjustment era included TechnoServe Ghana, Adventist Development and Relief Agency and World Vision International. For a history of non-governmental organisations in Ghana and their increased activities in agriculture in the 1980s, see Amanor, Denkabe and Wellard (1993).

In restructuring institutions in the import and distribution of fertilizers, the extension services of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture continued to engage in direct sales to bulk purchasers at discount rates. Similarly, farmers' service companies particularly those in the Northern and Volta regions, maintained the Ministry of Food and Agriculture depots and offered discounts on bulk purchases (Jebuni and Seini,1992:19). Private traders did not have enough capital to purchase and store large quantities of fertilizers. Consequently, private traders could not benefit from discounts offered by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, and the activities of the farmer's service companies damaged the fertilizer market for private traders.

Fertilizer traders, however, reserved their most vehement resentment for Sasakawa Global 2000, the main non-governmental organization in input supply. Sasakawa Global 2000 bought bulk fertilizer from the Ministry of Food and Agriculture at a discount and supplied it to farmers on a credit basis. With about 150,000 farmers in project areas covered by this non-governmental organization by 1993, private traders lost a sizeable market share (SG 2000,1993:7).

The experiences of fertilizer distribution are important in assessing the environment for private participation in input distribution. Credit was a critical requisite for the successful operation of private fertilizer supply. Private traders located the fertilizer stores in urban areas (site for brisk buying and selling), alongside their other trading stores. The bias of private traders in locating fertilizer-trading shops in urban rather than rural areas compelled farmers to travel further distances to secure fertilizers. Private traders, isolated by their urban locations were not able to form the type of trustworthy relations necessary to extend fertilizer on credit to farmers.

Sasakawa Global 2000 was able to reach many farmers. The organization bought fertilizer in bulk, obtained discounts and supplied it to farmers on credit basis. Sasakawa Global 2000 acquired prominence in farming communities, commanded a lot of attention from government institutions because of the high profile of its sponsoring agencies and the personalities involved. The head of Global 2000 Incorporated, Jimmy Carter, was a former President of the United States of America.

Jimmy Carter made a number of visits to Ghana since the Sasakawa Global 2000 began operating in the country. Such visits raised the profile of the organization and succeeded in lobbying political leaders about the importance of input supply (Tripp,1993:2011). Another high profile personality involved in Sasakawa Global 2000 in Ghana was Nobel Peace Prize laureate Norman Borlaug. Borlaug won the Nobel Prize in 1970 for his research on plant genetics and contributions to the Green

Revolution launched in south east Asia in the 1960s.

However, since fertilizer supplies depended on credit, farmers had to be able to produce and sell their produce at favourable prices in order to repay their debt. For Sasakawa Global 2000, the large number of farmers in the project areas implied a large credit scheme. Many farmers received fertilizer, and increased production, yet were unable to repay their credit. Farmers did not reap the benefits of the market because of structural constraints like storage and transport facilities (Novicki,1988:25).

Roads are the main mode of agricultural transport in Ghana. Available figures from the Department of Feeder Roads, indicate that the road system is made up of 10,000 kilometres of trunk roads and over 20,000 kilometres of feeder roads. The same source also indicated that although some changes have occurred in the general conditions of feeder roads in Ghana, in 1994, about 50 per cent of the total feeder roads were in poor condition. Thus, feeder roads, the critical component of the transportation system for agriculture, have been in a poor state. Because of marketing problems, many farmers have been unable to repay their credit. Sasakawa Global 2000 was thus unable to supply credit to farmers or extend the program to other project areas (World Bank,1993:14).

Another reason why farmers were unable to repay their credit can be traced to the social dynamics of the credit program.[84] Sasakawa Global 2000 advanced credit from the list compiled by the extension staff of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture. Local politicians at the district and local levels exerted pressure on the extension staff to include individuals in the credit scheme who turned out to be non-farmers. Most of these non-farmers utilized their credit on non-agricultural activities (for example, import of consumer goods) but cited problems in agriculture to default payment. It is an irony that the success of the Sasakawa Global 2000 program became the issue that restricted the program's expansion.

The above analysis shows credit as an important requisite for the successful operation of private fertilizer supply. Yet, monetary policies under the adjustment program placed a credit squeeze on the banking system, preventing financial institutions from providing agricultural activities with the much-needed credit (Pearce,1992:26; Weissman,1990:1625). The experiences of private participation in fertilizer supply also indicate that farmers cannot access agricultural inputs merely because of liberalization. Put differently, the private sector and the "free" market are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for farmers in accessing agricultural inputs (Alpine and Pickett,1993:96).

The application of market principles to fertilizer distribution, without addressing the social basis of granting credit, the credit needs of farmers and marketing problems affected fertilizer usage and the ability of the private sector in input supply. In the long-run

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[84] Interview with Senior Official, Accra, November 17, 1994.

> [t]here is no guarantee that poorer farmers will benefit from private distribution of inputs, and the termination of government programs that did succeed in distributing inputs to poorer farmers will have a negative impact on those farmers' productivity and incomes (Jebuni and Seini,1992:49).

Even if the private sector had succeeded in distributing fertilizer, the profitability of farming would also determine fertilizer usage.

Farmers need to receive adequate returns on their produce in order to pay for the cost of fertilizer and other inputs. Thus, the need for appropriate government policies to address structural issues in the market in order to stabilize the market, improve the income of farmers and increase their demand for fertilizer, cannot be overemphasized (Tripp,1993:2007; Toye,1991:190; Asiedu-Saforo,1989:366).

C.3 Agricultural Labour and Land Tenure

The labour policy of structural adjustment attacked the problem of excess labour in the public sector with the hope of increasing the supply of agricultural labour. At the onset of the adjustment program, a major problem of the public sector was overstaffing at lower levels, understaffing at managerial and professional levels, and low real wages for all levels (Jonah,1989b:142). Adjustment policies, however, required tight control of government expenditures and higher real wages to retain higher levels of the civil service in order to carry out the extensive and complex activities involved in restructuring (Younger,1989:146). To carry through the adjustment policies while rewarding the workforce, labour redeployment was carried out. Beginning with the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board, the labour redeployment exercise was extended to the Ghana Education Service and other public institutions.

The problem of farm labour was addressed through the National Mobilization Program. Established in 1983, the National Mobilization Program was one of the organizations associated with the Provisional National Defence Council government. Specifically, the government created the National Mobilization Program in the aftermath of the expulsion of about one million Ghanaians from Nigeria. The mobilization program helped to settle the returnees by working with defence committees and what were referred to as mobilization squads.[85] These squads received and distributed clothing and consumer items like rice and cooking oil to returnees under food-for-work programs organized by the Ghana office of the World Food Programme.[86] Mobilization squads also played a coordinating role in resettling the redeployed labour from the public sector in agricultural activities.

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[85] The National Mobilization Program is also in the forefront in providing relief for victims of national disasters like floods and bush fires. (Interview with Senior Official, Accra, October 27, 1994).

[86] Interview with Senior Official, Accra, September 2,1994.

From a historical perspective, agricultural labour in Ghana has not been organized on the basis of the market. A viable labour market for agriculture can be created if redeployed workers and the returnees have no source of employment and income apart from the agricultural sector. The hope of creating a viable labour market was also contingent on the ability to transform the socio-cultural values that surround work and authority in agriculture (Chapter 4). To what extent did redeployed workers and the returnees help in creating an agricultural labour market?

The majority of the redeployed workers did not go into agriculture, and remained in the urban centres because of the availability of better social services compared to rural areas. One aim of the adjustment program was to reverse the rural-urban differentials by rewarding agricultural producers. The producer price increases in cocoa led to increases in wages for agricultural labour. Between 1983 and 1987 the real wages for labourers in the cocoa sector doubled (Pearce,1992:25; Alderman,1992:8). Labour returns on non-traditional crops like pineapple also increased (Ghana,1990:8). The higher returns on labour for both cocoa and non-traditional crops made agricultural labour a profitable undertaking but did not result in the massive increase of agricultural labourers.

Relations between the farm owner and labour on large-scale cocoa farmers were flexible and guided by reciprocal obligations (Chapter 4). Given the attractions of urban areas and the fact that urbanites in Ghana have roots in rural communities, only a fraction of redeployed workers returned to the rural areas to farm for themselves (Sarris and Shams,1991:174). Most large-scale farmers supported the socio-cultural basis of organising labour, making it difficult for a strict definition of market operations to guide the availability and rewards for agricultural labour. Accordingly, the effect of redeployment marginally increased "the demand for [agricultural] labour rather than adding to its supply" (Pearce,1992:24).

The removal of government subsidies, which was intended to reduce government expenditure also undermined the extent to which redeployed labour from the civil service could create market conditions for agricultural labour. The absence of subsidies on social services like health care and education exposed the urban unemployed and the urban population in general to social and economic difficulties. Reflecting typical features of state "softness," the government anticipated political agitations from the urban unemployed. Lacking the funds to settle the severance package for redeployed workers, government slowed down the redeployment program. As a result, Ghana's civil service remains one of the largest in Africa (Leechor,1994:167). Most agricultural institutions, as in other state institutions, "[continue to] lack expertise in critical areas such as policy analysis [and] planning ... but are overstaffed at the lower semi-skilled and functional levels" (Ghana,1995:26).

The effectiveness of the National Mobilization Program and its mobilization squads in organizing farm labour relied on the political role of defence committees and the availability of productive resources, like fertilizers. When the government decided to adopt the structural adjustment program, it depoliticized the role of the defence committees. Given that the government supplied fertilizer at subsidized rates, the adjustment policy of removing subsidies on inputs created shortages and affected the productive capacity of the mobilization squads. Consequently, it was difficult to organize labour and provide resources for production.

The difficulties of mobilising agricultural labour were linked to the land tenure system. Over the years, legislation on land tenure secured tenure in deeds and not title registration.[87] With only 12 per cent of the cultivable land devoted to production, "land availability ... is not a constraint" (Sarris and Shams,1991:21). The incentive structure for non-traditional crops renewed the "tensions of land pressure, land acquisition costs, [and] socio-economic differentiation..." (Sarris and Shams,1991:186) reminiscent of the historical development of commercial cocoa production.[88] Tensions surrounding the land tenure system and agricultural development were complicated by the shortcoming of deeds registration.[89] In opening up agriculture to private and foreign capital in the 1985 Investment Code (amended in 1994), there was a compelling need to have a policy to secure interests in land.

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[87] A deeds registry records land transactions and a registered land has priority over an unregistered one in land adjudication. A title registry also records land transactions. However, land in title registry has an added guarantee as the final authority on land adjudication. The state sanctions that land title transactions cannot be annulled. Land interests are therefore more secured in title than deed registries (Agbosu,1990:105).

[88] Agricultural policies of the last two decades were also explicit in promoting private

The policy adopted on the land tenure system was the Land Title Registration Law (PNDCL 152). Enacted in 1986, the law indicated government's intention to use the advantages of title registration to solve the problem of uncertainty in the land tenure system. It also signalled the willingness to pursue land tenure reform outside socio-cultural practices.[90] The Memorandum accompanying the Land Title Registration Law clearly stated:

> Systematic land tenure research in Ghana [had] revealed radical weaknesses in the present system of registration of instruments affecting land under the Land Registry Act, 1962 (Act 122). The chief among them is litigation, the common sources of which [were] the absence of documentary proof that [the occupant] of land has certain rights in respect of it; the absence of maps and plans of scientific accuracy to enable the identification of parcels and ascertainment of boundaries; and the lack of prescribed forms to be followed in case of dealings affecting land or interests in land (Ghana,1986:i).

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interest in land, by providing subsidies for large-scale farmers under diversification programs.

[89] According to Hansen (1989:216) some large-scale farmers have attributed the failure of capital intensive agriculture to uncertainty within the customary land tenure system.

[90] The socio-cultural basis of land ownership and the problems it created for commercial agriculture were addressed in Chapter 4.

The Memorandum also stated that the purpose of the new law was "first, to give certainty and facilitate the proof of title; secondly, to render dealings in land safe, simple and cheap and prevent frauds on purchasers and mortgagees" (Ghana,1986:i).

Thus, the main aim for the new law was to guarantee certainty because the adjudication of land tenure through title registries "will reduce to the barest minimum, if not eliminate altogether, the errors and defects which had characterised land transactions under the previous system of deeds registration" (Agbosu,1990:122-123). The land title law raises two important questions: Was uncertainty the main reason for the lack of stable and heavy investments in agriculture? Has uncertainty of land tenure anything to do with agricultural productivity?

Commercial agriculture in Ghana began with cocoa production, and cocoa has remained the most profitable crop. The successes in cocoa production have been attained despite the argument about uncertainty of land tenure contributing to the lack of investments in agriculture. If tenure insecurity really affected investments in agriculture, given the importance of the cocoa sector, land policies over the years would have addressed tenure security for cocoa farmers. Previous land legislation preserved the customary system of land tenure, and cocoa farmers continued with production increases.[91] The fact that cocoa production continued under the customary land tenure system suggests the system's flexibility to pressures of commercial agriculture (Migot-Adholla et al.,1994). Flexibility in the land tenure system and the strides made in cocoa production contradict the argument that tenure insecurity has contributed to low investments in agriculture, at least in the case of cocoa.

The relationship between land tenure and agricultural productivity in Ghana has been explored as part of a multi-nation study in selected African countries (Migot-Adholla et al.,1994; Bruce and Migot-Adholla,1994). In Ghana, the study analysed pre-1986 land-tenure arrangements in three locations selected on the basis of differences in agricultural crops and customary descent systems. Taking into consideration the wider social and political processes and the changing value of agricultural crops, the study found out that "any program that would alter property rights in land is likely to increase farm output only modestly, if at all" (Migot-Adholla et al.,1994:114-115). Based on this observation, the study

> concluded that a costly national land-titling program by itself, without improvements in rural infrastructure, marketing, credit institutions, input supply and extension services, would be *ineffective* and probably counter productive (Migot-Adholla et al.,1994:115, italics added).

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[91] Cocoa production declined in some years. But the reasons for production shortfalls were not related to land tenure, but in marketing and pricing arrangements because of the simple fact that cocoa was an export crop, and the state also appropriated cocoa revenue.

Clearly, the land titling process will merely increase the power of bureaucrats, and those in close proximity to state power will acquire large tracts of land through a legitimate mechanism. Land titling does little or nothing to improve the social conditions under which the majority of farmers have access to land.[92]

With relative ease, state power was used to acquire land for large-scale mechanized agriculture and non-traditional crops under diversification programs. Most of these farms, as pointed out in Chapter 5, made minimal contribution to agriculture. Tenure insecurity was not the reason why these farms failed. The problem was how these farmers used agricultural resources. Farmers who acquired land under the auspices of the state used their registered deeds as collateral to secure credit from formal financial institutions. Loans obtained for agricultural purposes were directed to profitable economic activities outside the agricultural sector, mostly in the import and export trade and general mercantile activities.

The communal land tenure system is not flawless (Chapter 4). The question, however, is whether tenure insecurity has contributed to the lack of stable and heavy investments or lower productivity in agriculture. Since the above analysis has undermined the supposed relationship between tenure insecurity and low agricultural productivity, the legitimate question is, why was the land tenure law passed? The pressures for land title registration came from the non-agricultural sector, particularly the timber and mining sectors. Most of these non-agricultural prospectors also happen to be those whose need for land was secured by the state. The ease with which they straddled the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors of the economy, propelled their concerns for title security in timber and mining to be extended to the agricultural sector in general (Ninsin,1989b:177-178).

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[92] Under the land title law, rights to land would be obtained when the land is registered by the Land Department and a certificate issued. The need for an efficient survey department of qualified surveyors and cartographers to ensure the performance of the land title registration cannot be overemphasized.

The land law was therefore to

> satisfy the demands of the business community [in the timber and mining sectors] by confirming, consolidating and crystallising in legal form the private landed rights acquired [mostly through the state machinery and within the communal land tenure system] in the last hundred years... (Agbosu,1990:124).

Put differently, the land title law sought to buttress the political and economic powers associated with private land ownership (Agbosu, 1990:125; Ninsin,1989b:180).

What was required was a law that would improve conditions of accessibility for all farmers, even if that would mean significant changes in the communal land-tenure arrangement.[93] This was not done, partly because of the number of cocoa farmers and the importance of cocoa to the national revenue.[94] More importantly, the opportunities in the non-traditional sector and foreign participation in agriculture, were available to a few powerful elements who could either rely on the provisions of the land law to access land or were smart enough to register their land title. By taking legal ownership, farmers with a registered land title would have access to other resources. Consequently, it did not seem to be a major area of concern to policy makers if the land title law did not address the concerns of the majority of farmers.

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[93] There have been occasions when migrant farmers have had problems with land leases.

C.4 Agricultural Research and Extension Services[95]

Agricultural research and extension services are the processes by which new knowledge about agricultural development are generated and made available to producers and consumers. Agricultural research consists of both technical and social considerations. These concerns intersect at the farm level where production takes place, the community where support services for agricultural production are organized and at a societal level where consumers make use of agricultural produce (Ruttan,1982:298).

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[94] The irony of the law was that it sought to undermine the socio-cultural basis of access to land, yet the political leadership needed the socio-cultural role and political support of chiefs to implement the law. One instance of an appeal to chiefs to help in addressing problems of the land tenure system was contained in a speech to the National House of Chiefs in 1994, by the then Vice President Kow Arkaah (Daily Graphic,1994).

[95] A version of this section has been published. Puplampu (1996). *Review of Human Factor Studies*. 2,2:73-91.

The problems of agricultural research, as discussed in Chapter 4, established the fact that an agricultural research system which follows technical issues at the expense of social issues cannot address the problems of farmers. Technical and social research complement each other, and Chapter 2 indicated the theoretical basis of this complementary relationship. Technical research, to serve a social purpose, will not only be concerned with the generation of new agricultural technologies. The research will also select prevailing problems among farmers and ensure that outcomes solve a specific problem. Social research will, for example, identify factors that mitigate the success of technical research or proposed technical solutions that are socially not workable. The "refusal" of farmers to adopt research outcomes would not be taken to mean farmers are ignorant. Structural barriers to diffusion will be identified, addressed and possible changes made in techniques of delivery. Agricultural research also does not take place in a vacuum and the role of the state in agriculture in Ghana suggests that politics and other trite considerations will inform the research enterprise.

The restructuring of agricultural research and extension services was to involve the private sector in providing these services. A historical review of the

National Agricultural Research System was undertaken in 1989 (Ghana,1994; CSIR/ISNAR,1991a,b). The new and reorganized National Extension Division replaced the previous system of extension with the unified system. In the previous system of extension, various sections of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, (for example pests control, mechanization) had their own extension officers. Farmers were visited by workers from each of these divisions. Under the unified system of extension, one extension officer would provide extension services to farmers on behalf of all divisions.[96]

The review of the agricultural research system and the changes in the extension system, offered a glimpse into the institutions and organization of agricultural research and provide the context to raise an imperative question. Which crops received the most assistance from the agricultural research and extension system and why? An answer to this question requires an insight into the nature and organization of the agricultural research system in Ghana.

There are four main institutions in the National Agricultural Research System (Table 9). With about 300 agricultural scientists in Ghana, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, the largest research institution, has a total of 148. The Universities have a total of 91, Ministry of Food and Agriculture 35, other govern-

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[96] Interview with Senior Official, Accra, September 27, 1994.

Table 9: Organization of Agricultural Research in Ghana

Institutions	Functions/Duties
STATE OWNED	
The Ministry of Food and Agriculture, and its affiliated boards and other agriculture related ministries (eg. Grains and Legumes Development Board)	policy initiation, research coordination and implementation.
The Universities and affiliated research institutes (eg. Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research at the University of Ghana), agricultural colleges, and farm institutes.	predominantly research (technical and social) agricultural and training of personnel.
Institutes of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (eg. Food, Crop Research Institutes).	predominantly technical research.
PRIVATE OWNED	
Darko Farms (poultry) Ejura Farms (maize and cattle) Kpong Farms (rice, cattle, poultry).	collaborative technical research.

Source: Adapted from Ghana,1994:33-40.

ment and quasi-government institutions have 26 agricultural scientists (CSIR/ISNAR,1991a:25). Table 9 also shows that many agricultural institutions undertake technical research, confirming the findings by Nweke (1979) and

Puplampu (1996) that agricultural research in Ghana has focused on technical issues. Technical issues like plant breeding/selection, pests and diseases control are the focus of the 689 projects currently being conducted by the various research institutions.

The crop sector is the most researched with 482 projects and the three most studied crops are cocoa, oil palm and maize (the only food crop) (Ghana, 1994:54-55). The strong focus of the adjustment program on cocoa ensured that a disproportionate share of research funds went to support cocoa research (CSIR/ISNAR, 1991a:35). In 1986/87, cocoa research alone received about 45 per cent of national research funds, even though cocoa contributed only 17 per cent to agricultural gross domestic product. Research funds on all other crops and the livestock sector was 51 per cent, though the combined sector contributed 71 per cent to agricultural gross domestic product. Forestry and fisheries received approximately 3 per cent and 1 per cent but contributed almost 9 percent and 3 percent respectively to agricultural gross domestic product.

Cocoa research continues to be the focus because cocoa generates foreign exchange and other forms of revenue, conducive to the financial appetite of the Ghanaian state. However, given the price fluctuations in cocoa and the inefficiencies that characterize cocoa administration, devoting a greater proportion of research funds to cocoa will starve other crops of funds. It is therefore not surprising despite its long history, agricultural research in Ghana has not made any positive impact on the production techniques of food crops like cassava, yam and cocoyam (Ghana,1994:64).

Maize, the only food crop researched significantly, is also the main food crop which received sustained external funding. In other words, Ghana devotes resources into cocoa research for external consumption and could not support a basic domestic food crop like maize. The Canadian Government supported the maize research activities at the Crops Research Institute and the Grains and Legumes Development Board (Stackhouse,1996). Maize research also benefited from financial and other forms of support from the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre (Tripp,1993:2004). Under the auspices of public research institutions, maize research has introduced a new variety of maize called *obatanpa*. The new variety, an altered genes of the existing maize has a higher protein value.

Similarly, research in sorghum at the Savanna Agricultural Research Institute (formerly Nyankpala Agricultural Experimental Station) has been sustained through assistance from the German Government (Ghana,1994:51). The World Bank, however, remains the largest contributor to agricultural research. Since 1983, 22 million of the 450 million US dollars contributed to the agricultural sector were committed to research (World Bank,1994b:11).

Under the structural adjustment program, the national agricultural research system received considerable funding for research activities. Such support

> also resulted in a skewing of the agricultural research priorities....Research institutes successful in securing large sums of donor assistance could rebuild their operations and augment staff salaries. Research activities of low priority for donor agencies, but which may have been of high priority nationally, were neglected due to a lack of sufficient and secure funding (Tabor, Quartey-Papafio and Haizel,1993:4).

For example, apart from maize, research has not made any significant contribution to the production of major food crops like cassava, yam and cocoyam.

The minimal impact of agricultural research on many other crops is also the product of the relationship between the research system and farmers. The majority of the farmers in Ghana are scattered all over the country and their productivity can be improved only through techniques delivered by extension officers. There is, however, a paucity of extension officers because of lack of trainers. There are few agricultural social scientists in the national agricultural research system (Table 10).

Agricultural training institutions have not been able to produce extension officers, because of the lack of personnel to train the trainers, and inadequate funding among other problems. The universities, agricultural colleges and farm institutes, perform- ing at 40, 63 and 64 capacity respectively is an indication of the problems facing agricultural training institutions in Ghana (Ghana,1990:47). Consequently, the 4,000 front-line extension staff required by the year 2000 will not be available (Ghana,1990:68). The extension officer-farmer ratio is therefore high, the link with farmers weak and few farmers are reached by extension services.

Table 10 : Social Scientists in the National Agric. Research System

Institutes	Agric. Economists	Farming Systems	Extension/ Rural Dev.	TOTAL
CSIR	7	1	1	9 (26)
Universities	11	1	9	21 (62)
MOFA	1	0	0	1 (3)
Others	3	0	0	3 (9)
TOTAL	22	2	10	34 (100)

Source: Adapted from CSIR/ISNAR (1991:25a).
Figure in bracket is percentage.
CSIR: Council for Scientific and Industrial Research.
MOFA: Ministry of Food and Agriculture.

Farmers can adopt research results if extension services deliver such findings to them. With the absence of farmers' representation in the national agricultural research system, extension officers provide the critical link between farmers and researchers. The weak link between farmers and extension officers results in farmers' problems not being addressed by the technical orientation of the research establishment.

Besides the technical emphasis of agricultural research in Ghana, basic research, the scientific investigation that advances the frontiers of knowledge, is minimal. The bulk of research is adaptive, aiming at adjusting knowledge gained elsewhere to local conditions. Adaptive research can be useful only when local conditions are considered, but because of the weak link between extension officers and farmers, the social conditions of farmers are not addressed by the research system. Therefore, how the process of adaptation will be implemented and the chances of its success remain uncertain.

The unified approach to extension in which one extension officer provided information was consistent with the structural adjustment program's concern of cutting cost through restructuring and laying-off workers. However, one officer cannot be knowledgeable enough about the physical and social conditions of all crops. Thus, extension services will be satisfactory for crops like cocoa where the state identifies an immediate economic interest and unsatisfactory for many crops. Without any effective link with the majority of farmers, it would be difficult to incorporate farmers into research activities despite benefits of such an integration (Tripp,1993; SG 2000,1993; Edmeades et al.,1991; Donkoh,1989).

Amidst the grinding poverty of the majority of agricultural producers, caused in part by the politics of resource distribution, policy-makers disingenuously accuse small-scale farmers of low productivity (Hansen,1989:189). This argument has led to the mechanization programs that are equated with "tractorization." Mechanization is, however, not a major area of research and is, in fact, the least researched area (Ghana,1994:54). If agricultural research in Ghana is largely technical and mechanization receives the lowest number of research projects, then social analysis of mechanization programs is non-existent. Agricultural machinery is, therefore, imported without any understanding of the topographic conditions of the area, or any attempt to educate and involve farmers on how to use these machines. Hence, machines frequently breakdown, and mechanization projects in Ghana have disastrously failed (Chambas,1980).

The essence of restructuring was to replace the public sector agricultural research with an efficient private sector participation. For Tripp (1993), the issue is not whether public sector institutions are unable to sustain agricultural research, because the evidence in maize research shows the ability of a properly nurtured public sector agricultural research institution. The problem, as Tripp continues, is that structural adjustment's focus on the market, non-governmental organizations and an inadequately theorized role for the farmer will undermine the public agricultural research system.

Agricultural research is an expensive undertaking. Without state support to minimise losses, the market and the private sector cannot sustain agricultural research in Ghana. Private sector agricultural research institutions (Table 9) in Ghana are engaged in collaborative research with state institutions, and it is doubtful if they will undertake any independent form of research without state assistance.[97]

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[97] In general, private sector involvement in agricultural research depends on a host of factors, including the type of research dominant in the country, the technology and cost that applies to that particular form of research and the degree of market sophistication. See the case of private sector agricultural research in Kenya by

Non-governmental organizations in agricultural research relied on public institutions. Sasakawa Global 2000, the prominent non-government organization during the adjustment era, recruited extension officers from the Ministry of Food and Agriculture to monitor its credit program in the supply of fertilizer. For this relationship to flourish, there is the need for strong and capable extension officers. Yet, the structural adjustment program in restructuring agricultural institutions did not pay any attention to the ratio between farmers and extension officers. Finally, farmers are not only excluded from the agricultural research system, they have a weak link with the research system. Therefore, farmers cannot be effective players in the agricultural research system as envisaged under structural adjustment.

In Ghana, the government distributes resources for agricultural research in order to raise revenue for political interests. The focus has been on the export crops. Since adjustment policies also promote export crops, resources for agricultural research continue to concentrate on the production and research of export-oriented commodities (Deo and Swanson,1991:192). While the trend also seems to integrate national agricultural research institutions into the global agricultural research system, there is the problem of suitability of international research for local conditions, not to mention the cost of patents and other forms of intellectual property rights. These

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Hobbs and Taylor (1987) and the problems of privatization of agricultural research in Sub-Saharan Africa in Thirtle and Echeverria (1994).

issues underscore the importance of strengthening local agricultural research institutions to liaise with international agricultural research institutions. The lack of interest in this direction was one major omission at building sustainable institutions for agricultural development in Ghana and other African countries (Eicher,1989).

C.5 Structural Adjustment and Women Farmers[98]

Women play a very important role in Ghana (Chapter 3). In spite of their importance, women farmers do not share equally in the benefits of national development and their potential in agriculture is also inhibited by what services are available. In the area of production, for example, women experience difficulties in receiving extension services, agricultural credit and access to land (Sarris and Shams,1991:92). The problems of women farmers range from institutional barriers to the politics and socio-cultural biases of agricultural policies.

Structural adjustment had a specific focus on women farmers and called for policies to strengthen women's organizations. With extension services as one of the major problems facing women farmers, the reorganization of the extension services led to the creation of a department for Women in Agricultural Development.

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[98] Unless otherwise stated, the analysis in this section is based on an interview with a Senior Official and documents provided by the same source in Accra, September 19, 1994.

Because of the adjustment philosophy of minimal presence of state institutions in agricultural production, the analysis of the impact of structural adjustment on women farmers also needs to examine the role of women non-governmental organizations like the National Council on Women and Development and the 31st December Women's Movement.

In analysing the impact of structural adjustment policies for women farmers, two questions need to be answered. First, with the declining influence of the state and the relationship between extension officers and farmers, what would be the significance of the department for Women In Agricultural Development? The second question is whether the other women's organizations can play a significant role for women farmers given the political processes that condition access to resources and rewards.

The department of Women in Agricultural Development was a necessary but not a sufficient instrument for addressing the extension or education needs of women farmers. As a "subject matter department" specializing in women's agricultural needs, the department was necessary because it conducted adaptive research into new and improved women-specific technological packages for dissemination by extension staff. To carry out its mandate, the department required staff, able and prepared to reach women farmers.

Generally, extension officers concentrate on organizing tests on demonstration plots to introduce new methods of planting, maintenance, harvesting or processing. The multi dimension of women's work (producing, processing and marketing) prevent some women from attending these exercises. Thus, home visitation were necessary to extend new techniques to women farmers. Many extension officers (mainly men) neglected home visitation to deliver women-specific generated messages because of the administrative policy whereby organizing demonstration tests earned extra travel and transport allowances, while such claims could not be made for home visits. Since some women are not able to attend demonstration shows, there is no question that extension agents should be able to claim travel and transport allowances for home visitations.

The discussion under agricultural research and extension services, indicated a high extension officer-farmer ratio. The imbalance was worsened by the predominance of males over females in the extension system. In 1987, there were only 145 women extension officers throughout the country (Sarris and Shams,1991:110).[99] The majority of men officers lacked the kind of training necessary for the effective communication of women-specific extension messages.

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[99] Sijm (1993:100) cites a report that there were 500 employees in the Women Farmers Extension Division of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture. The Division formed the nucleus for the Department of Women in Agricultural Development. If the figure cited is anything to go by, it suggests only 29 per cent of the extension staff were women.

The administrative policy not to pay extension officers for home visits, the absence of adequate extension officers and the lack of financial resources to support the proposed changes had a selective negative impact on women farmers (Sarris and Shams,1991:111). For example, the lack of credit undermined the effectiveness of extension services in the millet-and-sorghum-producing activities of farmers in the Kassena-Nankani District of the Upper East Region (Tonah,1994). Because of the unusual policy requiring extension officers to use their own money to pay for defaulting farmers, the officers were forced to provide credit and assistance only to those farmers who were relatively prosperous. This selective access to credit affected the goals of increasing crop production, because a significant number of poor households, particularly female-headed ones, lacked the funds to acquire inputs when subsidies on inputs were eliminated in 1990 (Tanoh,1994:123-124). Given the difficulties the department for women in agricultural development had to contend with, organizations committed to women's needs were the other outlet to address problems for women farmers.

The National Council on Women and Development and the 31st December Women's Movement played a major role in championing the initiation and promulgation of the 1985 Intestate Succession, Marriage and Divorce Law (PNDCL 112), and the 1986 Land title Registration Law discussed earlier. Each law affected the status of women in Ghana, but the land law was the most crucial because women farmers have always had problems with access to land.

Women farmers, like men farmers, had access to land on the basis of socio-cultural practices in spite of administrative and statutory legislation. The most important socio-cultural variable that conditions women's access to land is the descent system (See Chapter 3). In each descent system, women do not have direct guarantees upon the death of their men, although women in the patrilineal system are slightly better off. They can obtain land directly from the paternal kin and sometimes can transfer land to their daughters (Obeng-Boampong,1989:45-46). Thus, women farmers have not fared well in the land tenure system, despite the flexibility and accommodating nature of the customary system of land tenure to the commercial production of cocoa as identified in the discussion on land tenure in an earlier section.

The land law promulgated in 1986 (PNDCL 152) centered on land-title registration under the assumption that tenure security would lead to heavy and stable investment in agriculture.[100] The law ignored conditions of accessibility for women farmers and left intact systematic gender barriers affecting landholding sizes and gender-biased inequity in land distribution (World Bank,1993:33). The existence of gender-biased conditions in the land tenure system, notwithstanding the political significance of the 31st December Women's Movement, reveals the political environment within which women's organizations function.

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[100] This assumption was discredited in the section dealing with Agricultural Labour and Land Tenure.

The women's wing of the Provisional National Defence Council, the 31st December Women's Movement was to mobilize women to participate actively in the "revolutionary process" of the military government.[101] The movement suffers an identity crisis and has been under the leadership of the First Lady, Nana Konadu Agyeman Rawlings since 1984 (Gary,1996:161-162). 31st December Women's Movement has been struggling to balance an image of supporting women while playing the role of an institution that supported the government of the Provisional National Defence Council. By 1987, the leaders of 31st December Women's Movement described the organization as a 'non-governmental organization' but continued to define its aims and objectives as those similar to the Provisional National Defence Council (Tsikata,1989:86).

As a political wing of the government, the 31st December Women's Movement relied on state power to get access to resources that were used according to political imperatives (Tsikata,1989:87). The movement's chief accomplishment was to establish day care facilities, primarily in urban areas, reflecting the needs of its power base. The argument here is not to diminish the importance of day-care facilities for women who work outside the home. Rather, the movement should have used its political clout to influence and initiate social policies that will attack the basis of gender discrimination in Ghana.

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[101] The Provisional National Defence Council government is no longer in power, but the current constitutional government, the National Democratic Congress in its second four-term emerged from the Provisional National Defence Council. For details on the continuities between the military and constitutional government, see Jonah (1994). The 31st December Women's Movement continues its association with the current government.

By tailoring its focus on women in urban areas, the movement left women in rural areas to contend with a land-title law that did not improve their access to land. The movement, as Gyimah-Boadi (1994:137) observes "had no pretensions to neutrality in politics...and any benefits to women [from its activities] were purely incidental." Reflecting on the 31st December Women's Movement, Manuh (1993:191) also remarks how it "became a women's organization with little feminist vision and in reality an agent of the gender ideology of men in general... [and of the Provisional National Defence Council regime in particular]."

Structural adjustment program spoke glowingly about enhancing organizations for women farmers. The department of Women in Agricultural Development was faced with problems of how to recruit extension officers to send messages to women farmers. The political context of 31st December Women's Movement and male dominance in Ghanaian society united to prevent any meaningful move towards strengthening associations for women farmers.

D. Structural Adjustment and Food Security

The previous section discussed adjustment agricultural policies and showed that the interest of both the Ghanaian state and the World Bank was in export crops (cocoa and non-traditional crops). Although the cocoa farmers responded favourably to producer price increases, declining world market prices underscored the inherent problems of relying on the cocoa industry alone to address food security.

The promise of the non-traditional sector as an alternative to cocoa, was also faced with two related problems. First, the fact that non-traditional farmers retained 100 per cent of their foreign exchange component raises the question of how much revenue the state would obtain from the non-traditional sector. The second problem, and perhaps the major one, is the international market for non-traditional crops. In an era when international markets are structured around trading-blocks, market participation and quota requirements vary for members and non-members. Such were the requirements that affected banana exports from Ghana to the European Union (The Economist,1995:51-52).

Volta River Estates, a Dutch-owned company in Ghana, has been producing the *Cavendish Grand Nain* banana, the favourite of European consumers. The company, however, could not sell in the European Union market because of quota restrictions. The European Union's Banana Protocol gives quota and preferential access to former British and French colonies, but to long-time producers. Therefore, Ghana, as a new producer did not benefit from the quota arrangements. Although the company eventually obtained a market share, through an European Union fund which allowed the company to acquire the licence, the process was expensive. The company's difficulties in selling bananas cast doubts on structural adjustment's portrayal of the world market as a neutral and benign entity.

Given the problems of export agriculture, it is important to explore the performance of food crops during the adjustment period. Few policy initiatives were introduced for food crops because funds for agricultural reforms were earmarked for the export sector (Herbst,1993a:81). Notwithstanding the lack of attention to food production, per capita food production of tubers (which received minimal attention in agricultural research) registered a dramatic increase in 1984, although stagnated from 1985 to 1990 (Figure 6). The stagnation in tubers production continued between 1990 and 1994, but at higher levels of production. Figure 6 also shows that per capita production of cereals (the focus of agricultural research) have not registered any significant increases. In fact, the per capita production of cereals remains low and stable for the period 1983 to 1994.

When growth rates in population are considered against those of major food crops, a clearer picture emerges about the condition of food agriculture during the adjustment period (Figure 7). Figure 7 shows that for six years out of the eleven year period (1983-1994), the rate of growth in food production was below that of

Figure 6



Raw Data for Food Crops from Agric. Stats & Census Div., PPMED, MOFA., Nov. 1993 and Dec. 1994

Figure 7



Raw Data for Food Crops from Agric. Stats & Census Div., PPMED, MOFA., Nov. 1993 and Dec. 1994
Population Data from FAO 1997 (FAOSTAT)

population. Since adjustment policies did not pay any attention to food production, at least in the early stages,[102] what factors account for the short-term improvements in tubers production?

Hansen (1989:217-218) cites the argument by J.S. Addo, a former Governor of the Bank of Ghana, that adequate rainfall in 1984 played a major part in restoring food production after three years of drought. Because of the severe food shortages in 1982 and 1983, farmers took advantage of the improved weather conditions in 1984 and increased food production. Despite the recognition by local officials of agricultural prices as a "thorny issue"[103] the link in rainfall and production suggests the irrelevance of price reforms in food production. The World Bank (1985:55) has recognized, at least in Ghana, that price increases alone cannot stimulate food production.

The reform of state agricultural marketing institutions had a neutral effect on many farmers, but the removal of subsidies had negative consequences on food production. Chapter 5 showed that state sponsored production institutions have not only failed, but those in marketing have also had a minimal impact on farmers' production decisions. The Ghana Food Distribution Corporation's role in food marketing, has been limited to purchases of selected food crops (mainly rice and maize) at guaranteed minimum prices[104] for sale in urban areas. On average, the food distribution corporation bought less than 5 per cent of the maize and rice produced in the country (Pearce,1992:21). Lack of storage facilities in farming communities, and difficulties in transporting farm produce to urban centres have been accompanied by a habit of the food distribution corporation to default payment to farmers. The state distribution corporation therefore faces problems, and is not able to administer the guaranteed minimum prices.

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[102] In 1990, seven years after the structural adjustment program started, food security, as a concept was first mentioned (Ghana,1990:iii-iv). While mentioning the concept, the role of small-scale farmers in addressing national food needs was also acknowledged, but without a any serious discussion of how farmers would fare under agricultural structural adjustment policies (for example, removal of subsidies, exchange rate fluctuations and increases in input prices).

[103] Interview with Senior Official, Accra, September 27, 1994.When pressed to explain why prices are a thorny issue, the Official alluded to the political significance of low prices in urban areas.

The significant adjustment policy on the food market was the restructuring of the Ghana Food Distribution Corporation and the removal of the guaranteed minimum prices in 1990. Because of the food distribution corporation's limited range of crops and the lack of funds for prompt payment, many farmers have not benefited from the food distribution corporation and do not factor its activities into their decision making process. As a result, a lot of farmers were neither affected by the removal of the guaranteed minimum prices nor took notice when it was abolished in 1990 (Sijm,1993:138).

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[104] The guaranteed minimum price assumed prominency since the era of Liberal Agricultural policies (1966-1972 - See Chapter 5).

Since the state's role in food marketing has been limited, the private food market[105] should have been the focus of any strategy to address food production and marketing. The private food market, however, continues to contend with an inadequate transportation network. Transportation costs alone contributed to about 50 per cent of the total market-price of food crops (Nyanteng and Dapaah,1993:74).

With the removal of subsidies on input, the variations in food production have been attributed to increases in the prices of inputs (Fosu,1993:55; Novicki,1988:25). High cost of input prices has been noted for maize. The input cost for traditional maize-production technology increased by almost 19 per cent between 1981 and 1987 with especially sharp increases for improved and advanced techniques (Sarris and Shams,1991:173).

The discussion so far suggests that food security remained a problem during the adjustment period, because there was a continued dependence on food imports, against the background of fluctuations in local food production and declining value of exports (Gibbon, Havnevik and Hermele,1993:121; FAO,1990:7). In 1988, Ghana ranked as the seventeenth most food insecure country among 114 developing countries (Jazairy, Alamgir, Panuccio,1992:382). The value of food aid, for instance, increased from 13 million to 26.9 million US dollars in 1988 and 1992 respectively (UNDP,1991:145; 1994:155). The instabilities in food supply affected food consumption.

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[105] The private food marketing system consists of three main types of traders: a large number of itinerant traders, market-based traders, and food contractors. Itinerant traders buy and collect food directly from farmers within a geographical area and arrange the transportation of these crops to wholesalers or food contractors. Market-based traders buy from itinerant traders and sell directly to consumers in both rural and urban markets. Organized into specific commodity groups, markets are led by market-queens, who maintain the link between itinerant and market-based traders. Food contractors buy food in bulk from farmers for sale to mainly state institutions.

Nutrition studies conducted by the Catholic Relief Services[106] between 1981 and 1987 found, especially for pre-school children, the highest prevalence of malnutrition in the northern farming zone (Upper East, Upper West and Northern Regions) and the western section of the forest farming zone. Another nutrition survey in 1988 found that 30.6 per cent of children under age five were chronically malnourished (too short for their age) and 7.8 per cent acutely malnourished (underweight) (Alderman,1990). Children continue to bear the brunt of food insecurity. Africa Nutrition Chartbooks (1993) show that in Ghana, for children between the age of 3 to 36 months, nearly 1 in 3 is chronically undernourished (too short for their age) and underweight.

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[106] Catholic Relief Services, is a United States of America based non-governmental organization, operating in Ghana since 1958. In the 1980s, the organization was involved in running maternal health care programs with an explicit focus on food and nutrition. (Catholic Relief Services, Annual Reports from 1989-1993).

E. Conclusion

This chapter has considered the agricultural dimensions of the structural adjustment program that began in 1983. The chapter has argued that persistent deterioration of economic conditions and policy failure called for new ways to address old problems. Adjustment policies, in the short term, improved export crops production. The program had few specific initiatives on food crops and short-term improvements in food production were not related to the adjustment policies. However, the long-term changes in food production were due to adjustment policies.

The state, through the various institutional changes in agriculture, maintained a powerful presence and strengthened links with powerful sections of society, especially large-scale cocoa farmers and the producers of non-traditional crops. Changes in agricultural research continued to focus on export crops, and the paucity of personnel in agricultural research affected food crops and extension messages to food producers. Despite their important role, women farmers were negatively affected by the adjustment program. Structural barriers still remained in distribution and marketing, contributing to the inability of price and market reforms alone to stimulate food production and marketing.

The inability of the adjustment program to remove the influence of the state in agriculture, even though that was a cardinal principle of the program is instructive. The state machinery provided the only viable framework for implementing the myriad of adjustment policies. Since the state does not exist in a vacuum, the critical issue defining the performance of agricultural policies was the differential impact and reactions from social groups. Bearing in mind the context of policy performance, the next chapter concludes this study by rethinking the role of the state in agricultural development.

CHAPTER 7

SUMMARY AND REFLECTIONS

A. Summary

This chapter offers a summary of the study, a theoretical analysis of the study's findings as well as policy recommendations on improving agricultural policy performance in Ghana. This has been a study about the processes by which agricultural policy affects the allocation of resources and rewards to social groups and the implications of that process for food security. Agricultural policy in Ghana has generally promoted the production of export crops. Price changes in world commodity markets, a deliberate policy that underpays cocoa farmers by widening the margin between the export price and the price paid to producers; and manipulating exchange rates, the state used revenue when available to underwrite expenditures in urban development and food imports.

However, the state has not been able to determine revenue from cocoa exports. The political use of cocoa revenue, the fact that some farmers have had to contest for productive resources, while others diverted agricultural resources to non-agricultural interests have introduced uncertainty and instability into the cocoa industry. Instabilities in cocoa revenue imply revenue scarcity for food imports, and the neglect of local food production and marketing problems have set in motion the processes for food insecurity in Ghana. The noticeable impact of food insecurity, especially at the level of consumption, has been the incidence of malnutrition.

During the colonial era, agricultural policy performance and food security were the product of the colonial context of the economy, price levels in world commodity markets, particularly cocoa prices and the responses by social groups. In pursuing the colonial mandate, the colonial state kept an eye on society and policy performance was contingent on socio-cultural practices (as in the land tenure system) and political processes (the chief's role). The difficulty of the colonial administration was how to make profit with minimal social cost in a political environment in which it lacked legitimacy.

For instance, the colonial state recognized the socio-cultural importance of the chief in the mobilization of labour and land, and preserved that role in order to pursue the political interests of the colonial administration. Access to land was also situated within the socio-cultural practice of communal ownership. The successful implementation of plantation agriculture involved breaking the communal basis of land ownership. The colonial state was not prepared to attempt such a change not only because such a move conflicted with the interests of chiefs, its main allies, but also because the negative implications for state revenue and the prospects of political instability. Thus, the power of the colonial state and its agricultural policies were situated within and limited by the complex interaction between socio-cultural and political practices. Consequently, the initiation, implementation of agricultural policies were negatively affected, performance and outcomes uncertain, resulting in, for example, food insecurity.

Postcolonial governments, to the extent that they wielded power and desired revenue, faced constraints similar to the colonial one. Beginning with Nkrumah's government, postcolonial administrations also relied on cocoa to provide state revenue for national development. The clash between the state and cocoa farmers over the terms of production and marketing, and the fact that cocoa prices were determined by the world market affected the cocoa industry and the prospects of relying on the industry for national development and food imports.

The focus of agricultural policy was to transform existing systems of production through agricultural modernization. State control changed the character of agricultural organization by using force, intimidation and patronage to determine accessibility to resources and rewards. Attempts by postcolonial governments to support food production favoured large-scale farmers over small-scale producers and women farmers. The policy shift was based on the belief that large-scale farmers, operating under modernization through mechanization, could produce a broad range of crops for export in addition to food crops. Unfortunately, most of the large-scale farms were exercises in political mobilization, and the lack of attention to the resource needs of the existing groups in food production, made the prospects of food security even more remote. Even the structural adjustment program, with its declared emphasis on improving resource accessibility for small-scale farmers and women, undermined that commitment by the very nature of its policies and implementation strategies.

The structural adjustment program had no domestic focus. It concentrated on exports crops because the program did not arise out of grievances from rural producers or farmers in general (Walters,1995:113). The Provisional National Defence Council adopted the adjustment program because of the economic circumstances of the country in the early 1980s, and the government's desire to take advantage of what appeared to be favourable changes in the international financial system.

However, domestic forces in the export sector, particularly large-scale cocoa and pineapple farmers benefited from the adjustment program. Large-scale farmers, given their dual role in urban and rural areas are influential in the farming communities. Many farmers depend on the goodwill of influential urban residents for the supply of non-agricultural goods. Large-scale farmers have exploited their dual role in society to garner support from farmers for the adjustment program, despite variations in rewards within and between agricultural groups (Mikell,1991).

The study identified negative long-term implications for farmers' access to productive resources under the adjustment program. For food producers, the problems stem from the privatization of fertilizer suppliers, the removal of subsidies on agricultural inputs and the high input prices following monetary and fiscal policies. The ultimate result would weaken the capacity for local food production. The World Bank itself noted that the adjustment program had a negative implication for food producers as follows:

> Given that most of the poor live in rural areas and depend on agricultural activities for most of their income, the deterioration in terms of trade [between cocoa and food production] indicates that rural income may have fallen during [the adjustment] period, further exacerbating poverty in rural areas. The deleterious effect on income (and welfare) may have been more severe among households in northern Ghana where agricultural production is based largely on food crops, and on rural women in the south, who also tend to predominate in production of food crops (World Bank,1993:31).

The lasting legacy of the state in agriculture has been the political considerations underlying conditions to access to productive resources and marketing rewards. In such a context, social groups, particularly those in agriculture whose activities are vital but are not politically relevant do not have the resources and rewards required to sustain production, marketing and consumption.

B. Reflections

The study gives rise to some theoretical questions on how state and society relations affect agricultural policy performance. The theoretical assumption that informed this study was that the state's actions and inactions could best be understood within a social context. A consideration of the social context of the state or the state in society perspective is a far cry from the autonomy of the state implied in previous discussions which focus on the state. The state in society perspective recognizes the fact that state actions are political choices, and that "[a]lthough choices are always made within constraints, they are, nevertheless choices" (Kohli and Shue,1994:302).

Governments all over the world are interested in the agricultural sector and and the case of the Ghanaian state is not different. The Ghanaian state has responded to its role in agriculture by establishing institutions, apparently to direct, participate in or influence agricultural development. While the state's eagerness to get involved in agriculture is a tacit admission of its role in setting conditions for agricultural development, the problem has been how to promote effective agricultural policies. This study has shown that the ability of the state to promote effective agricultural policies is a theoretical and empirical problem that can be analysed by "understanding both why specific development strategies or options were adopted and, more important, the consequences of the political choices for political and economic change" (Kohli and Shue,1994:302). The question of food security is one area that highlights the consequences of political choices.

Food security is the product of improvements in production, marketing and consumption. The improvements depend on the availability and organization of resources and rewards from the short to long term and the nature of state and society relations. Since it is people who make institutions and structures function, the effective interaction between the state and society requires a modicum of understanding over prevailing problems and their resolution. Indeed, the problems of Ghana's agriculture, identified and analysed in Chapters 4 to 6 show the contradictions and inconsistences in the relationship between the state and social groups, especially the farmers. The result of the problematic nature of the relations is that some sections of the farming community do not identify themselves with state policies, especially when such policies make it difficult for them to have access to productive resources or equitable rewards

The structure, nature and conception of development pursued by the colonial and postcolonial state in Ghana have placed severe restrictions on social groups in agriculture. Any measure to enhance food security would require changing the basis of state and society relations. However, change in state-society relations, to be effective, will have to take place in a medium of what Adjibolosoo (1995;1994) calls human factor development. The human factor argument focuses on the relationship between the quality and commitment of human agency and the performance of social institutions. Human factor development, therefore goes beyond the mere availability of institutions to include the

> characteristics and other dimensions of human performance that enable social, economic and political institutions to function, and remain functional, over time.... The dimensions and attributes ... involve dedication, responsibility, and accountability in implementing measures towards [agricultural] development (Adjibolosoo,1994:26).

A human factor development approach to food security will highlight the multi-dimensional nature of the relationship between socio-cultural practices and politics and give due consideration to the role of human agency.

Ghanaian farmers have demonstrated beyond any doubt that they can produce under conditions in which their welfare can be guaranteed. Farmer reactions such as the smuggling of cocoa, the movements into and out of the cocoa and food crops production will have to be understood within the wider context of the social dynamics and differential impact of agricultural policies.

If the differential impact of agricultural policies on farmers is due to the absence of effective representation by farmers in the policy-making machinery, then farmers would have to be involved in the making of agricultural policies so that they could identify with such policies and play a positive role in policy implementation. A distinction must, however, be made between setting up institutions in the name of farmers and farmers coming together to participate as effective agents to influence policy. The extent to which farmers can organize themselves, is conditioned by historical circumstances and the state's role in those circumstances.

The colonial state tolerated farmers' organizations, because to refuse would have generated numerous social and political problems which the colonial mandate could not afford. By tolerating farmers' organizations, the colonial state provided a mechanism for venting social grievances and some of the contradictions of colonial agricultural policy. The experiences of farmers' organizations during the colonial era in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and other parts in east and southern parts of Africa strengthens the argument that the historical role of the state is key in the development of autonomous farmers' organizations (Bratton and Bingen,1994). The case of Zimbabwe is particularly important.

Zimbabwe (formerly Southern Rhodesia) had British settlers, and many of them took to farming. The colonial minority government initiated policies in favour of British farmers. When Zimbabwe attained majority rule, the new national government was confronted with a well established and powerful farmers' organization, whose interests have been satisfied over the years. In order to avoid the flight of British farmers and maintain the balance of power between farmers' associations and the government, the Government of Zimbabwe aided the establishment of a nationwide farmers' organization. The farmers' organizations in Zimbabwe, based on their previous experiences are, therefore, skilled negotiators and are involved in the institutionalized process of setting prices for crops and have a direct influence in agricultural policy (Makumbe,1994; Herbst,1993b:347).

As far as the Gold Coast was concerned, there were no well entrenched British farmers. The interests of most Gold Coast farmers went beyond the agricultural sector and they realized their non-agricultural interests could be attained through participation in the political arena. Postcolonial governments in Ghana have also acknowledged the importance of the agricultural sector but thought agriculture's contribution to national development could be realized when the sector was controlled. Thus, postcolonial governments have reaped the benefits of agriculture for non-agricultural purposes by organizing the farmers.

When the state organizes farmers, the organizations are subordinated to the dictates and political manipulations from the national level. Such arrangements inevitably curtail the extent to which farmers' organizations can influence agricultural policy and address the needs of members at the grass-roots. When and if farmers' organizations organize themselves, their impact on policy will depend on how government perceives such activities. Thus, the formation and survival of farmers' organizations requires the active role of farmers themselves and the social space tolerated by the government.

A good illustration of the role of farmers' organization and government's perception was in the implementation of the structural adjustment program. The early stages of the Provisional National Defence Council's administration was characterized by the prospects of people-led initiatives. Through the language of participation, via the defence committees, the Provisional National Defence Council galvanized citizen participation in the political processes. When the government changed its populist orientation, and began to implement the structural adjustment program, it no longer found it expedient to sustain organs of mass mobilization.

However, the adjustment program also saw the participation by farmers and the strengthening of farmers's association as key to sustaining institutional capacity.

It is contradictory that a government and a program that value participation, would by the very nature of their policies pay lip-service and stifle its growth. Without any political participation by farmers, there is no "guarantee that the political terms of trade will favour farmers" (Herbst,1993b:350). The need for farmer-led political actions is obvious, even though the unfavourable political terms of trade affect not only farmers but the society at large.

Farmer-led initiatives, short of creating social and political chaos, would have to be within a system of democratic discourse. For the 37-year period (1957-1994), elected governments in Ghana ruled for barely 14 years while self-imposed military cum civilian regimes stayed in power for 21 years.[107] Governments in each case, had to and did respond to the needs of civil society. However, the state's responses were based on personalities and power considerations. A well-defined system of governance in which both the state and society possess power, and are able to exercise it, would provide a system of checks and balances. Within a system of democratic control, the ability of farmers in organizing themselves can rise to a level where grass-root farmers' organizations can blossom and eventually attain a certain degree of auto-nomy and participate in political actions.

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[107] Because of the overlap in the years in which the coup makers toppled elected governments, the total number of years for both military and civilian administrations is 35 and not 37.

In the absence of democratic forms of governance, policy-makers in Ghana would continue to emphasize the production of export crops, failing to realise the danger for the agricultural sector. As Ayittey (1992:113) argues, they fail to appreciate the fact that British colonial administrators had to import food because they were not used to African food. Once the colonial administrators consumed imported food, the Ghanaian administrators felt that they should do the same. After developing an avid preference for imported food, policy-makers are interested in export crops in order to generate revenue that would allow them to indulge in their preferences. This practice precludes any attention to local food crops. The lack of incentive for food crops production and the fact that food producers in Ghana receive the lowest income among agricultural producers, is a serious indictment of any agricultural policy which aims at improving the income of farmers as a route to food security (Boateng et al.,1990:22-23).

In the absence of effective changes in how resources are allocated, the human indignity experienced as a result of televised images of emaciated famine victims will continue to thrive on the popular notion that Ghana and indeed "Africans cannot even produce enough food to feed themselves." The already scarce foreign exchange will be spent to import food, most of which can be produced locally, while the emphasis on producing what is not eaten by the majority of people will linger on. Since it is possible to produce food for local consumption, changes are required not only in the attitudes of policy makers who feed off the wealth produced by farmers, but also in the general context of state and society relations.

With the bulk of resources allocated to export crops, particularly cocoa, changing state and society relations within the context of human factor development has several policy recommendations. First, resources, especially for the cocoa industry should be made available in a less political and more efficient manner. The instability of world market prices for cocoa should serve as a wake-up call to the political leadership in postcolonial Ghana. Instead of admonishing the citizenry to eat what is grown locally, political authorities should live by example and also eat what is grown. If politicians live up to what they expect from the ruled, not only will they have the moral authority to rule, they will also come to realize the importance of serious domestic planning.

In view of resource scarcity, Ghana and many African countries need to maximize returns on available resources and also create national priorities for the distribution of external assistance (Contant and Bottomley,1992). External sources of help cannot be substitutes for serious domestic policy planning, because external assistance promotes the interests of the donor and is influenced by politics and other mundane reasons. Such assistance is directed to areas that may not be necessarily important to national needs, as was the case in the national agricultural research system (Chapter 6).

Secondly, a framework for domestic planning must be developed to serve as a guide for external assistance. A more genuine attempt should be made in building national consensus (domestic support), especially as the case of agricultural development affects the well-being of the whole nation. Without a domestic framework, the politics of external assistance and the instability of the world market will further contribute to food insecurity. The low prices in the world commodity market and policy biases in local food production, expose Ghana and many African countries to an increased reliance on food aid and food imports. Relying on external sources for food ties a country's food security to the world food market, which is also being currently restructured. The end result of a reorganized world food market may not necessarily favour countries depending on it (Friedman,1993; McMichael,1992).

Thirdly, while it is obvious that addressing food insecurity involves complex issues, the study contends that the capacity to confront food insecurity is available. The missing elements are the appropriate policies to tailor available resources and engender accountability, dedication, commitment and integrity in the relationship between the state (policy makers) and social groups in agriculture. The policy recommendation, flowing from the theoretical assumptions of the study, is that agricultural policy must aim at closing the gap between the state and farmers, for example, through an effective two-way channel of communication. This two-way channel should begin by replacing the zeal to set-up formal institutions, with a desire to make existing ones accountable to the needs of farmers.

In agricultural research, for example, the paucity of research personnel carrying out formal training procedures should lead to an emphasis on the role of informal procedures in educating farmers (Abakah,1995). A critical aspect of the informal process is to incorporate farmers knowledge into the making of agricultural policies (Amanor,1991; Richards,1985). The critical context for the two-way channel of communication remains the system of democratic discourse.

The two-way channel of communication implies the availability and effective functioning of communicative institutions which state and farmers will use to speak to and hear from each other in the making of agricultural policy. This is yet another reason to change the nature and structure of state-society relations, in order to incorporate farmers in major decisions that affect agriculture. If properly conceived and implemented, the above recommendation will be the mechanism through which the state and farmers would initiate agricultural policies.

Finally, it is significant to bear in mind that the social and historical context of state and society relations in agricultural development revolve around conditions of access to resources and rewards. Any move to address agricultural development should pay attention to the issues of resource flows and distribution of rewards. After more than a decade of dismantling the state, the World Bank (1997b:7) is calling for measures that will "reinvigorate the state's institutional capability" and to explore the mechanisms through which the state operates. The World Bank, probably because of the relentless criticisms of its concept of the state and development, the pragmatic views of its new President, James Wolfensohn,[108] the willingness to listen and adopt a less domineering attitude seems to be offering new tools to analyse the state and the problem of development in the developing world.

While it is gratifying to note the World Bank's changing attitude, the real test of the Bank's success will be seen in two areas. The extent to which the Bank backs up its call for the reinvigoration of state institutions with the resources it withdrew from the state in the first place. Then again, the role of internal structures (for example, operating capability and personnel availability) within the context of a well defined domestic agenda in each African country, is critical to complement external resources from the World Bank.

The value of a theoretically informed analysis of the state rests on the empirical relationship between the state and society. By keeping the dynamics of state and society relations in a proper historic and dynamic context, the uncertainties and unpredictability of policy outcomes can be shown. A meaningful picture can then be drawn to show *what* needs to be done, and *how* it can be done. Herein lies the theoretical and empirical value of an analysis situated within the dynamics of state and society relations in understanding agricultural policy performance.

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[108] See for example, Wolfensohn's (1997) speech to the Board of Governors of the World Bank in Hong Kong, China.

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APPENDIXES

Appendix 1: Organizations From which Data was Collected

Formal Organizations (National)

1. Ministry of Agriculture
    - Policy Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Department (Agricultural Statistics, Credit Marketing)
    - Extension Services
    - Women in Agricultural Development

2. Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology
    - Council for Scientific and Industrial Research

3. Ministry of Education
    - University of Ghana - Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research

4. Ministry of Health
    - Nutrition Division

5. Ministry of Transport and Communications
    - Department of Feeder Roads

6. Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare
    - National Mobilization Program

7. **Formal (International)**

United Nations System
- The World Food Program
- The World Bank
- UNICEF
- Food and Agricultural Organization

8. **Non-Formal Organizations (International)**

- Sasakawa Global 2000
- Catholic Relief Services

Appendix 2: Some Issues Raised in the Unstructured Interviews

1. Academics/Researchers

a. What in your estimation are some of the key problems that face Ghana's agriculture.
b. There is the argument that small/large scale farmers cannot produce enough food to satisfy demand in the country. Is there any current research (by you or your organization) that can shed some light on this argument?
c. Researchers explain agricultural problems either in terms of policy inadequacy or social structural factors. What can you say to this practice?
d. In your estimation, what are the key factors to be taken into consideration in the initiation and implementation of agricultural policies.

2. Policy Makers

a. Could you please take me through some specific policies initiated for the agricultural sector in the last decade?
b. How would you evaluate this (I will name a policy based on the above response).
c. On the basis of hindsight, what do you think would have improved policy performance?
d. What official distinctions are made between small-scale and large-scale farmers?
e. There is the argument that small/large scale farmers cannot produce enough food to satisfy demand in the country. Is there any current research (by your organization) that can shed some light on this argument?

Appendix 3: Raw Data on Food Crops, Population Figures and Statistical Computations (1970-1994)

Year	POP('000)	Maize (1000 MT)	Sorghum (1000 MT)	Millet (1000 MT)	Rice (1000 MT)	Cassava (1000 MT)	Cocoyam (1000 MT)
1970	8.616	482	186	142	49	2388	1136
1971	8.835	465	173	130	55	2388	1136
1972	9.087	402	152	99	71	2840	945
1973	9.354	426	167	109	62	2865	1325
1974	9.608	486	177	154	73	3696	1510
1975	9.835	343	135	122	71	2398	1099
1976	10.025	286	189	144	70	1818	773
1977	10.188	312	140	133	63	2119	633
1978	10.352	296	137	121	61	2334	681
1979	10.550	309	160	148	63	2320	699
1980	10.808	354	156	136	64	2896	848
1981	11.135	334	171	131	44	2721	972
1982	11.521	264	126	120	37	1986	756
1983	11.950	141	106	114	27	1375	613
1984	12.395	574	176	139	76	4065	2835
1985	12.838	395	185	120	80	3075	900
1986	13.273	559	128	110	70	2876	1005
1987	13.706	598	206	173	81	2726	1012
1988	14.138	600	178	192	105	3300	1115
1989	14.575	715	215	180	67	3320	1200
1990	15.018	553	136	75	81	2717	815
1991	15.468	932	241	112	151	5701	1297
1992	15.923	731	159	133	132	5662	1202
1993	16.385	961	328	198	157	5973	1236
1994	16.856	940	324	168	162	6025	1148

Plantain (1000 MT)	Yam (1000 MT)	Total Prod. (cereals) (1000 MT)	Total Prod. (tubers) (1000 MT)	Per capita cereal prod. (kg)	Per capita tubers prod. (kg)	Population growth rate	Growth rate in cereal production	Growth rate in tubers production
1641	909	859	6074	99,70	704,97	0	0	0
1641	909	823	6074	93,15	687,49	2,541783	-4,19092	0
1670	679	724	6134	79,67	675,03	2,852292	-12,0292	0,987817
2071	606	764	6867	81,68	734,12	2,938263	5,524862	11,94979
2024	850	890	8080	92,63	840,97	2,715416	16,49215	17,66419
1246	709	671	5452	68,23	554,35	2,362614	-24,6067	-32,5248
1256	574	689	4421	68,73	441,00	1,931876	2,682563	-18,9105
776	497	648	4025	63,60	395,07	1,625935	-5,95065	-8,95725
902	517	615	4434	59,41	428,32	1,609737	-5,09259	10,16149
784	550	680	4353	64,45	412,61	1,912674	10,56911	-1,82679
931	525	710	5200	65,69	481,13	2,445498	4,411765	19,45785
835	463	680	4991	61,07	448,23	3,025537	-4,22535	-4,0192[illegible]
763	374	547	3879	47,48	336,69	3,466547	-19,5588	-22,2801
755	354	388	3097	32,47	259,16	3,723635	-29,0676	-20,1598
1234	725	965	8859	77,85	714,72	3,723849	148,7113	186,051
1350	560	780	5885	60,76	458,40	3,574022	-19,171	-33,5704
1088	1048	867	6017	65,32	453,33	3,388378	11,15385	2,242991
1088	1185	1058	6011	77,19	438,57	3,262262	22,02999	-0,09972
120	1200	1075	5735	76,04	405,64	3,151904	1,606805	-4,59158
1040	1200	1177	6760	80,75	463,81	3,090961	9,488372	17,87271
799	877	845	5208	56,27	346,78	3,039451	-28,2073	-22,9586
1178	2632	1436	10808	92,84	698,73	2,996404	69,94083	107,5269
1082	2331	1155	10277	72,54	645,42	2,941557	-19,5682	-4,91303
1322	2720	1644	11251	100,34	686,66	2,901463	42,33766	9,477474
1475	1700	1594	10348	94,57	613,91	2,87458	-3,04136	-8,02595
		Raw Data for Food Crops from Agric. Stats. & Census Div., PPMED, MOFA.,						
		Nov. 1993 and Dec. 1994						
		Population Data from FAO 1997 (FAOSTAT)						